Quico says: One of the little pleasures of life in revolutionary times is watching the utter discombobulation of chavista hackdom whenever Fearless Leader pulls off one of his legendary U-Turns.
Today, fate provided one of those delicious little moments, as Hugo Chávez effectively vetoed his own Intelligence Decree-Law. In one of the more bizarre moments of his decidedly dadaist presidency, the guy declared that a piece of legislation he unilaterally drafted behind closed doors, with no public discussion whatsoever, and that became law exclusively on his say so, without a parliamentary vote, invoking the special powers to legislate by decree the National Assembly had granted solely to him, was "indefensible."
Spare a thought for poor old Stephen Lendman, who'd just penned a delirious, breathless rant explaining how utterly and completely baseless all criticism of the decree-law was, and how every last bit of it was a product of an imperialist media plot to destabilize the government.
There's no fooling Lendman. He knew there was one reason and one reason only why the decree-law was being criticized:
CIA, NED, IRI, USAID and other US elements infest the country and are more active than ever. Subversion is their strategy, and it shows up everywhere.
(It's worse than you thought, Stevy-lad...looks like CIANEDIRIUSAID got to old man Chávez himself.)
The furious backsliding over at Venezuelanalysis will be marginally amusing to witness, and we can all be glad that Chávez has chosen to revise at least the most prominently insane bit of the decree: apparently even he realizes that threatening regular folks with six years in jail if they refuse to rat out their neighbors is pretty vile. (Lendman, presumably, will conclude the guy's gone soft.)
Not up for "reappraisal", however, is the article requiring "all Justice System officials" to cooperate fully in spying operations. That's closer to Chávez's understanding of "defensible", apparently.
The decree authorises police raids without warrant, the use of anonymous witnesses and secret evidence. Judges are obliged to collaborate with the intelligence services. Anyone caught investigating sensitive matters faces jail. The law contains no provision for any kind of oversight. It blurs the distinction between external threats and internal political dissent. It requires all citizens, foreigners and organisations to act in support of the intelligence system whenever required—or face jail terms of up to six years.
Now that you have a clear choice between just two candidates in November, many of you will be asking, "yeah, ok, Iraq, yaddi-yadda, health care, blah-blah, CUT TO THE CHASE! Which one is better for Venezuela?!" Right?
No?
...dang...
Silliness aside, I do realize that, come November, the politics of the Chávez era are likely to rank pretty low on your list of criteria. But people vote for all kinds of idiosyncratic reasons, and if you're reading this there's just a chance that you're among a small, hardy breed that will actually think through the elections' effects on Venezuela before you cast your ballot. If so, hear me out.
The first thing to grasp is that, no, US policy towards Venezuela is not likely to be very different no matter who wins. The strategic realities underlying the Caracas - Washington relationship's weird brand of sotto voce co-dependence transcends the politics of the moment. The US under John McCain will buy just as much Venezuelan oil as the US under Barack Obama...or under any other imaginable president. And if there's one thing we know for a fact by now is that Venezuela would continue selling oil to the US even if some half-deranged marxist strongman with a huge id and a stunted superego took control of the country.
To put it differently, the name on the White House lease really has no bearing on the eagerness of US drivers to bankroll Hugo Chávez's revolution, or on Hugo Chávez's eagerness to keep taking all y'all's money.
Nor would either of the major US candidates be more likely than the other one to launch some kind of military adventure in Venezuela. Again, the reasons are strategic rather than ideological. Trudging through a chronic recruitment crisis that has forced it to offer up to $40,000 in sign-up bonuses just to keep force levels steady, the US military is barely able to maintain the military commitments it already has.
And even if, somehow, the Pentagon could manage to recruit more soldiers, it's clear that the US has geostrategically far bigger fish to fry than Chávez, with Iran, North Korea, Syria and even a failed-state like Somalia presenting far bigger danger to US national security than Chávez even when he's off his meds.
(This, by the way, is one key reason Chávez can actually bash the US safely: even as he rails against an imminent invasion he knows full well that the US isn't really in a position to launch one.)
So the, lets say, material underpinnings of the US-Venezuela relationship just don't hinge on what happens on November 8th. Oil and invective will continue to flow north while money and opprobium continue to flow south. As far as Venezuela goes, the differences between an Obama presidency and a McCain presidency will play themselves out on a different, more symbolic level. They could, nonetheless, be profound.
Before getting into all that, though, I feel there's something we need to clear up. You've read, I'm sure, at least some newspaper reports about Hugo Chávez's heavy-duty penchant for Bush-whacking. You have, depending on your own stance, either shaken your head in disgust or felt a little thrill of approval at it. Either way, you've probably, at least implicitly, drawn the conclusion that Hugo Chávez really hates George W. Bush and, by implication, that US foreign policy is frightfully important to the fate of the Chávez regime.
On this point, the Chávez and Bush governments actually agree. In fact, whatever their ideological stance, my feeling is that most people in the US are deeply wedded to the idea that what their country does really matters to the rest of the world. For the right, that influence is a force for good in the world, while, for the left, it's often a force for evil - but everyone agrees, it's a force.
This is another aspect of the oedipal mating ritual of scorn-filled co-dependence between Washington and Caracas: Washington needs to feel influential, and with its constant stream invective, Caracas flatters it, convincing them that yes, they really are as influential as they want to believe.
So it usually comes as a surprise to people - or at least as a kind of bad-boy provocation - when I tell them that, in an oddly counterintuitive way, Chávez's anti-americanism really has nothing to do with the US, or even with George Bush. Instead - and if you really grasp this next sentence, you'll understand more about chavismo than 99.9% of your compatriots - Chávez uses anti-US rhetoric as a mechanism of social control inside Venezuela.
How does that work? Simple: whenever something - anything - goes wrong in Venezuela, Chávez blames the US. This extends from serious issues where there are legitimate questions about the extent of US involvement - like the 2002 coup attempt against him - down to matters as mundane as a bus driver's strike.
Milk is in short supply in Caracas stores? The CIA did it! Dengue fever breaks out in the South of the Country? Blame the gringos! Civil liberty groups are concerned about the latest spying legislation? The State Department put them up to it!
The US serves as a kind of all-purpose foil for Chávez, a universal receptacle for every buck that's in need of passing. But that's not all, because when everything bad that happens to you is the fault of a foreigner, then anyone who opposes you must be a traitor.
For years now Chávez has been attacking any and every sort of internal opposition in Venezuela by labeling it as part of a CIA orchestrated plot against him. This allows him to delegitimize all dissent while casting doubt on the patriotism of anyone who dares to question his judgment.
So anti-US rhetoric solves a huge variety of domestic problems for Chávez. It marginalizes dissent, it provides cover for government SNAFUs, and it helps turn "chavista" and "patriotic Venezuelan" into rough synonyms.
Now, having cleared that up, we can get back to the US election. In order to work as an instrument of internal control, anti-US rhetoric has to have a credible target inside the US. Over the last eight years, George W. Bush has been perfect for these purposes: bellicose, aloof, given to flights of neo-imperialist rhetoric and, lest we forget, willing to launch crazy military adventures against authoritarian regimes that happen to control a lot of oil. Bush made it almost too easy for Chávez.
Now, from a Venezuelan perspective, the main difference between Barack Obama and John McCain isn't what they are likely to do, but rather how they're likely to play into Chávez's strategy of internal-control-through-US-bashing. With his military background, tough-guy image, testosterone fueled rhetoric and penchant for humming tunes about bombing Iran, it's easy to see how Chávez's rhetoric could transition smoothly from Bush-whackery to McCainicide. Wouldn't miss a beat.
