July 15, 2006
July 14, 2006
How to win with crime...
Crime is the issue Venezuelans are most worried about. It's also the issue where they rate Chavez's performance worst. Here's Keller's June 2006 Performance-by-Issue slide:
[Click to expand. Red=Problem is getting worse. Yellow = Problem is the same as ever. Blue = Problem is getting better.]
Somehow, though, the opposition can't get any traction on it. The problem is that, today, crime is just not a politicized issue. That's because Chavez just won't join the fray. The most amazing thing about Chávez's line on the crime epidemic is that he doesn't have one. And when the other side fails to acknowledge the issue, it's impossible to establish a discussion.
How does the opposition change this dynamic? It's tough. But one possible avenue is to talk about crime as a social and economic issue. This is something Tony Blair managed to do with his now famous "tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime" campaign line. By underlining the links between poverty, exclusion and urban violence, the opposition can use the sharp rise in crime to tell a story about the overall social failure of the regime - who's ever heard a country where rapid poverty abatement and social inclusion go hand in hand with an unprecedented crime wave? The story doesn't hang together.
The opposition badly needs to make the December election about its strongest issue. It needs to grab control of the agenda, something it's catastrophically failed to do since 2003. The protests surrounding the deaths of the Fadoul brothers showed that there's an substrate of anger around insecurity, that crime is politicizable. Time to move on this.
Venezuela's Murder Rate: Click here to expand
Addendum: Some of the crimes being reported these days are just jaw-dropping in their audacity. On Wednesday, at 5 a.m. in Guatire, a group of thugs held up fourteen buses in one go in a commando-style operation.
[Click to expand. Red=Problem is getting worse. Yellow = Problem is the same as ever. Blue = Problem is getting better.]Somehow, though, the opposition can't get any traction on it. The problem is that, today, crime is just not a politicized issue. That's because Chavez just won't join the fray. The most amazing thing about Chávez's line on the crime epidemic is that he doesn't have one. And when the other side fails to acknowledge the issue, it's impossible to establish a discussion.
How does the opposition change this dynamic? It's tough. But one possible avenue is to talk about crime as a social and economic issue. This is something Tony Blair managed to do with his now famous "tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime" campaign line. By underlining the links between poverty, exclusion and urban violence, the opposition can use the sharp rise in crime to tell a story about the overall social failure of the regime - who's ever heard a country where rapid poverty abatement and social inclusion go hand in hand with an unprecedented crime wave? The story doesn't hang together.
The opposition badly needs to make the December election about its strongest issue. It needs to grab control of the agenda, something it's catastrophically failed to do since 2003. The protests surrounding the deaths of the Fadoul brothers showed that there's an substrate of anger around insecurity, that crime is politicizable. Time to move on this.
Venezuela's Murder Rate: Click here to expandAddendum: Some of the crimes being reported these days are just jaw-dropping in their audacity. On Wednesday, at 5 a.m. in Guatire, a group of thugs held up fourteen buses in one go in a commando-style operation.
July 13, 2006
Making Crime Pay
From a polling perspective, it's a no-brainer. The issue most people identify as the country's biggest problem is also the one where they rate Chavez's performance the worst.
According to Hinterlaces' May/June 2006 poll, 87% of voters identify crime is the biggest problem in the country. 70% say crime has gotten worse under Chavez, and 24% say it's the same as it's always been.
Keller's June poll also identifies crime as the number one issue - 76% of his respondents think it's gotten worse and 15% say it's the same.
How should a savvy oppo candidate react?
By talking about very little else.
According to Hinterlaces' May/June 2006 poll, 87% of voters identify crime is the biggest problem in the country. 70% say crime has gotten worse under Chavez, and 24% say it's the same as it's always been.
Keller's June poll also identifies crime as the number one issue - 76% of his respondents think it's gotten worse and 15% say it's the same.
How should a savvy oppo candidate react?
By talking about very little else.
Chavista Assembly Members Demand Dissidents be Jailed
Pro-Chavez National Assembly Members José Albornoz (PPT) and Ismael García (Podemos) are asking the Prosecutor General to jail Sumate's leaders.
Their crimes? Usurping the CNE's prerogative by seeking to organize a primary election outside the state's control and incitement for publicly airing their views on CNE.
Still more proof that chavismo, as an ideology, has no room for the idea that some matters are not the state's business - that there are spaces where citizens can and should come to make decisions without the state's interference. We already saw this in 1999 when chavismo insisted that labor union elections had to be organized by CNE, and in 2003 when they said that signature-gatherings had to be run by CNE.
The notion that citizens can use whichever method they deem best to select their candidate for election is beyond them. The concept of civil society - of a sphere of social life that is both public and outside the state's control - is deeply alien to their understanding of the good society. By this reasoning, voting for Miss Venezuela will end up having to be organized by CNE.
Extremism? What extremism?
Their crimes? Usurping the CNE's prerogative by seeking to organize a primary election outside the state's control and incitement for publicly airing their views on CNE.
Still more proof that chavismo, as an ideology, has no room for the idea that some matters are not the state's business - that there are spaces where citizens can and should come to make decisions without the state's interference. We already saw this in 1999 when chavismo insisted that labor union elections had to be organized by CNE, and in 2003 when they said that signature-gatherings had to be run by CNE.
The notion that citizens can use whichever method they deem best to select their candidate for election is beyond them. The concept of civil society - of a sphere of social life that is both public and outside the state's control - is deeply alien to their understanding of the good society. By this reasoning, voting for Miss Venezuela will end up having to be organized by CNE.
Extremism? What extremism?
July 12, 2006
On the nature of verbal agression
Katy says: The debate that raged in the comments section (see Quico's prior post and the discussion that followed) got me thinking about the power of words. The right words said in the right context, be they Chávez's, Quico's, Alek Boyd's or Materazzi's, can be a powerful tool. They can inspire fear, apprehension, ridicule. They can send people into a tizzy, or send them straight to the nearest airport or locker room. They can provoke a reasonable, inspired response, or they can provoke an act of violence tinged with just the right amount of honor.
But I'm not a good enough writer to talk about these things. Here's what tennis writer/blogger Peter Bodo had to say about Zidane's infamous head-butt. I think there's some truth in there for all of us.
"What Zidane did was undoubtedly stupid. It was silly. It may have cost France a most magically earned World Cup championship, and it cost Zidane himself a fair amount of the glow surrounding his name.
But I also think this: Zidane was driven to butt Italian Marco Materazzi out of a sense of personal honor (you certainly can’t say Zidane acted in the heat of the moment), because Materazzi crossed a line in the sand. And that notion of “honor” is almost entirely gone from our collective life these days.