But what if a black guy who opposed the Iraq War from the start and pledged to talk directly to him took office? Now things get interesting. An Obama presidency stands to completely scramble Chávez's key strategy for internal control.
An Obama victory leaves Chávez with only bad options. He could try to apply the anti-Bush stencil to an Obama White House, blaming him personally everytime something goes wrong in Venezuela. But caricaturing Obama as some kind of racist/imperialist war monger in the Bush mold just wouldn't pass the snigger test, even within Chávez's tightly controlled circle of collaborators and sycophants. It's hard to demonize the guy who's gone out of his way - and paid a political price - to pledge to negotiate with you.
Alternatively, he could tone down the rhetoric and abandon the demonize-Washington strategy, but then all of his government's internal failures would be laid bare for all to see and all of his internal opponents would suddenly become legitimate adversaries rather than traitors.
To my mind, there's no doubt that Chávez would prefer a McCain victory. Only a McCain victory would keep him within his US-bashing comfort zone. Only with McCain in the White House could he continue the strategy of domestic control that has paid off so handsomely for him in the past.
Lets be clear: Venezuelan democracy in 2008 is far, far up a creek without a paddle in sight. An Obama victory would not suddenly revive it. But it would give Venezuelan democrats some very welcome breathing space, the chance to come out from under the veil of suspicion that association with George W. Bush has put us under.
And that, I think, is worth something.
Note: I actually wrote this as a script for LinkTV's"Dear American Voter" project. I'm better at writing than at talking into a camera, but for what it's worth, here's the Vid:
One part of the law, which explicitly requires judges and prosecutors to cooperate with the intelligence services, has generated substantial concern among legal experts and rights groups, which were already alarmed by the deterioration of judicial independence under Mr. Chávez.
While the language of this passage of the law, and several others, is vague, legal experts say the idea is clear: justice officials, including judges, are required to actively collaborate with the intelligence services rather than serve as a check on them.
“This is a government that simply doesn’t believe in the separation of powers,” said José Miguel Vivanco, Americas director for Human Rights Watch, the New York-based rights organization. “Here you have the president legislating by decree that the country’s judges must serve as spies for the government.”
So when various do-gooding NGOs challenge the new decree-law in the courts, they'll be putting their arguments to judges required by law to spy for the defendant.
Quico says: I thought I should weigh in on the developing net-spat over opposition party bashing. It's a sin I've been guilty of too often in the past, but one I find increasingly difficult to defend.
The first point I think we need to grasp squarely is our own complete powerlessness.
That, in itself, is an anomaly: in normal democracies minorities retain a measure of political power. Normally, minority parties can block or slow legislation through parliamentary tactics. They can use their access to the press to shame governments into changing their positions. They can appeal to the courts to demand redress when they feel government actions violate the law.
In other words, they have options: things they can do to force the government to act differently than it would prefer to.
One important way in which chavismo is undemocratic is in denying the opposition any of those channels. Even before the (disastrous) 2005 oppo parliamentary election boycott, no less than seven reforms to the National Assembly's internal rules had shorn the parliamentary minority of any power to affect legislative outcomes. The government's pack-and-politicize judicial strategy has been extensively documented. And its obdurate, systematic refusal to change its behavior in any way in response to anything the opposition press publishes is now a central part of its self-image.
I think we need to look at our propensity to fly off the handle at the oppo parties within the context of their complete powerlessness. Take, for instance, this business about protesting the Enabling Law (which allows Chávez to legislate by decree on almost everything.) People are incandescently angry that the opposition hasn't, well, opposed the enabling law more actively. But in the context of its complete lack of power, what would that entail, exactly?
Sure, the opposition parties could call for street protests against the enabling law. We would all go out in the streets. March. Chant. Show off our wit with guffaw-inducing placards. Then a spot of bailoterapia and take the metro back home. (We know the drill by now.)
Would that change anything? Of course not! The government is determined to rub our noses in our own powerlessness: any demonstration of public opposition is merely a cue for chavismo to harden its stance. After all the street antics are finished, Chávez would enact his Enabling Law decrees just as though none of it had happened.
You know that. I know that. The oppo party leaders know that. And it makes us angry.
Of course it makes us angry, that feeling of utter impotence as we face the unchecked power of a lunatic.
And how do we channel that anger? What do we do with it? Where do we direct it? Towards the opposition parties, for failing to do something they manifestly don't have the power to do!
It's a childish, self-defeating attitude. And it repeats itself again and again over a whole range of issues.
Again, I've been just as guilty of this as the next guy. When CNE refused to give out complete results for the Dec. 2nd Referendum, I railed mightily against the oppo parties' silence over the issue. It still, deep down, makes me mad.
But when I think through what would almost certainly have happened if they had chosen to make the Dec. 2nd results issue a Cause Celèbre (CNE ignores them, full results are never announced anyway and they destroy their access to CNE while putting the extent of their powerlessness on full display once again,) I'm forced to concede that anger does not a political strategy make. (That, if nothing else, we should've learned by now.)
And, if I'm honest with myself, I have to acknowledge that my anger at the oppo parties boils down to my rage that there is literally nothing anybody can do to change a deeply abhorrent, entirely indefensible position.
None of this, of course, implies that oppo party leaders aren't often short-sighted, thick, venal, ridiculous, callous and stupid. Many of them - not all - clearly are. But I don't think that's the real reason they get bashed so much. Cuz, lets face it: if they won a tactical skirmish now and again we wouldn't be nearly so bothered by their general unsavoriness.
No, the real reason they get bashed is that we systematically take our anger at our own powerlessness out on them. We've turned them into punching bags in some bizarre internal psychodrama - pagapeos in a fight we're really having with ourselves.
De pana que no la tienen fácil los partidos de oposición.
Katy says: - Father Luis Ugalde, SJ, president of my alma mater, is a towering figure in Venezuelan academia. His life experience working with the poor, his willingness to swim against the current and his unique observations on our country set him apart from those who typically talk about Venezuela, including Quico and myself. It's been a privilege of mine to learn from him in class, work with him in the UCAB's Board of Regents and get to know him as a friend.
Which is why it pains me that his latest article is such a disappointment. (Daniel's translation is here)
First, let's deal with the legal issue regarding the people being disqualified from running.
Article 39 of the Constitution reads: "Venezuelans who are not subjected to political disqualification ... exercise their citizenship and therefore have political rights and obligations..." (emphasis is mine)
Right off the bat, the Constitution is saying that political rights and obligations are inherent to all citizens that have not been disqualified for some reason.
Article 42 of the Constitution, the one Ugalde quotes, goes on to say: "The exercise of citizenship or any of the political rights can only be suspended by firm judicial sentence in the cases that the law determines."
What does "the law determine"? One of these is the Organic Law of the Comptroller's Office. It clearly says, in articles 103-108, that the Comptroller can disqualify someone from running for office, and spells out the appeals process to get that overturned.
What do I make of this? That the legal case is not as clear cut as Ugalde would like to think.
Yes, it is unfair, and yes, the law as it is written clashes in some way or another with the Constitution. But it is not clear that the Comptroller is violating the Constitution, as Ugalde is saying. Attempts to make it sound as such are disingenious and, in a way, insulting to the reader.