Theoretically, we should be living in a time of civility and harmony, because we’ve managed to create powerful prohibitions against things like the good old-fashioned punch-in-the-nose. Actually, it appears that we’ve thrown open the floodgates on incivility, reckless accusation (and lying), the vilest kinds of name-calling, bigotry - the whole nine – because nobody is held accountable anymore. Therefore, a guy like Materazzi (I'm basing all this on admittedly unsatisfying press reports) feels he can say anything he wants - Zidane wouldn't dare hold him accountable. Not with millions watching! Not with all that money at stake! Not with the precious World Cup trophy on the line!
But every once in a while, somebody – today, it’s Zidane - violates the taboo. He or she in effect, says, I don’t care what is on the line, how much money or personal advantage or reward. I am not going to have the last laugh, or laugh all the way to the bank. My code of honor simply won’t allow me to let this go unanswered. It takes an individual of great (if not necessarily admirable) character to take that road, and wasn’t Mr. Materazzi surprised to learn, in the most direct manner, that he was being held accountable for his words?
I don't expect many of you to agree with me on this. But I can't deny the way I feel about this. Of course, a part of me feels badly for the French squad, which inadvertently suffered because of what Zidane felt he had to do. But a part of me condones what Zidane did and forgives him because, in addition to striking a blow for accountability, his action also demonstrated something that many people forget and that as a writer I feel strongly about: words are powerful weapons, they can cause more hurt and sorrow than fists or belts or willow switches.
...
The head butt was about the power of words, the notion of accountability, and about honor. It was not an admirable move, nor a clever or practical one; it was something that transcended those mundane considerations."
July 11, 2006
Chavista Extremism: Scarier and scarier...
Extremism is becoming the defining characteristic of the chavista movement. At no point does the ruling ideology draw the line - just the opposite: every part of the new elite seems to operate under the maxim that if a little extremism is good, a lot is better. The result is a kind of tournament within the regime, a dynamic of one-upmanship where each tries to out-extremist the other.
It's a scary thing: the phrase "that's going too far" doesn't seem to be a part of the regime's political lexicon. More and more, the regime has lost its feel for the ridiculous (el sentido del ridículo) - leaving it shorn of any way to judge how much is too much.
Examples? They're a dime a dozen. Here are a few:
We need to be clear about this: Venezuela is not a totalitarian regime. But we also need to be clear about this: it is moving more and more decisively in that direction. Clearly, spaces for dissent still exist; just as clearly, the regime is working to close them down.
What's terrifying is that there is no logical limit to chavismo's power ambition. Nothing in the structure of the belief system limits its tendency to expand control into new areas of political and - more and more - social life.
There is no room in chavista thinking for the notion that some of spheres of human activity are and ought to remain outside of the political sphere. And there is certainly no space in chavista thinking for the notion that any part of the political sphere ought to remain outside the state's control. It's a way of conceiving politics that never says "enough," that has no notion of "that's not the state's business," that never sees a reason to stop expanding its reach, and that does not recognize any distinctions between the concepts of "nation", "state", "government", "party" and "Chavez." As far as the ruling ideology is concerned, to be for one of those is to be for all of them; to oppose one is to oppose them all.
What's scary is not so much where we are now, but where the internal logic of chavista thinking points us. These days people are happy buying their hummers and plasma TVs and such. But the logic of blanket politization is afoot, and with it the mechanisms first for authoritarian and later for totalitarian control.
We're definitely not there. Chavismo's myriad internal contradictions might yet cause its collapse before we get there. But it's not really possible to deny that we're heading there. Not any more.
It's a scary thing: the phrase "that's going too far" doesn't seem to be a part of the regime's political lexicon. More and more, the regime has lost its feel for the ridiculous (el sentido del ridículo) - leaving it shorn of any way to judge how much is too much.
Examples? They're a dime a dozen. Here are a few:
- The Armed Forces' Polytechnic University awards an honorary doctorate to an aging Mikhail Kalashnikov for his lifetime contribution to the noble cause of figuring out how to kill people efficiently.
- A Cuban communist guerrillero who literally led an armed invasion against Venezuela's democratically elected government is honored in a public ceremony by regime hierarchs (handily exceeding the DDefinition of supporting terrorism") and the news is proudly splashed on pro-government websites.
- Thousands of Venezuelan kids go off to Cuba for paramilitary and ideological training, come home, and get 15,000 assault rifles bought with public money. Among their slogans - Commandante Chavez: Ordene!
- Practically alone in the world, Venezuela sets out a principled defense of North Korea's right to develop ICBMs, essentially celebrating its missile tests as an anti-imperialist move in the eve of Chavez's visit to Pyongyang.
- The National Assembly moves to further restrict the scope for NGO action, with the avowed aim of bringing them under control.
- A literally gun-toting president threatens to shut down opposition TV and radio stations, saying it is unacceptable for the media to criticize the government.
- Essentially all high-profile opposition elected officials still in office are prosecuted on trumped up charges or threatened with prosecutions if they do not behave as the regime demands.
- Even the Venezuelan Olympic Committee is taken over by a chavista aparatchik.
We need to be clear about this: Venezuela is not a totalitarian regime. But we also need to be clear about this: it is moving more and more decisively in that direction. Clearly, spaces for dissent still exist; just as clearly, the regime is working to close them down.
What's terrifying is that there is no logical limit to chavismo's power ambition. Nothing in the structure of the belief system limits its tendency to expand control into new areas of political and - more and more - social life.
There is no room in chavista thinking for the notion that some of spheres of human activity are and ought to remain outside of the political sphere. And there is certainly no space in chavista thinking for the notion that any part of the political sphere ought to remain outside the state's control. It's a way of conceiving politics that never says "enough," that has no notion of "that's not the state's business," that never sees a reason to stop expanding its reach, and that does not recognize any distinctions between the concepts of "nation", "state", "government", "party" and "Chavez." As far as the ruling ideology is concerned, to be for one of those is to be for all of them; to oppose one is to oppose them all.
What's scary is not so much where we are now, but where the internal logic of chavista thinking points us. These days people are happy buying their hummers and plasma TVs and such. But the logic of blanket politization is afoot, and with it the mechanisms first for authoritarian and later for totalitarian control.
We're definitely not there. Chavismo's myriad internal contradictions might yet cause its collapse before we get there. But it's not really possible to deny that we're heading there. Not any more.
July 10, 2006
The 2006 PSF D'Or goes to...
Envelope please...[rustle-rustle, cough]...Ladies and Gentlemen, the 2006 Pendejo sin Fronteras d'Or goes to...Chris Kraul, of the Los Angeles Times!
It's no contest, really: his piece in Sunday's LAT about the ways chavistas have been using Charlie Chaplin's 1936 classic, Modern Times, for propaganda purposes will go down as a timeless classic of slack-jawed PSFery. The story misreports, misunderstands, misconstrues and misattributes Venezuelan workers' problems with such gusto, the competition didn't have a chance.
A taste:
In a way, the first thing that jumps out at you is not so much Kraul's staggering ignorance as his utter lack of inquisitiveness. The piece details the way chavistas have used Modern Times to make a point about labor exploitation in Venezuela. A minimally curious writer might then ask, "hmmmm, are labor conditions in Venezuela today really comparable to labor conditions in the US during the depression? Do Venezuelan workers really have no meaningful rights? does it really make sense to describe Chaplin's film as 'all too relevant' in Venezuela?"
Well, lets see, what were workers fighting for in the 1930s in the US? First and foremost, they were worried about the right to form unions and bargain collectively...rights that have been guaranteed and widely exercised in Venezuela since 1958.
Bad start. OK, the minimum wage, then? Nope, there has been a minimum wage in Venezuela, for decades. Not only that, figured as a percentage of the average wage, Venezuela's minimum wage is the highest in the America's - fully 90% of the average, meaning that, for all intents and purposes, Venezuelan wages as a whole are decreed by the Central Government.
Not that either, then. Perhaps the eight hour work day is a good parallel? Nope, Venezuelan workers got that reivindicación decades ago. Vacation pay? Got it. Severance pay? Got it. Mandatory employer contributions to pensions? Got those too. Statutory overtime pay premiums? Check.
Hmmm...how about some more lavish perks - the kinds of things European workers protest over these days? Statutory employer-provided childcare and dining facilities, say, or an open-ended ban on layoffs, or subsidized housing, subsidized worker training, subsidized transport, or statutory profit-sharing, or paid maternity leave? Hell, these are demands that would have made US workers blush back in the 30s - but, you guessed it, Venezuelan workers have all of those as well!
In fact, Venezuela has some of the most restrictive, rigid, employment-zapping labor legislation anywhere in the world.
So restrictive is the legal framework that in the paper I wrote about yesterday, Hausmann and Rodriguez set out microeconomic evidence showing how labor market rigidities have hampered Venezuela's attempts to crack non-energy export markets, deepening our dependence on oil exports and contributing to the country's economic collapse since 1977.
In effect, with existing legislation, the legal economy can't begin to generate enough jobs for the size of the workforce we have, leaving about half of Venezuelan workers to scrape together a living somehow in the informal sector. Once there, they have no protections whatsoever. UCAB researchers have found that 90% of informal sector workers earn less than the legal minimum wage. It's hardly surprising that, for informal workers, finding a job in the "savage capitalist" economy Modern Times sends up is a universal aspiration, a wistful dream that's simply out of their reach.
Given the very high costs associated with Venezuela's hypertrophied labor legislation, it's easy to see why the informal sector has swelled. Venezuela has a plainly outsized "fiscal wedge" (cuña fiscal) - the gap between what it costs an employer to create a legal job, and the pay a worker effectively takes home. By some researchers' estimates, every Bs.100 in take-home pay for legal workers costs employers Bs.171 to generate - with the extra Bs.71 going to cover various taxes, mandatory contributions, and statutory workplace perks. These figures dwarf the notorious fiscal wedges in countries like Germany (51%), Belgium (56%) and France (47%).
For all his efforts to "even-handedly" present business viewpoints in his piece, Kraul catastrophically fails to grasp the basic ridiculousness of the way Modern Times is being used to push an extremist ideological agenda. What Kraul tragically fails to process is that Venezuela's legal labor force is a relatively privileged elite within the working class, the better-off half in a vicious insider-outsider dynamic that condemns millions of people to the atrocious poverty and total insecurity of the gray economy...and that the more legal goodies that relatively privileged elite gets, the more expensive it gets to create legal jobs, and the harder outsiders find it to crack into the legal job market.
Maybe, on his way back to the Meliá from that poultry plant, Kraul should've stopped to chat with some of the buhoneras in the Boulevard de Sabaná Grande and asked them what they think about the terrible exploitation of the quince-y-último set. The look of baffled fury he would've gotten from them perfectly mirrors my outrage at his deeply ignorant little piece.
His, dear reader, is one richly deserved PSF D'Or...
It's no contest, really: his piece in Sunday's LAT about the ways chavistas have been using Charlie Chaplin's 1936 classic, Modern Times, for propaganda purposes will go down as a timeless classic of slack-jawed PSFery. The story misreports, misunderstands, misconstrues and misattributes Venezuelan workers' problems with such gusto, the competition didn't have a chance.
A taste:
Since January, in a bid to expose the evils of "savage capitalism," the Labor Ministry has shown the Chaplin film to thousands of workers in places such as this rundown industrial suburb of Caracas.Chaplin wanted his Depression-era movie to make a point, that "once inside the factory, workers had no meaningful rights," said Los Angeles-based film historian and Chaplin authority Richard Schickel. "It was very relevant in the moment it was released, a time of social unrest and the emerging U.S. labor movement."
Seventy years later, Chaplin's fable is all too relevant in Venezuela, said several factory workers who saw the film recently.
In a way, the first thing that jumps out at you is not so much Kraul's staggering ignorance as his utter lack of inquisitiveness. The piece details the way chavistas have used Modern Times to make a point about labor exploitation in Venezuela. A minimally curious writer might then ask, "hmmmm, are labor conditions in Venezuela today really comparable to labor conditions in the US during the depression? Do Venezuelan workers really have no meaningful rights? does it really make sense to describe Chaplin's film as 'all too relevant' in Venezuela?"
Well, lets see, what were workers fighting for in the 1930s in the US? First and foremost, they were worried about the right to form unions and bargain collectively...rights that have been guaranteed and widely exercised in Venezuela since 1958.
Bad start. OK, the minimum wage, then? Nope, there has been a minimum wage in Venezuela, for decades. Not only that, figured as a percentage of the average wage, Venezuela's minimum wage is the highest in the America's - fully 90% of the average, meaning that, for all intents and purposes, Venezuelan wages as a whole are decreed by the Central Government.
Not that either, then. Perhaps the eight hour work day is a good parallel? Nope, Venezuelan workers got that reivindicación decades ago. Vacation pay? Got it. Severance pay? Got it. Mandatory employer contributions to pensions? Got those too. Statutory overtime pay premiums? Check.