Which brings me to my other point. In the second half of his article, Ugalde proceeds to blast "the opposition" for not standing up more firmly against this ruling.
Ugalde forgets that the opposition is the main victim of this injustice. Every political party has seen some of its best people disqualified. Ugalde calls them on apparently not fighting hard enough, saying it's partly their fault because they don't have the guts to stand up and fight. This strikes me as inaccurate and grossly unfair.
An indignant Ugalde claims that "some people" in the opposition are making "calculations." Blanket statements like that taint the opposition as a whole and do us all a disservice. If he thinks "some people" aren't fighing hard enough, he should name them.
Furthermore, he simply does not consider the possibility that the opposition will step up the fight once nominations have been settle. Fighting for the rights of the opposition's single candidate in, say, Caracas, carries more weight than fighting for the rights of one of the many pre-candidates. Once everyone agrees that Leopoldo is the man, they will rally behind him and it will make it much more politically expensive for the Comptroller to maintain his stance.
Ugalde continues to blast opposition parties and leaders, saying they don't fight for the Constitution and for democracy - never mind that I have yet to hear the students, the real leaders of the opposition according to him, discuss the issue. He claims, with no basis, that last September "most" political parties had given up the fight against the Constitution, and it was only the students who decided this was a fight worth fighting for. Only then did the parties tag along.
Ugalde knows this is not true. He knows that some political parties in the opposition had to fight tooth and nail, against the current of public opinion, for participating in December's referendum and against abstention. And while it is true that the student movement played an important part in firing people up, his political insight is far too polished to really believe the predominant line that "it was the students who decided to wage the battle and that everyone else followed suit."
Ugalde's article is part of the conventional wisdom in Venezuela that sees everything bad that happens, every disappointment, every false step the opposition makes, as the fault of opposition political parties. I expect that kind of reasoning from Marta Colomina, not from Luis Ugalde.
Venezuelans have a saying, "the just pay for the sins of the sinners." It's a strange kind of justice for a priest to be handing out.
Quico says: Considering my Ph.D. work has nothing at all to do with Venezuela, it's slightly disconcerting that my first academic publication does: this week, my standard rant about the emptiness of Venezuela's debate about Freedom of Expression and the bankruptcy of chavismo's claim to represent a clean break with the past somehow made it past peer review! Co-written with my friend Sacha Feinman, you can pick it up all decked out in Academic garb in the latest issue of Lateinamerika Analysen, a journal published by Hamburg University's German Institute for Global Area Studies.
Unfortunately, these guys don't put full texts online, so you'll have to dig up an actual copy of the journal to read it. You shouldn't have any trouble locating our piece, though: it's the one right before Allan Brewer-Carías densely argued legal tract explaining why the 1999 Constituent Assembly was a protracted coup d'état.
Katy says: - I've avoided posting about the opposition lately. We are approaching the moment when we will see if the bone of grand statements about unity will have some meat to it. The process is bound to get uglier as the date nears. My first inclination is to wait until all this has been sorted out, but several readers have asked me to address the issue, so here goes.
Right now, what's happening in the opposition is like a weird, dysfunctional mating dance. Positions are staked out, things are said, principles are laid out, threats of consequences are carelessly uttered.
It's tempting to see Leopoldo's latest fights with Liliana, or Manuel's feud with Julio, and give up hope on the opposition. I think that's a mistake, at least at this juncture.
Forming a coalition can be messy. It involves negotiating with people who do not have your best interests in their mind and, sometimes, the country's best interests don't even figure. What is said today is ignored tomorrow, and today's enemy will be my top supporter tomorrow.
Venezuela's opposition coalition has particular problems. Not only are voters demanding unity, they are demanding it from folks who disagree on crucial issues: the merits of the IVth Republic, the electoral conditions, the recall Referendum, political ideology. The fact that they are even on speaking terms with one another is cause enough to see the glass half full.
Messy is how politics are when there you don't have a single person leading and deciding what to do. All succesful, diverse coalitions go through these same things, whether it's political coalitions like Chile's Concertación or even coalitions of countries such as the European Union. At the end of the day, I think that unity positions will be agreed upon in most of the places where it matters.
We tend to make a lot of noise about how in Chacao there are more candidates than voters, or how there is no clear strategy about what to do with the people whose political rights were taken away from them unfairly. Ultimately, I still see the parties committed to unity and few people questioning the agreed-upon method of consulting opinion polls to decide who to run where.
So, in the meantime, let's not make too much of the day-to-day bashing or the threats of disunity. From what I have seen, there are no serious threats to opposition unity in the horizon, and opposition politicians, despite what you may think, are clear about the real stakes in this election. I would suggest sitting back and waiting for them to meet in smoke-filled rooms and sort all this out.
Sausages are delicious, but you don't want to know much about how they are made. Right now, we're in the process of making sausages. It ain't pretty, but let's hope it's effective in the end.
We will fully support Colombia's fight against the FARC. We'll work with the government to end the reign of terror from right-wing paramilitaries. We will support Colombia's right to strike terrorists who seek safe haven across its borders. And we will shine a light on any support for the FARC that comes from neighboring governments. This behavior must be exposed to international condemnation, regional isolation, and if need be strong sanctions. It must not stand and it will not when I am president of the United States of America.
Katy says: - My new favorite website. Sorry to those who don't speak Spanish - its content is both hilarious and untranslateable. Thanks to Daniel for the tip.
Katy says: - I have the utmost respect for physical therapists. They are hard-working professionals who deserve to be compensated for their work just as much as the next person.
But do we really need a Physical Therapy Act in Venezuela?
According to our useless National Assembly, we do!
See, this is a Revolution. Every profession needs a law, and our "wise" lawmakers are there to grant professionals the right to "freely exercise their profession." Free, that is, except that the government sets wages, imports Cuban physios who unfairly compete with you and harrasses private health-care providers.
The Law conveniently says that Physical Therapists have to meet professional standards and guidelines set by academic institutions and competent administrative authorities. I wonder if they also included that, if they work for a government hospital, they have to don a red shirt and march whenever the fat man in the palace feels like it.
In a country with rampant inflation and corruption that knows no bound, where thousands of people die each year at the hands of crime - this is what our National Assembly chooses to discuss and (unanimously!) pass.
Next up on the Legislative agenda: a National Hairdressers and Manicurists Law. I've seen some awful haircuts on some of these lawmakers, and if there is a sector begging for regulation, that one's it.
Quico says: A few days ago, Katy posted a link to this Rory Carroll piece in The Guardian, to mixed reactions. Personally, I thought it was a pretty good, up-to-date primer. But the bit that really caught my eye was this paragraph on Land Reform:
Nobody had a clue how much this was costing. Government agencies hum with young helpful staff in red T-shirts who consult maps of farmland with swooping arrows showing the next phase of "recovery". But queries about budgets are met with blank looks. In Barinas I visited the auditing agency Superintendencia Nacional de Cooperativas (Sunacoop), the National Land Institute, the credit agency Fondafa and the agriculture ministry. Not one could say how much money was being ploughed into the land. Was it $5m, $50m, $500m, $1bn? Shrugs. The lack of accountability is astonishing. Even petro-boom Venezuela has finite resources.
This kind of thing always baffles and fascinates me. There's a limitless pathos to this little anecdote: the inviability of the revolution condenced into a single paragraph.
It seems to me that behind all the anti-capitalist rhetoric, what lurks is a knee-jerk aversion to accounting. The revolution thinks it below its dignity to work through such grubby concerns as, y'know, whether its economic initiatives cost more than their product is worth.