Hmmm...how about some more lavish perks - the kinds of things European workers protest over these days? Statutory employer-provided childcare and dining facilities, say, or an open-ended ban on layoffs, or subsidized housing, subsidized worker training, subsidized transport, or statutory profit-sharing, or paid maternity leave? Hell, these are demands that would have made US workers blush back in the 30s - but, you guessed it, Venezuelan workers have all of those as well!
In fact, Venezuela has some of the most restrictive, rigid, employment-zapping labor legislation anywhere in the world.
So restrictive is the legal framework that in the paper I wrote about yesterday, Hausmann and Rodriguez set out microeconomic evidence showing how labor market rigidities have hampered Venezuela's attempts to crack non-energy export markets, deepening our dependence on oil exports and contributing to the country's economic collapse since 1977.
In effect, with existing legislation, the legal economy can't begin to generate enough jobs for the size of the workforce we have, leaving about half of Venezuelan workers to scrape together a living somehow in the informal sector. Once there, they have no protections whatsoever. UCAB researchers have found that 90% of informal sector workers earn less than the legal minimum wage. It's hardly surprising that, for informal workers, finding a job in the "savage capitalist" economy Modern Times sends up is a universal aspiration, a wistful dream that's simply out of their reach.
Given the very high costs associated with Venezuela's hypertrophied labor legislation, it's easy to see why the informal sector has swelled. Venezuela has a plainly outsized "fiscal wedge" (cuña fiscal) - the gap between what it costs an employer to create a legal job, and the pay a worker effectively takes home. By some researchers' estimates, every Bs.100 in take-home pay for legal workers costs employers Bs.171 to generate - with the extra Bs.71 going to cover various taxes, mandatory contributions, and statutory workplace perks. These figures dwarf the notorious fiscal wedges in countries like Germany (51%), Belgium (56%) and France (47%).
For all his efforts to "even-handedly" present business viewpoints in his piece, Kraul catastrophically fails to grasp the basic ridiculousness of the way Modern Times is being used to push an extremist ideological agenda. What Kraul tragically fails to process is that Venezuela's legal labor force is a relatively privileged elite within the working class, the better-off half in a vicious insider-outsider dynamic that condemns millions of people to the atrocious poverty and total insecurity of the gray economy...and that the more legal goodies that relatively privileged elite gets, the more expensive it gets to create legal jobs, and the harder outsiders find it to crack into the legal job market.
Maybe, on his way back to the Meliá from that poultry plant, Kraul should've stopped to chat with some of the buhoneras in the Boulevard de Sabaná Grande and asked them what they think about the terrible exploitation of the quince-y-último set. The look of baffled fury he would've gotten from them perfectly mirrors my outrage at his deeply ignorant little piece.
His, dear reader, is one richly deserved PSF D'Or...
July 9, 2006
Skypecast: Francisco Rodríguez on Venezuela's Economic Collapse
Click here to listen to the interview.
This interview features Francisco Rodríguez. Francisco is Assistant Professor of Economics and Latin American Studies at Wesleyan University, and a fast rising academic star. He's currently co-editing a book on Venezuela's economic collapse with Harvard's Ricardo Hausmann. Over the next few weeks I will be publishing Skypecasts with several of the book's contributors.
Working drafts of all the book's chapters can be downloaded here.
In this wideranging, 40-minute Skypecast, Francisco describes the overall research project, and then walks us through the draft chapter he co-authored with Ricardo Hausmann. In explaining Venezuela's economic collapse, Hausmann and Rodríguez stress the fact that Venezuela didn't have an alternative export industry to cushion the blow when oil prices fell. They go on to assess five different hypotheses to explain why, unlike Mexico, Indonesia and Malaysia, Venezuela didn't develop alternative export industries.
The Skypecast sets out their research in language that (I hope) will be understandable to non-specialists. Towards the end, Francisco explains some of the policy implications of his analysis.
Click here to listen to the interview.
This interview features Francisco Rodríguez. Francisco is Assistant Professor of Economics and Latin American Studies at Wesleyan University, and a fast rising academic star. He's currently co-editing a book on Venezuela's economic collapse with Harvard's Ricardo Hausmann. Over the next few weeks I will be publishing Skypecasts with several of the book's contributors.Working drafts of all the book's chapters can be downloaded here.
In this wideranging, 40-minute Skypecast, Francisco describes the overall research project, and then walks us through the draft chapter he co-authored with Ricardo Hausmann. In explaining Venezuela's economic collapse, Hausmann and Rodríguez stress the fact that Venezuela didn't have an alternative export industry to cushion the blow when oil prices fell. They go on to assess five different hypotheses to explain why, unlike Mexico, Indonesia and Malaysia, Venezuela didn't develop alternative export industries.
The Skypecast sets out their research in language that (I hope) will be understandable to non-specialists. Towards the end, Francisco explains some of the policy implications of his analysis.
Click here to listen to the interview.
Talk vCrisis here...
Personally, I've been careful not to say much about the Boyd-Livingston saga. My deep disagreements with Alek are just as public as our friendship is. However, there seems to be a limitless appetite to discuss this, so I'll open this thread for that purpose.
July 8, 2006
Extra! Extra! Sanity breaks out in the comments section!
An event rare enough to merit a post of its own: Yesterday, at about 1:00 p.m., a debate broke out in the comments section that was on topic, fun, sophisticated, enlightening and cordial. Feathers, Katy, Rafael, and Amieres: you don't know how happy you made me!
July 7, 2006
Rosales's Quirky Campaign Launch - And Teo's Obstructionism
After months of sitting on the fence, Zulia's neo-adeco governor Manuel Rosales has finally made it clear that he's running for president - in the weirdest way possible, by announcing he is willing to participate in an oppo primary. What kind of a campaign launch is that? Though Borges, Rosales and six marginal candidates have signed on, it's still unclear whether there will be a primary on August 13th, because Teodoro Petkoff is still dithering. Teo's made it clear in various ways that he's not for a primary, and would prefer a complicated polling solution to determine the candidate. Not surprising, cuz the guy is far behind in the polls.
Sumate's position, that they will only organize a primary if all main oppo candidates participate, effectively gives any one of them a veto over the whole thing. Is this really sensible?
July 6, 2006
Common Sense Meltdown Chronicles: The Chavez-North Korea Axis
In the wake of worldwide condemnation for North Korea's missile tests, Chávez's timing for a Pyongyang getaway is looking especially ill-judged. North Korea's move, which is being interpreted as a slap in the face even for its only ally, China, has placed the hermit totalitarian prison-state even farther beyond the pale than it already was. Hell, even Argentina was horrified.
Right on cue, in step the chavistas to stick up for Pyongyang's right to develop missile technology - while, moronically, asserting that the government doesn't have an official position yet. Hm.
With Caracas now serving as the site for meetings of the Board of Directors of the International Institute of the Juche Idea and Venezuela hosting one of the very few North Korean embassies abroad, it's hard to disagree with the US State Department's judgement that Chávez is an outlier on this issue.
Chávez's ongoing flirtations with the Ultimate Rogue State merely underlines a point that should be clear to anyone who's been paying attention: the guy never met a tyranny he didn't like. But does he really understand how very, very far from diplomatically correct it is to cozy up to a state like this?
Of course, my comments section has already served as the site of impassioned defenses of the use of children as mine-clearing equipment in Iran - following Chávez's coddling up to that regime - so how long can it be until someone turns up to explain that no, really, North Korea is really a nice place?
Personally, I can't wait for him to go so I can put the picture on my right-hand column.
Would an AMLO win really favor Chavez?
Say chavistoid populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador somehow gets the Mexican vote count overturned and wins the Mexican presidency...would that really favor Chávez?
Personally, I have doubts. Chávez is happy to have fellow travellers elected in smaller, weaker, poorer countries like Bolivia, Peru and Nicaragua, places where his oil dollars carry enough weight to dictate policies. But would AMLO really play second fiddle to Chávez? Would a larger, richer, stronger country really fall into line behind our little Napoleon's fantasies of hemispheric leadership? I really doubt it.
More likely, AMLO would end up staking a challenge to Chávez's ambitions for leadership of the hemispheric left. And that's the last thing El Comandante wants.
Personally, I have doubts. Chávez is happy to have fellow travellers elected in smaller, weaker, poorer countries like Bolivia, Peru and Nicaragua, places where his oil dollars carry enough weight to dictate policies. But would AMLO really play second fiddle to Chávez? Would a larger, richer, stronger country really fall into line behind our little Napoleon's fantasies of hemispheric leadership? I really doubt it.
More likely, AMLO would end up staking a challenge to Chávez's ambitions for leadership of the hemispheric left. And that's the last thing El Comandante wants.
Could the government be lying about illiteracy?
Katy says:
"Just to cite some important examples, our country had the honour in 2005 of having been declared officially by UNESCO as an illiteracy-free territory." Mary Pili Hernández, Venezuela's Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
"UNESCO has not endorsed or made any statement to the effect that Venezuela is free of illiteracy." Sue Williams, UNESCO's Chief of Section of Bureau of Public Information, Paris.
Source: Vcrisis - the encore.
"Just to cite some important examples, our country had the honour in 2005 of having been declared officially by UNESCO as an illiteracy-free territory." Mary Pili Hernández, Venezuela's Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
"UNESCO has not endorsed or made any statement to the effect that Venezuela is free of illiteracy." Sue Williams, UNESCO's Chief of Section of Bureau of Public Information, Paris.
Source: Vcrisis - the encore.
Update: Calderón Pulls Ahead
At 5:07, Ccs time, Calderón takes the lead...
Click here for minute-by-minute updates from the Mexican El Universal.
Mexico's Nail-Biter
Nothing to be done in Mexico but nibble at your nails...
At 4:47 a.m. (Caracas time), with 97.6% of actas recorded, AMLO is ahead by 0.02%...but results are changing all the time and the latest results coming in are from the pro-Calderón north, so keep checking for updates...
At 4:47 a.m. (Caracas time), with 97.6% of actas recorded, AMLO is ahead by 0.02%...but results are changing all the time and the latest results coming in are from the pro-Calderón north, so keep checking for updates...
July 4, 2006
Chavez's trade policy in historical perspective...
In a Working Paper, presented at a recent conference on Venezuela's disastrous economic performance since the late 70s, Ricardo Hausmann and Francisco Rodríguez put forward a sophisticated explanation for the collapse.
At the center of their interpretation is the argument that the absence of an alternative export industry left Venezuela badly exposed to energy market shocks. Unlike countries like Mexico, Indonesia and Malaysia that managed to diversify their export baskets, Venezuela's nearly complete specialization in energy (and energy-related) exports amplified the impact of sporadic oil price downturns.
From this point of view, policies that help diversify Venezuela's export basket constitute a safety net against future downturns. And few policies had achieved that goal as well as signing regional free trade agreements like the Andean Community and the G3 deal with Mexico and Colombia. As this chart shows, from the early 1990s Venezuela's non-Energy Intensive producers finally started to gain a foothold, largely thanks to those deals:
Click to enlarge. Taken from Hausmann and Rodríguez, Why did Venezuelan growth collapse?, Page 50.
As the chart also shows, since the very start of the Chavez era, misguided trade policy decisions have seriously undermined the value of those agreements. All of which we should keep in mind as we track the debate over Venezuela's exit from the G3 and the Andean Community, and our entry into the barely-functioning Mercosur.
First off, Venezuela's Andean and G3 trade was largely concentrated on its largest and most "natural" trade partner: Colombia. Tearing down our trade agreements with Colombia to enter a deal with countries whose economic center of gravity is thousands of miles away makes no sense.
Second of all, while it's clearly a bad idea to formally deny Venezuelan exporters their privileged access to the Colombian market, we need to keep the decision in perspective: the real economic damage has already been done, through things like the introduction of transshipment requirements in 1999 and exchange controls in 2003. Formally exiting the deals merely makes it official.
At the center of their interpretation is the argument that the absence of an alternative export industry left Venezuela badly exposed to energy market shocks. Unlike countries like Mexico, Indonesia and Malaysia that managed to diversify their export baskets, Venezuela's nearly complete specialization in energy (and energy-related) exports amplified the impact of sporadic oil price downturns.
From this point of view, policies that help diversify Venezuela's export basket constitute a safety net against future downturns. And few policies had achieved that goal as well as signing regional free trade agreements like the Andean Community and the G3 deal with Mexico and Colombia. As this chart shows, from the early 1990s Venezuela's non-Energy Intensive producers finally started to gain a foothold, largely thanks to those deals:
As the chart also shows, since the very start of the Chavez era, misguided trade policy decisions have seriously undermined the value of those agreements. All of which we should keep in mind as we track the debate over Venezuela's exit from the G3 and the Andean Community, and our entry into the barely-functioning Mercosur.
First off, Venezuela's Andean and G3 trade was largely concentrated on its largest and most "natural" trade partner: Colombia. Tearing down our trade agreements with Colombia to enter a deal with countries whose economic center of gravity is thousands of miles away makes no sense.