"Capitalist values!" they'll scream. "The bourgeois fixation with profit!"
These people are revolted by the very thought that a cost and benefit calculus can ever be a basis for action. But, when you think about it, what is profit if not an accounting expression of what happens when the things you produce are worth more than the things you use to produce them with?
What can you expect from people who lionize the principle of indifference to profits other than unchecked waste?
I guess what I mean is that it's anything but a surprise that the revolution consistently uses up Bs.5 worth of lemons to make Bs.3 worth of lemonade. Just the opposite: that's more or less the cornerstone of its economic vision.
Katy says: - Talk about old news: turns out the recent hubbub over Chávez's support of FARC was a given for Chavistas in-the-know even eight years ago. Hell, one-time KGB-junketeer Richard Gott even put it in print!
Well-known in PSF circles for his many laudatory books and articles on Hugo Chávez, Gott ("affectionately" known as Pol Gott for his longstanding support of loony left causes) published his first Chágiography all the way back in 2000. As he researched it, Gott had tremendous access to the President and his leading ideologues as early as 1999.
The book is called In the Shadow of the Liberator, but one has to wonder what the Liberator would think of Gott's startling admissions regarding Chávez and the FARC and his apparently dishonest backtracking.
On page 201 of the 2000 edition of his book, Gott writes:
"More significantly, the new emerging forces in Colombia, associated with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the Farc) and the National Liberation Army (the ELN) express similar Bolivarian views to those of Hugo Chavez. There is today an identity of attitude between the Venezuelan government and the 'Farc government' that controls perhaps a third of Colombia. Officially, this interest is disguised behind Venezuela's public desire, expressed to the 'official' government of President Andres Pastrana in Bogota, to assist in peace negotiations between the warring factions in Colombia. In reality, Hugo Chavez and his government are on the side of the Farc.
Chavez wants the Farc to win, or at any rate to be so successful in the peace negotiations that its incorporation into the government will entirely change the political complexion of Colombia. Were that to happen, Chavez's dream of recreating Gran Colombia - the old nineteenth-century alliance of Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador, devised by Bolivar - would come true. The Bolivarian project that lies at the heart of his hopes for the continent would be well on its way."
(the emphasis is mine)
So here we have a guy with unparalleled access to Chávez writing back at a time when even Alfredo Peña was a chavista and finding it clear that Chávez was on FARC's side. The episode fits the classic definition of a gaffe: the accidental uttering of an unacceptable truth.
Sources tell me that, during 2000-2001, people close to Chávez's inner circle expressed concern with the above passage, and spoke to Gott about it. The paragraph was modified, apparently to appease those who thought the previous admission was, how to put it, politically incorrect. The fact that the Venezuelan government directly financed publication of the Spanish edition may have had something to do with Miraflores - ahem - editorial leverage here.
So in the 2005 edition of the same book, now called Hugo Chávez: The Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela (obviously Gott didn't deem Chávez worthy of anyone's shadow at this point), the corresponding bit, on pages 192-93, reads:
"More significant, the new emerging forces in Colombia, associated with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the FARC) and the National Liberation Army (the ELN), express similar Bolivarian views to those of Hugo Chavez. Venezuela's public desire is to assist in peace negotiations between the warring factions. In private, Chavez leans towards the FARC. Chavez hopes that it will be so successful in the peace negotiations that its incorporation into the government will entirely change the political complexion of Colombia. Were that to happen, Chavez's dream of reuniting Gran Colombia - the old nineteenth-century alliance of Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador, devised by Bolivar - would come true. The Bolivarian project that lies at the heart of his hopes for the continent would be well on its way."
See, before Chávez wanted the FARC to win, but now, oh no, he's simply leaning toward the FARC.
Perhaps Gott simply had a mistaken impression in the first version regarding Chávez wanting the FARC to win. Perhaps he then chose to correct himself in the second edition.
But it's unlikely, for two reasons. First, the paragraphs were cut instead of expanded - not the usual thing to do when you want to clarify a point or make it more nuanced. And second, Gott clearly admits that Chávez himself provided some of the opinions in his book when he writes in the acknowledgements to the first version:
"President Chavez took considerable interest in this book, and I was privileged to have a long interview with him in Caracas, as well as the opportunity to travel in his company into the Venezuelan countryside."
Seems to me Mr. Gott owes his readers an explanation.
Katy says: - Lots is going on that we should probably touch upon. Some of it is happening over the radar - literally, as in the case of the US plane - but other issues are slipping by, and merit a closer look.
Perhaps the US government was looking for more pictures of Hugo Chávez, Jr. and his friends livin' la vida güisky in La Orchila, courtesy of Venezuelan taxpayers. To paraphrase Daddy, if being rich is bad, then Hugo Jr. is baaaaaaad.
2. No spam zone. Prestigious Colombian weekly Semana had a summary of some of the emails contained in the Raúl Reyes laptop. Some of the highlights include a secret meeting between FARC bigwig Iván Márquez, Piedad Córdoba and Chávez. They discuss Márquez's testimony saying that Chávez wanted to set up mobile hospitals in the border to tend to the FARC's wounded. They also openly discuss Chávez's support for Piedad Córdoba's presidential run in 2010.
3. Sé cómo duele ... ser guerrillera. The Colombian government landed one of its biggest fish since the death of Iván Ríos earlier this year. Comandante Karina, the legendary head of the FARC's 47th front, who for years had kidnapped and harassed the entire western portion of Colombia, turned herself in. In dramatic testimony, Karina confessed that the FARC's western front was on its last leg. Apparently, she was almost starving and was simply exhausted from life in the jungle.
4. Blackmail? Moi? The Ecuadorean government said that the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Colombia will depend on the Colombian government's willingness to stop disseminating false information about Ecuador. In other words, file the laptop and nothing has happened.
Funny how Ecuador has been saying that laptop was all lies and that the Colombian government had zero credibility, and now it is desperately trying to make it go away.
5. Guisocaribe. The Economist reports a scandal brewing in Belize. President Hugo Chávez sent former Belizean Prime Minister Said Musa $10 million as part of the Petrocaribe scheme where Venezuela exchanges millions of dollars for political support. The money apparently ended up in the Belize Bank, to whom Musa owed a significant amount of cash.
One of the ironies is that the chairman of Belize Bank is also the deputy chairman of Britain's Conservative Party.
6. That's quite a shopping list. The Associated Press reported recently on Chávez's current planned purchases of weapons. To estimate the cost to Venezuelan taxpayers, come up with an estimate of the value of this stuff and multiply by 2, to include the necessary commisions, fees and bribes.
Katy says: - I’m in Maracaibo, walking up 72nd street. Everything is flooded.
I'm with my aunt Isabel, only she's twenty years younger and considerably taller than me, odd 'cause she's five-foot-three. The sky is the color of plums. We're walking from one friend’s house to the next when we fall into a puddle, only it's not a puddle, it's an enormous pool of mud.
There is mud everywhere but my aunt Isabel is smiling and telling a charming story that I can't quite make out. I try and warn her that we're sinking, but she seems oblivious to the goo that surrounds us. All of the sudden, I grab her arm …
Beep-beep ... Beep-beep ...
I open my eyes and my cell phone light illuminates the corner of my bedroom with an artificial shade of blue. I slowly wake up. Beep-beep... Beep-beep... Is it time to get up? So soon? But no, it’s not my phone’s alarm.