Second of all, while it's clearly a bad idea to formally deny Venezuelan exporters their privileged access to the Colombian market, we need to keep the decision in perspective: the real economic damage has already been done, through things like the introduction of transshipment requirements in 1999 and exchange controls in 2003. Formally exiting the deals merely makes it official.
The Chavez Effect: Two for Two
Well, the election in Mexico is achingly close, and the legal challenges will surely mount. One thing we can say for sure, though: Andrés Manuel López Obrador's comfortable lead, which lasted for two years prior to the election, vanished the second Calderón managed to link him to Chávez.
Just like in Perú, even the perception of Chavophilia has proven an electoral poison pill in Mexico.
Imagine how different the hemispheric picture would look without the Chavez Effect. With Ollanta and AMLO in power, all the tooth-gnashing about an authoritarian backslide in the hemisphere would have some real meat on its bones. As it stands, Hugo's club is a problem for Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba - not for the hemisphere.
Just like in Perú, even the perception of Chavophilia has proven an electoral poison pill in Mexico.
Imagine how different the hemispheric picture would look without the Chavez Effect. With Ollanta and AMLO in power, all the tooth-gnashing about an authoritarian backslide in the hemisphere would have some real meat on its bones. As it stands, Hugo's club is a problem for Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba - not for the hemisphere.
July 3, 2006
Last last-ditch effort to save WTO talks fails - attention now shifts to last last last-ditch effort
This weekend's Geneva Mini-Ministerial conference failed yesterday over the same old, same old lingering deadlocks. You know things have really come to a head in the World Trade Organization talks when even the Director General, Pascal Lamy, starts using the C-word to describe the state of negotiations.
The last last last-ditch effort comes in two weeks, when the G8 meets in Saint Petersburg and the whole Doha hot-potato gets tossed up a level, from Trade Ministers to Heads of Government. Some people think that the round was so deadlocked, it was never going to move without Head of Government-level intervention anyway, and that you weren't going to get that level of attention until the Trade Ministers led the round to a near-death experience like the one it's having now.
But can the Bush administration make a dramatic overture just four months before a tough mid-term election? And can Chirac overcome the temptation to poo-poo the whole thing?
Hmmmm...
The last last last-ditch effort comes in two weeks, when the G8 meets in Saint Petersburg and the whole Doha hot-potato gets tossed up a level, from Trade Ministers to Heads of Government. Some people think that the round was so deadlocked, it was never going to move without Head of Government-level intervention anyway, and that you weren't going to get that level of attention until the Trade Ministers led the round to a near-death experience like the one it's having now.
But can the Bush administration make a dramatic overture just four months before a tough mid-term election? And can Chirac overcome the temptation to poo-poo the whole thing?
Hmmmm...
July 1, 2006
Caracas Chronicles on Restorative Hiatus
Well, you must have noticed that I've moved more or less permanently to the Futbol Blog. I can't help it - ever since España '82 my life has been running on a four-year cycle: 47 months feverishly awaiting the next World Cup followed by one month of total, fanatical immersion in the tournament.
I've gotten an inordinate amount of crap in my inbox about this. Typical emails run something like "while you're off watching grown men chasing a little ball like monkeys, Chavez is doing X, Y and Z under cover of mundial, finally enslaving all Venezuelans." I tend to roll my eyes at this sort of message: as if Chavez was going to slow down if we paid more attention. As if he gave a toss about scrutiny. As if we could actually do something about it.
We can't. And I think it's important for us to come to grips with the fact that we can't. From 1999 to 2004 we fought the good fight, and we lost. At this point, we can act as observers, as scrutinizers, as commenters. But not really as activists. Not meaningfully. Not anymore.
Yes, yes, I know. What is happening in Venezuela is unacceptable. The cruel thing is: we have to accept it. Accept its reality.
To my mind, learning to cohabit with the reality of Chavez in power is not just a sign of maturity, but actually a pre-requisite for staying sane. Getting stuck on the ongoing affront to basic decency represented by his regime does nothing beyond raising our blood pressure. Folks, if our principled anger could change the reality on the ground, Chavez would be long gone.
Faced with a reality we can't accept but have to accept, it becomes imperative to find some way to keep our wits about us. To find some joy all the same. This is why I don't apologize for a second for obsessing over futbol: the World Cup is something that gives me immense pleasure, something to hang on to faced with a reality I can neither accept nor change.
We all need our little coping strategies here. I've found mine. I strongly advice you find yours.
Trust me, I'm not happy that it's come to this. But it has.
So, all together now, y sin complejos: GO BRAZIL! God I hope Parreira sees the light and leaves Adriano on the bench...
I've gotten an inordinate amount of crap in my inbox about this. Typical emails run something like "while you're off watching grown men chasing a little ball like monkeys, Chavez is doing X, Y and Z under cover of mundial, finally enslaving all Venezuelans." I tend to roll my eyes at this sort of message: as if Chavez was going to slow down if we paid more attention. As if he gave a toss about scrutiny. As if we could actually do something about it.
We can't. And I think it's important for us to come to grips with the fact that we can't. From 1999 to 2004 we fought the good fight, and we lost. At this point, we can act as observers, as scrutinizers, as commenters. But not really as activists. Not meaningfully. Not anymore.
Yes, yes, I know. What is happening in Venezuela is unacceptable. The cruel thing is: we have to accept it. Accept its reality.
To my mind, learning to cohabit with the reality of Chavez in power is not just a sign of maturity, but actually a pre-requisite for staying sane. Getting stuck on the ongoing affront to basic decency represented by his regime does nothing beyond raising our blood pressure. Folks, if our principled anger could change the reality on the ground, Chavez would be long gone.
Faced with a reality we can't accept but have to accept, it becomes imperative to find some way to keep our wits about us. To find some joy all the same. This is why I don't apologize for a second for obsessing over futbol: the World Cup is something that gives me immense pleasure, something to hang on to faced with a reality I can neither accept nor change.
We all need our little coping strategies here. I've found mine. I strongly advice you find yours.
Trust me, I'm not happy that it's come to this. But it has.
So, all together now, y sin complejos: GO BRAZIL! God I hope Parreira sees the light and leaves Adriano on the bench...
June 28, 2006
Vcrisis on hiatus
Katy says: Catching up on the blog posts I may have missed due to an increased workload, I was surprised to see that Vcrisis, Alek Boyd's hard-hitting website, has gone on a temporary hiatus. Alek has never struck me as someone who minces his words, yet his parting editorial, while clearly heartfelt, is strangely vague.