Someone is texting me. Someone is texting me? What time is it?
I look at my phone and I can’t understand the number. I look at the clock and it’s 4:00. Yes, as in AM – I’ve gotten used to that obnoxious habit in this country where 4 PM is 16:00. My clock says 4:00, so it’s AM for sure.
I press the green button and read: “I’m stuck at Inti and I’ve been here since noon.”
My dream made more sense than this. I go back to sleep.
....
The following morning, I text the number back. “Who is this?” I write as soon as I wake up, not sure if the message had been part of my dream or not. I face the morning traffic, drive the girls to school, and as I plunk down on my computer, I see I have an email message from my friend Roger. It says "I just spent 16 hours at INTI, call me in the afternoon and I’ll tell you about it. I’m off to sleep now." It was sent at 4:45 in the morning.
Roger's wife is the daughter of a Puerto La Cruz restaurant owner. Fifty years ago, he bought 100 hectares between Puerto La Cruz and Cumaná. The land is made of cliffs and beaches and the sole reason for buying it was to, someday, take advantage of the area's unique natural beauty and open it up for tourism.
Forty-five years ago, the adecos fostered the invasion of the land. A group of thirty families settled in a small area of his property, and the town of Ocoa was born. Most of Ocoa's new residents lived off of subsistence agriculture and handouts from the government, since there were no other sources of income.
Luckily, Ocoa was not founded on the beach but rather on a steep valley about 3 kilometers away from the shore. This meant that most of the shoreline on the property was untouched by squatters and the ubiquitous piles of garbage that mysteriously appear any time our landscape and our citizens collide.
Thirty-five years ago, the government created Mochima National Park. When they created the park, the government did not compensate the owners of the land, nor did they establish clear property rights. Part of Roger's property fell within the boundaries of the park, but a large chunk of it (including Ocoa) did not. Ocoa’s population grew to 150 families and they cleared away even more of Roger's land for cattle grazing.
Five years ago, Roger’s father-in-law had a crazy idea: to take a piece of his seaside property and construct a group of cabins, a posada where tourists could come, relax, feel welcomed and enjoy the breathtaking scenery. He decided he would only employ Ocoans, something they welcomed with open arms since, after all these years, they still had no jobs. The posada began doing brisk business, and the townspeople were mostly grateful and excited to be part of a nascent project in their hometown.
One day Roger’s father-in-law walks in and asks Roger to help him: he wants to give the people of Ocoa the titles to their land. So off they go and set up a foundation that would receive the titles to the land, only to distribute them among the townspeople, according to the informal property rights that currently exist.
Townspeople were thrilled. 124 of the 150 families signed up, and attendance to town meetings generally exceeded 75%. Only one group wasn’t happy: communal councils.
Roger's father-in-law began to receive strange visits. One day, the Environment Ministry came and shut them down because they had no working sewer system, only a septic tank. The next week, construction of the pool was stopped per order of the state government. Finally, the maitre’d of the restaurant confided that communal councils were pissed because "his Foundation is spreading capitalist values on the population."
The day after this conversation, Roger’s father-in-law got a visit from INTI, Venezuela’s state regulator of land ownership. He was told he was being investigated for hoarding land, and that he had to prove ownership of the land going all the way back to the war of Independence if he had any chance of keeping it.
Luckily, the records were intact. With a bit of hard work and a side-order of bribes for local officials, Roger was able to prove ownership of the land going all the way back to 1796, a remarkable feat. He called INTI and set up an appointment in Caracas last Wednesday, at 12 noon.
Roger and his father-in-law met downtown and went together. They arrived at 12 sharp. They were told to wait. The hours went by. They did not move, for fear that a trip to go grab a bite would mean losing their hearing. Finally, at 3:30 in the morning, they were invited in.
The official, the same one who had visited him a few weeks earlier, looked remarkably alert given the time. "INTI is run by a shift of vampires during the evening hours," he told me, "in charge of harassing honest landowners and sucking them dry of their rights and their dreams."
The vampire asked to see the papers. Proudly, trying to contain his urge to smack him over the head with the folders, he handed them over. The vampire looked at them, and brushed them aside.
"Tenemos un problema."
OK, here it comes. As it turns out, the vampire told them that during Venezuela’s Second Republic, the government issued land decrees that certified that land ownership acknowledged by the colonial authorities was going to be respected by the newly independent nation. Apparently, Roger and his father-in-law did not have this certificate.
Roger informed him that, yes, he had heard of that, but that was only in the case when land was transferred or sold during that period. Since the land had been in the same hands until its first sale in 1872, he was OK, right?
No. He had to come up with the certificate from the Second Republic, or else he runs the risk of losing his land on account that it is idle agricultural land. Never mind that it’s a nature preserve, 80% of which is cliffs and shoreline not apt for agriculture.
Roger’s father-in-law offered to grant the government part of the land in exchange for them leaving him the piece where the posada is. The vampire said they would consider that option, but that it was likely that if they could not find the paper from the Second Republic, they would lose it all. The piece of land Roger’s father-in-law offered the government is the part that lies within the National Park – the part that the government took forty years ago without compensation.
In the meantime, the posada continues to do well. The people of Ocoa are in legal limbo, and the Communal Council continues to pressure the government to take it all away.
....
I suddenly remember my aunt Isabel and my dream. If only someone had told Roger’s father-in-law not to invest. If only someone had shook his arm and warned him of the dangers of investing in Venezuela. Now, he’s sinking, and he still harbors hope that things will work themselves out. If only ...
(Note: the above is based on a true story. Names and places have been changed for obvious reasons)
Katy says: - A day after the Interpol report on Raul Reyes' laptops and President Chávez's predictably Orwellian reaction, it's worth analyzing the possible implications from this scandal. So put down your dulces de lechoza, get comfortable, and let's start speculating.
It's worth pointing out that much of the fallout will depend on the type of information the Colombian government chooses to make public. This is not to say that what we already know isn't serious. Don't get me wrong, what we know so far is cause enough for impeaching the President. But in a country with no institutions, that will not happen (por ahora) and the scandal, if left as is, may very well go away.
The Colombian government is likely to play this one by ear. It has already showed a willingness to practice real-politik with the laptop, as leverage to try to keep Chávez at bay. Its ability to do so will depend on the credibility of the evidence in the eyes of foreigners (we have already seen the EU's Javier Solana back the report's findings).
However, Colombia will not want to play this hand too heavily, for fear of incurring commercial sanctions on the part of Venezuela. The Colombian economy is significantly dependent on exports to Venezuela, paritcularly labor-intensive commodities such as food and textiles. And while the risk of losing the Venezuelan market is small (Chávez needs Colombian food staples to keep inflation and scarcity somewhat under control), Chávez hinted yesterday that commercial relations will suffer, and this should cause some concern in Bogotá.
With the Interpol report, Colombia gained credibility in a court of law. Bogotá daily El Tiempo reports that the head of Interpol confirmed that the material given back to Colombia includes sealed copies of the files. If Colombia were to find more incriminating evidence in the laptops, it could hand them over to a domestic or foreign court of law with Interpol's seal of approval. All you would need to verify is that the same file is contained in Interpol's sealed copy and the evidence would most likely be accepted.