Love him or hate him, Alek always had an opinion, and his website occupied an important role in the opposition blogosphere. Let's hope that whatever funk prompted Alek to shut down is only temporary. Even though I often didn't agree with his views or his language, his no-nonsense, investigative blog was a must-read for me. He will be sorely missed.
Love him or hate him, Alek always had an opinion, and his website occupied an important role in the opposition blogosphere. Let's hope that whatever funk prompted Alek to shut down is only temporary. Even though I often didn't agree with his views or his language, his no-nonsense, investigative blog was a must-read for me. He will be sorely missed.
June 25, 2006
The colors of the new power - Part 2
The second instalment of my translation of Juan Carlos Zapata's dynamite piece in this week's Descifrado en la Calle:
Zapata is a serious researcher, with un-frikkin'-believable contacts in the government. He's putting a lot of names out there - now if someone would just investigate them!
What is happening with Chavez? He faces down traditional capitalists, he faces down multinational capitalists, and he won't allow new capitalists to emerge freely. The newcomers are scared. They haven't quite emerged yet. There are some new names, but the old names are still bigger players.
Chavez is an autocrat, and the state he's trying to build is not a democratic state. He fears capitalist values, but his collaborators don't. Quite a problem. Quite a problem for Tobías Nóbrega. For Wilmer Ruperti. For Omar Sarría. For Ricardo Fernández. For Pedro Torres Ciliberto. For Carlos Batisttini. For Rafael Satría. For Arturo Sarmiento.
On April 11th, a confluence of business, the church and the armed forces tossed Chavez out of power. And if Chavez returned it;s because the elites that failed in the final years of representative democracy showed their political clumsiness once again. They showed their lack of leadership, of a vision for the country, to the point that they were unable to put together a minimal plan to ensure governability. They betrayed one another, showing themselves incapable of dealing with the imponderables of power. With that mise-en-scene, they confirmed one final time why the old model was exhausted by 1998 and why Chavez won.
However, today, the problem for Chavez is worse than on April 11th. Because:
1-He doesn't have the Church's backing
2-He's still fighting with the business class
3-More than half the country doesn't accept him
4-Emerging capitalists don't trust him for the long haul
5-The most important government leaders are starting to see him as a necessary evil, but still an evil
6-The armed forces will tilt wherever events are leading.
Why do I say the situation is worse? Because Chavez has alienated small and mid-sized businessmen, small and mid-sized agricultural producers, the traditional land-owners, the people who've traditionally struck deals with the government, old and new contractors who have no long-term guarantees that they will be recognized, and old and new capitalists who once helped him make it through the oil strike and the distribution strike in 2002-03.
When the government takes a factory by assault, when the Armed Forces take-over lands, the government's financial allies, or those who simply do business with the government, reach into their pockets, look at their check books, and rule out bringing back any dollars they have abroad. Those businessmen know that cordial relations between business and the government have not been re-established. Everyone negotiates, but everyone understands that it can't be an open and transparent interchange, because they know that within the Chavista government three currents co-exist:
1-Those who want nothing to do with business, not even as a temporary ally. This current knows they are fair-weather friends, but not partners for the future. This is the current that thinks, like Chávez, that capitalism is a virus and the market a disease. It's the most cohesive current, in terms of its plans for power.
2-The capitalist current. The one that understands the necessary alliance between various social forces, including business, as a way to buoy up the economy and guarantee social and economic progress. This force is not as powerful as the first, though it has more people in it.
3-The parasite current. The one that tilts whichever way the wind is blowing, but because of its inefficiency paralizes the state, and in so doing, works in favor of the first current, which for convenience tends to protect it and keep it as an ally.
It's not a comfortable situation for Chávez's power. It's not easy or simple. Nonetheless, he is favored by the dispersion of the capitalists, who have no unity of purpose. And yet, this could happen sooner rather than later, given how aggressive Chávez's for now inhibited plans seem to be.
What will Rafael Sarría do when someone decides to investigate his companies? How will Carlos Kaufman react when they ask him to disclose Venoco's real partners? What will Wilmer Ruperti do when they try to rope him into a congressional hearing again? What will Ricardo Fernández do when Mercal stops dealing with him? What will the Khalil brothers do if they tell them that Eveba's production is only for social purposes? What will Parmigiani and governor Rodriguez do in Vargas? What will all the cooperatives do when they are forced to give away their production because they have received Chavez's money? What will the Chávez brothers do in Barinas? Will they just take it if someone tries to give away what they've accumulated? What will Mercal's private sector intermediaries do when the government tells them they've become too powerful in the distribution chain and so they've become dangerous agents infected with the virus of capitalism? What will Orlando Castro, who has been reborn as a Chavez-era businessman, do? How will Alito Uzcátegui and the Empresarios por Venezuela do when they're told to quit being capitalists? And what will Alberto Cudemus, the pork sector guru, when opportunities start to close for him? What will Luis Felipe Acosta Carles do with Carlos Batisttini and Jorge Motta? What's going to happen with Diosdado Cabello, who says that to develop the country today we need the help of private enterprise and businessmen? What's going to happen with someone who says outright that his model businessman is Oswaldo Cisneros? What will happen to his friend, Omar Camero? What might happen with him and Sarría, who at the right time saved Banesco and Juan Carlos Escotet from Chávez's wrath? And what will happen to José Vielma Mora, who says he is no communist, is a friend of Lorenzo Mendoza, and that Polar is a company that does the country good, while Chávez and the radicals set their sights on Polar? And what about Wilmar Castro Soteldo, the minister who understands the importance of private investment? And what will Acosta Carles's destiny be, given his close link with Carabobo and Caracas businessmen? And what's going to happen with all those who, from the government, help their friends, and their friends' friends, to do business with the government? And what will happen with the friends Luis Velásquez Alvaray left behind? And what's going to happen with the military officers who think only about hoarding money and stashing it away in hard currency, land, and real estate? And what ever happened to José Vicente Rangel, whose family loves the high life? What ever happened with José Vicente Rangel, Pedro Torres Ciliberto's personal friend? And what about Ismael García y the business people clustered around his party, Podemos? And when did we last hear of Alí Rodríguez, who's left the whole Utopian Socialist stage well behind him? And what about the business buddies of Monagas governor José Gregorio Briceño? And how will governor Eduardo Manuitt react, being a businessman and independent farmer by nature? And what will happen with Juan Barreto and his coterie of capitalist friends like Alex del Nogal, Ruperti, Humberto Petricca? And what will happen with former Finance Minister Jesús Bermúdez's many, many friends? And what is going to happen with the crony bankers protected by Finance Minister Nelson Merentes? And what's going to happen when Tobías Nóbregas's network of protected friends is made public? Does Alejandro Dopazo sleep easy at night in New York? And what ever happened to the former Agriculture Minister Albarrán? And what about the Cadivi intermediaries? And what about Nicolás Maduro's friends, and Pedro Carreño's, and Francisco Ameliach's? And how about those involved with Jesse Chacón, the ones incriminated by the evidence Velásquez Alvaray has?