Needless to say, Colombia's threats to haul Chávez to the International Court of Law, as amusing as that would be, are not really credible. In order for that to be viable, two things would need to happen: the price of oil would have to fall, and more incriminating evidence would need to surface. I'm not sure the evidence we have seen so far is enough to convict Chávez in a court of law (although, as a reader told me yesterday, the fact that chavismo is claiming the laptop's contents fall short of incriminating Chávez reinforces the files' accuracy - after all, if Colombia is making stuff up and putting it on the computer, why wouldn't they make the evidence even more incriminating?).
Furthermore, Venezuela has not yet reached a point where people would stand by while Chávez is dragged to The Hague. If we recall the instances when Presidents have either been impeached or completely lost their legitimacy, we can recognize periods when society as a whole reached a consensus regarding the person being questioned. In 1993, pretty much everyone in Venezuela accepted that Carlos Andrés Pérez was a crook. In 1998, everyone accepted that Caldera had been an awful President. We haven't reached that point yet.
The government's tenacious questioning of the authenticity of the documents stemming from Reyes' computer is sure to convince its most ardent followers just like the revelations so far have convinced moderate and strident opponents of the President. But unless new evidence surfaces, we will not reach a consensus in Venezuela as to Chavez's links to the FARC, with each side arguing their point to the death. It will all boil down to those in the middle (more on that later).
Colombia's real leverage comes, I think, from the evidence linking the FARC to some of the people in Chavez's government. The files point to deep financial, logistical, political and military links between the FARC and chavista apparatchiks, so Colombia may very well press on the issue of Chávez's subordinates even further without pressing on Chávez's direct role. The case of Lybia and its protection of the Lockerbie bombers comes to mind.
Under this scenario, the Chávez government would come under intense pressure to hand over some of its collaborators. This could prompt increased rivalries within chavismo itself, including the Armed Forces.
The political fallout, on the other hand, is likely to be small for now. Unfortunately, I have yet to see evidence that this scandal is hurting the government. Links to the FARC are an issue for people already in the opposition and for people living along the border, but the fabled Ni-ni voters are more worried about inflation, crime and scarcity.
Unfortunately, it doesn't seem like swing voters either care nor understand the implications. This is not to say that they couldn't be convinced to care. After all, a cover-up of the massacre of Venezuelans is something that anyone can understand and be apalled by. Continued scarcity due to Chávez's fights with Colombia will continue eroding the President's popular support. But it's going to take a lot of work, and the political benefit for the opposition from pressing the case is not evident.
The only immediate internal effect I see is an indirect one. Colombia's continued highlighting of this case will force Chávez to focus on defending himself to save face with international public opinion, something our resident megalomaniac deeply cares about. This will draw his attention to external affairs, which will mean taking his eye off the Regional Elections. As we saw in the second part of last year, the President finds it hard to walk and chew gum at the same time, so this could pave the way for big opposition gains in November.
Nine years of chavismo has left Venezuelan society somewhat immune to scandals. We saw it with Maleta-gate, and we will probably see it with laptop-gate. It's a real disgrace, and I hope I'm wrong, but the short-term fallout from all this is likely to be small.
Katy says: - Well, Interpol confirmed what everyone already knew: that the three laptops, three USB drives and two portable hard drives the Colombian government claims belonged to the late Raúl Reyes are in fact his, and the files they contain have not been tampered with.
Interpol, a respected, impartial institution, is basically putting its reputation on the line. It said the Colombian government had not altered the information, and that the files they have already made public do indeed come from Reyes' computers. They have expressed a desire to talk to the Venezuelan and Ecuadorean governments and explain the technical work they did, but so far they have not been invited. You can access their report here.
The sheer size of the evidence is staggering: 37,872 text documents, 452 spreadsheets, 210,888 images, 10,537 multimedia files, 7,989 e-mail addresses and 22,481 webpages. All in all, a whopping 610 gigabytes of information.
Kind of makes you wish the Colombian government put all this stuff online. Could you imagine? Accessing Reyes' world-famous ajiaco recipe, or verifying whether Reyes ever read Caracas Chronicles? The possibilities are endless.
Katy says: - The US, the Constitutional Reform, the FARC, Fidel - these are some of Chávez's well-known obsessions. His latest one is November's Regional Elections. Lately, not a day goes by without someone from the government reminding voters of the importance of the coming vote. But why? What is it about November that is so important to Chávez?
Chavistas talk non-stop about what they think is at stake in November. They say this election is crucial for the Revolution and they outlandishly suggest that an opposition win would risk breaking up the country and plunging us into a civil war.
Yet Chavez's infatuation with the Regional Elections is curiously overblown. It's as if nobody has bothered telling him to relax, because the reality is that a good outcome is much more important for the opposition than for the government.
The previous regional elections, held in 2004 on the heels of a Recall Referendum, left the opposition completely bewildered. Predictably, Chávez ran the table, winning 20 of the 22 state governorships up for grabs and all but a handful of the mayor's offices.
So in spite of record-high oil prices, there is little Chávez can do to prevent the opposition from doing better. Bouyed by last December's victory, and in spite of continuing internal struggles to define unity candidates, the opposition seems well-positioned to do much better than the last time. Their challenge is not to improve but to hold on to a key fact they established in the last Referendum: that the government is no longer backed by the majority.
The effect of likely opposition gains on chavismo is minimal. Chavista governors and mayors are serial underperformers, notoriously inefficient public servants that are more concerned with busing people to rallies in Caracas and driving around in expensive Hummers than delivering for their constituents. This is something Chávez himself has recognized on the numerous ocassions he has scolded mayors and governors on live TV. It's only natural that voters want to dish out a little dose of whoop-ass on their very red local leaders.
And if they do, so what? Most of the power of state and local governments is being diluted anyway, thanks to the government's unorthodox budgetary practices.
It works this way: the capacity of Venezuelan states and municipalities to raise their own taxes is extremely limited, if not inexistent. What little power they have to raise their own income is shrinking, as witnessed by the central government's recent moves to eliminate tolls from interstate highways and take away the administration of ports and airports from state governments.
State and local governments rely on a budget allocation called "Situado Constitucional." The law governing the Situado requires that a certain percentage of each year's budget go straight to the coffers of state and local governments, allocated according to their population.
The problem for the states is that the budget is based on unrealistic assumptions. Each year, the budget assumes an average price of oil that is much lower than the market price, thereby underestimating the level of income that has to be shared with state and local governments.
Furthermore, the central government is increasingly relying on extraordinary income that is not part of the budget such as excess oil royalties, and less on traditional (or "ordinary") sources of income like the VAT tax. All this extra money goes to a parallel budget institution called Fonden, directly managed by the President and generally not available to state and local governments. Revenues distributed to state and local governments are much lower than they should be - independent estimates I have seen reckon they are receiving 30% less than what they should be getting.
Chávez has never been a fan of decentralization. Ever since reaching office he has been promoting parallel forms of community organizations - from "Bolivarian Circles" to "Communal Councils" to "Socialist Cities" - which share one thing in common: they are all heavily dependent on Miraflores. This makes his obsession with state and local governments, institutions he has never cared for and he has actively undermined, dumbfounding to say the least.
His attitude seems to be the response of a wounded narcissist, someone who woke up one December morning and found to his dismay that the majority of the country doesn't approve of him. His posturing is to prove to himself, his followers and the world that his is not a movement in decline.
Due to his extremely competitive nature, he needs a victory. He is a soldier, and for the military it's all about winning battles. It's been a year and a half since he's had a victory at the ballot box, and few egos the size of Chavez's can withstand that.
Quico says: What would it take to get Mark Weisbrot, Larry Birns & co. genuinely cheesed off at the Venezuelan government? Would documentary evidence that Chávez had actively conspired with foreign gunmen to cover up the killing of Venezuelan soldiers do the trick? We'll find out soon...
Lets connect some dots. In their recent communiqué questioning Colombia's interpretation of the Reyes laptops, Birns, Weisbrot and their motley crew of groovy ñángara academics credit Adam Isacson of the Center for International Policy with conducting "the most extensive evaluation of the available documents."
There is little doubt that the documents are real and untampered with. Interpol is very likely to conclude that, and it stands to reason - it would be hugely embarrassing for Colombia to be discovered to have been tampering with the computer files. We have to proceed on the assumption that these guerrilla communications are real. Venezuela’s denials of their authenticity constitute a weak defense.
Nonetheless, Isacson concludes that the material on the laptops, while troubling, is probably not enough on its own for the US to label Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism. Fair enough: if your main concern is the US policy implications of the Reyes files, that's sound advice. Given the massive economic and geostrategic consequences of such a move, erring on the side of caution seems like the only sane course for a US policy maker.
But notice what's happened here: in the context of a debate about US policy, Larry Birns and Mark Weisbrot have basically told us that their go-to-guy on the Reyes Files thinks the files are authentic, and that Interpol will say as much.
Question is, what else was on those laptops that Birns and Weisbrot's favorite expert thinks are for real? Lots and lots of stuff...much of which has no direct bearing on SSOT status, but raises very troubling questions about the regime they have been working so assiduously to bolster for so long.
A button for show: Colombian weekly Semana reports that the Reyes Files contain a detailed e-mail volley about a massacre perpetrated by FARC inside Venezuela, in Apure State on September 23, 2004. (Excerpts in English here.)
The emails, between Iván Márquez, 'Mono Jojoy', Rodrigo Granda and the late Raúl Reyes, reveal that FARC mistakenly ambushed a group of PDVSA engineers and their Venezuelan military escorts near La Charca that day. It was all a big case of mistaken identity, but when the dust settled six Venezuelans were dead: five soldiers and one woman working as a PDVSA engineer.
As soon as he hears this, Reyes sends a message to his brothers in arms noting that the Venezuelans would have no trouble realizing FARC was responsible for the killings. He says FARC should immediately own up to its mistake and apologize to the Venezuelan government, stressing the need to keep the whole thing quiet. Later emails from Granda note Chávez's anger at the killings, but also his determination to give the mishap a 'prudent and political' response.
The files detail the close collaboration between FARC and the head of Venezuelan military intelligence, General Hugo Carvajal, their determination to improve coordination in future, and their shared interest in not allowing "the right wing" to exploit the fracas.
Sure enough, within days, then Venezuelan defense minister Jorge García Carneiro was in front of the TV cameras in Caracas blaming the Apure Massacre on Colombian paramilitaries who had "acted in cold blood." The perpetrators were never caught, much less tried. The murders remain unsolved.
So if I'm keeping score right here, Weisbrot and Birns' more or less accept the authenticity of documents detailing Chávez's involvement in a criminal conspiracy with foreign insurgents to pervert the course of justice in the mass murder of five Venezuelan soldiers and one Venezuelan public employee. We'll be expecting a strongly worded communiqué from them denouncing this chicanery any time now.
The Apure Massacre and its cover up have very little bearing on the SSOT status debate. If your main concern about the Reyes Files is what the US should do about them, you can see why you might not pay much attention to these sordid events.
But if your worry is focused more on the moral sensibility of the Chávez regime and its foreign boosters, the massacre and its cover up take on a whole different hue. Larry, Mark, the time to take a principled stand is now. Here's your chance.
Lets step back and think through what we're really dealing with here. Imagine, for one fleeting second, what would happen if Larry Birns and Mark Weisbrot got their hands on authenticated documents detailing George W. Bush's personal involvement in a conspiracy to cover up a multiple murder of US servicemen carried out by foreign insurgents.
Quico says: I'd been planning to wait until Thursday's Interpol report on the authenticity of the Reyes laptops to join this particularly sordid fray, but really there's no need to hold off. In parallel, weirdly unhinged damage limitation speeches, Hugo Chávez and Rafael Correa pretty much gave the game away yesterday, with Correa insisting that whatever Interpol hasn't said yet is not worth listening to and Chávez charging that Interpol is - wait for it - a CIA puppet.
After all that, wouldn't it be fun if Interpol came out and said the computers were faketie-fake fake!?
It's a fun thought, but unlikely: even the Birns-Weisbrot Axis - in a masterpiece of misplaced outrage - implicitly own up that the laptops are for real and obliquely accepts that the Chávez-FARC relationship has been cordial all along and close since the fall of 2007.
No such nuance was forthcoming from Chavez or Correa, entrenched as they are in deny everything-accept nothing-make counter-accusations mode.
Correa's prenial was bizarrely childish - the diplomatic equivalent of sticking your fingers in your ears and saying "nyaaa nyaaa-I'm not listening to you-nyaaaa nyaaaa..." Chávez's was characteristically more non-sequitur oriented: demanding "evidence, not documents!" despite the fact that some of the information in the computers has led directly to real-world busts, like the $480,000 in recovered cash in Costa Rica. (To say nothing of the fake distinction between "documents" and "real evidence.")
It's hard to beat Chávez for sheer lunacy when he shifts into full-rant mode but, to be fair, there were some real head-scratchers in Correa's speech as well. I especially enjoyed his contention that anyone who believes what FARC's commanders say to one another in private emails is, somehow, duty-bound to also believe their anti-Uribe propaganda. Credibility is credibility, ¿o no?
[and this, mind you, is how they talk when they're trying to distance themselves from FARC!]
These guys are running around like chickens with their heads cut off; they know the other shoe is about to drop. There's something grimly amusing about the whole scene but, like so much else, it's a sideshow.
Beyond the public posturing, beyond the denials and prenials and smoke-screens and obfuscations, the camera-ready histrionics and the tsunami of insults pointed at the Casa de Nariño, one thing is becoming clear here: Venezuela under Chávez is a state that sponsorsterrorism.
Whether, in some bureaucratic/legalistic/diplomatic sense that's grounds for labelling Chávez's regime a state sponsor of terrorism, I don't know. But, in ordinary language, a state that mobilizes its resources to help arm a group that relies on murder and kidnapping is a state that sponsors of terrorism.
That's what Venezuela's been doing. Colombia knows that, Ecuador knows that, the US knows that, and of course Chávez knows that.
Since Colombia started sharing the Reyes files on a government-to-government basis, Ecuador and Venezuela have known that Colombia and the US know that, and Colombia and the US have known that Ecuador and Venezuela know that Colombia and the US know (and so on and so forth.)
From Thursday (but, really, since yesterday)it's out in the open: everybody knows that everybody knows.
Chávez is not a social activist, a leader shaped by social struggles or the academy. Chávez is a lucky conspirator, just a man of great daring and, it's true, a man with great political instincts. Unfortunately for us, he reaches power without knowing what to do with it: without a program, without life experience, without real knowledge of the country and its problems. Later, when he starts to try out solutions, his Utopian side starts to come out, though fortunately his is not a bloodthirsty utopianism, at least not so far. He's a Utopian who doesn't think it's necessary to chop off the girl's toes to make them fit into cindarella's glass slipper. Instead, he goes about applying his ideas - which almost always fail - without jailing his adversaries.
Now, why can we have a non-bloodthirsty utopian? Because he has a hell of a lot of money. Our non-bloodthirsty utopian can afford these kinds of experiments in Venezuela because he has the kind of money nobody else has. We're a country of 27 million that's set, this year, to take in $70 billion from oil exports. Man, who gets to live like that?! Chávez can't think up ways to spend the money fast enough: he can feed all of his fantasies.
Quico says: Hats off to José de Córdoba and Jay Solomon: their front-page investigative piece on the real extent of the Chávez-FARC nexus revealed by Raúl Reyes's laptops caused enough of a stir to actually move the bond market today, which has to be the ultimate measure of journalistic impact.
After studying over 100 documents from the laptops, they conclude that the Chávez-FARC relationship is broader and deeper than was previously known, and extended to micro-level operational cooperation over things like weapons procurement and training. The piece anonymously quotes a US official saying that "there is complete agreement in the intelligence community that these documents are what they purport to be." It's probably a good idea to read the whole thing.
A couple of things caught my eye here.
First off, the venue. Page A1 of the Wall Street Journal is widely considered the most intensively edited, fact-checked and coveted piece of journalistic real estate in the English language. Investigative pieces for the WSJ front page are especially serious business: often months in the making and obsessively checked and re-checked for accuracy. Think what you will of their lunatic OpEd page, but when it comes to investigative stuff, especially on the front page, these people don't fool around.
The second thing is a lovely little detail that goes by almost unnoticed in the piece: how does FARC go about publishing its comuniqués denying they cooperate with the Venezuelan government? They post them on the Venezuelan government's Ministry of Information's Website, bien sûr!
Quico says: There's a desperate, clawing pathos to it: the painfully fake debate Chávez made the A.N. hold over "Zulia secessionism" ended with parliamentarians approving a strongly worded motion against a movement that's so shadowy, so covert, that it has no known spokesmen, no advocates, no organization, no message, no ideology, no history, no funding, no platform and no plan.
They really are cunning, these CIA guys. They've found the ultimate way of making a movement literally impossible to root out: not existing. What will they think of next?
I think Chávez is really losing his touch here. He used to appreciate that for a smoke-screen to be effective it had to have at least some possibility of being believed, some baseline credibility that, once blown way out of proportion, retained some nub of potential to freak people out.
But Zulian separatism has always existed in the same Dave Barryesque space for dadaist humor as Vermont separatism. It's an expression of Springfield vs. Shelbyville style hometown chauvinism that manifests itself mostly in things like the visual gag in that "Zona en Reclamación" map. Good for guffaws, sure, and great for maracucho bonding...but an actual political project? It's just silly...
In my experience, Zulianos are some of the most patriotic Venezuelans out there. Granted, I've never lived out there (boy, that's one bullet dodged) but I've met a good number of them and I can honestly say I've never even heard of anyone who took the idea of Zulia secession as anything more than a punchline.
Quico says: So speaking to reporters the other day, Planning Minister Haiman "Orwelito" El Troudi accepted that the last few rounds of sovereign bond issues have created an "implicit price" for the dollar that's above the official rate.
(Why? Simple...now you can buy Bs.F 3.3(ish) worth of bonds and immediately resell them for $1. Every part of the transaction is legal. So, in effect, there's a second legal price for the bolivar that's higher than the official Bs.F2.15/$.)
"But," El Troudi quickly added, "that flexibilization will never derive into a differential system in any of its forms, such as a dual exchange rate. There shall be one exchange rate."
Which is a lot like saying that yes, admittedly, your sister does trade sex for money, but that will never derive into prostitution in any of its forms...
Quico says: After a morning wasted fiddling around with the blog's software, I've now upgraded to one of Google's new style Blogger templates. It looks pretty much like the old template, but has all kinds of new little features - most of which, alas, make more of a difference to Katy and me than to readers.
Regrettably, I was unable to make the new template get along with the old commenting software, so all the old comments have been flushed down some cyberspatial memory hole. R.I.P.
Quico says: Joy was uncontained in Venezuela today as the government announced that, thanks to the millions of dollars it has invested in the electric industry, there will no longer be any blackouts in.....Nicaragua!
Quico says:Chavez, Ahmadinejad & co. have made something of a hobby horse of it: Oil should be traded in Euros rather than sullied by association with the Grand Imperialist Greenback. But could it be that what they frame as a radical new departure is something markets are already doing on their own?
This chart from The Economist certainly suggests that, holding out the possibility that much of the recent oil boom is a kind of accounting mirage driven by the dollar free-fall. Or alternatively, the rising price of oil could be pushing the dollar down, since a depreciating dollar gives traders an incentive to horde dollar-denominated commodities.
For its part, The Economist blames the Fed, noting that lower US interest rates drive down interest rates world wide, stimulating consumption and fueling the oil boom. Which would be Exhibit Umpteen in the case that the empire unwittingly underwrites the revolution (and the mullahs as well.)
Either way, one suspects the Euro-Oil peg hits Iran harder than it hits Venezuela: they do most of their international trade in Euros, we do ours mostly in dollars. Still, it's worth bearing in mind: the barrels we sell earn more and more dollars, but the dollars we get buy less and less stuff.
Three words, six letters, short, sharp, unambiguous, devastating.
The slogan is one of the most heartening developments in recent Venezuelan politics: it crystallizes the way the opposition has rediscovered its spine in the wake of its December Referendum victory.
Suddenly, the myriad presidential initiatives that amount to "smuggling constitutional reform through the back door" are meeting far more determined opposition: "no means no" has become a rallying cry for those of us convinced that if democracy it's too mean anything at all, the constitutional reform proposals defeated at the polls must not be resurrected through regular laws.
What a difference a year makes. In spring 2007, I was posting a lot about the distinction between the "hard constitution" (el hilo constitucional) and the "soft constitution": everything else. My argument then was that 95% of the reform proposal was filler, soft constitution stuff that Chávez didn't really need to change the constitution to implement - the evidence being that, in many cases, it was stuff he was already doing.
As I put it at the time at the time, "Supposing the reform proposal were defeated at referendum, do you really think the government would stop regulating pay-TV? Start funding FIEM? Disband the Guardia Territorial? Of course they wouldn't...but in that case, what exactly is the point of asking us to vote on it?" What difference could a vote make?
Every item in that little agenda was already being implemented before the December Referendum, and is still being implemented today. It's not any more unconstitutional today than it was a year ago.
But there is a difference: the referendum made the opposition as a whole much more conscious that the government has no legal basis to do much of what it's doing. December left us with a new awareness of the constitution's role as a bulwark against the abuse of power, and that awareness is becoming a focal point for resistance against further encroachment on our rights.
The government's climb down on the "Bolivarian" School Curriculum is the most visible example, but it goes further than that: the legitimacy of any move to implement Chávez's main agenda - all of which was contained in the reform proposal - has been badly undermined.
We should be clear: the opposition is still much weaker than it once was, hardly unified, still a minority, and only sporadically effective in holding the line against government encroachment. But the ability to say "No es no" has certainly bolstered its legitimacy, at least when it comes to rear-guard actions.
In a way, our referendum win ended up hardening up parts of the "soft constitution", strengthening our allegiance to it, even as the government systematically violates it. It's not much, but I call that progress.
Quico says: One of the little pleasures of life in revolutionary times is watching the utter discombobulation of chavista hackdom whenever Fearless Leader pulls off one of his legendary U-Turns.