Zapata is a serious researcher, with un-frikkin'-believable contacts in the government. He's putting a lot of names out there - now if someone would just investigate them!
June 24, 2006
The colors of the new power - Part 1
Juan Carlos Zapata has written an excellent but far too long article in this week's Descifrado en la Calle. I'll translate chunks of it, in parts.
(Incidentally, JCZ, buddy, you're a good analyst but BOY do you need an editor! You could knock out at least 20% of the words in this article without losing any content.)
(Incidentally, JCZ, buddy, you're a good analyst but BOY do you need an editor! You could knock out at least 20% of the words in this article without losing any content.)
Extracts:
What will Chavez do when the contradictions at the heart of the revolution burst into the open? Because they will burst, as they burst with Luis Miquilena, who Chavez called his father in private but in private, between confidants, linked to the past. The Chavista generals knew that the old man was an obstacle to Chavez's purposes, because Chavez knew that Miquilena didn't understand him, didn't agree or approve of talk of revolution or socialism or taking apart the capitalist system, or his siding with Fidel Castro. And so he was faced down by Chavismo's left wing and, in the end, with Chávez himself.
And as they burst with Luis Alfonso Dávila, a right wing military man who traveled the country with Chávez when he was just starting to build his political project, who would chair Congress and become foreign and interior minister. After Miquilena left he also faced the leftist wing of chavismo: he made a grab for control of MVR, was picked out by the movement's vultures, cornered and defeated.
The winners were Chávez and Diosdado Cabello, and their allies. In just a few years they cleansed the movement of outmoded right-wingers - like Davila and viceadmiral Gruber Odremán, and of groups with roots in the past - like those lead by Luis Miquilena and Tobías Carrero, among others. Having cleaned house, they have become lords and masters of the revolutión. But it's obvious that ideology still separates them. While Chávez fights capitalism, Diosdado Cabello cheers it and protects it.
There is no question: the contradictions will blow into the open again because what's a stake in Venezuela is a conception of the state, of the system. How far will the allies go along with Chávez in deepening an anti-capitalist revolution? How far will they back his constitutional changes to guarantee he can perpetuate himself in the presidency?
The Bolibourgeoisie, born of the Chavez era, might claim the spaces it has won at any time - including the space to make agreements with traditional and multinacional capitalists, because nothing is more pragmatic than capital.
Neither Juan Vicente Gómez nor Pérez Jiménez nor Rómulo Betancourt would hang out at the Caracas Country Club, but they understood their tacit pact with capital. Chávez doesn't go to the Country Club and, at the same time, wants to take apart a system for coexistence that has been in place since the Republic exists, since 1830, where, according to historian Ramón J. Velásquez, the generals rule, the learned make the laws and the rich do business. Since Gómez's time, no head of state had accumulated so much power - in fact, it may not be totally crazy to affirm that Chávez has accumulated more power than Gómez.
In 1998, when the business elite ended up backing Chávez, they thought that the 1830 pact would remain intact, that the partition of powers would continue. But the last few years shows that the regime's goal is not just to break the pact - which it has already done formally - but to go beyond that and to take apart the system that underlies the pact.
"The long term objective, in the economy, is to transcend the capitalist model," said Chávez on November 12, 2004 talking to a meeting of government officials. "The capitalist economic model is inviable, impossible. We, the leaders - especially the leaders - have to be very clear about that."
This is why Chavez lumps the entire business establishment together into just one big fascist, counter-revolutionary oligarchy. And so he has taken on the challenge to dominate it and destroy it if needs be.
And yet, while he says that for now "we are not considering getting rid of private property...at this time (2004) that would be crazy...it's not the right time," and at the same time he says "nobody knows what will happen in the future," a good part of the leadership that surrounds him has very different goals: to become the new big players in the business world, to take the spot of the Polar Group, the Cisneros Group, the bankers, etc. That's the deep divide in chavismo. The major contradiction that sooner or later will burst open within the movement. And Chávez knows it. Chávez suspects it. That's why he keeps talking about Juan Vicente Gómez's treachery against Cipriano Castro and he talks about Gómez's surrender to the Caracas oligarchy.
"We must think through the creation of a new economic system. We can't do that in two or five years, that would be a lie," says Chávez. Many who listen to him think of the utopian nature of the discourse, and rather than utopias they prefer to stuff their pockets.
And so after seven years of bolivarian revolution, power has become military-political domination. The Armed Forces' High Command, the Army Command and the MVR's National Tactical Command all respond to Chávez orders, as both political and military leader, and from their orders are handed on down to the military bureaucracy, which dominates not just the armed forces but also the key structures of the government and the state. The National Assembly, the Supreme Tribunal, the National Electoral Council, the Prosecutors, the Ombudsman and the Comptroller, all see their space for action reduced until they've become mere puppets in a system with a democratic facade.
The minority of the structure is powerful, and within that minority there is the president, who accepts no decentralized political decisions from governors, ministers, parlamentarians or heads of State-owned enterprises. When the finance minister, for instance, announces a decision, he has no problem saying that the decision has been made but the president has the last word, when pro-government candidates are selected for the National Assembly, the leaders have no problem admitting that the president has the last word; when Caracas Mayor Juan Barreto announces a plan, the publicity highlights the president's name; when a little square is opened in any town in Venezuela, the mayor unveils a little plaque saying the public work is due to Hugo Chavez.
These details reflect the domination of that autarkic power, which demands of its followers that they must repeat, again and again, "fatherland or death," "with Chavez unto death," and "Chavez is the people."
The military caudillo cannot accept doubts of any kind, and therefore demands total subservience, and if this stops happening that would be a dangerous signal of a crisis. It also explains why the caudillo prefers to set up a parallel state, to set up the bolivarian schools, the Bolivarian University, the adult education missions, and why he attacks private education and limits autonomous universities: to sow feelings of personal loyalty and loyalty to the revolution. It doesn't matter that the level at the Bolivarian University or Mision Sucre fall far short of quality standards. The problem isn't quality, it's loyalty. Loyalty is proof of love for the caudillo.
But then others say: my loyalty is money.
June 22, 2006
There's more to the shooting
Katy says: This news item from Unión Radio continues the story from my previous post. Laura Toro, the Dean of FACES College where the shooting took place, fears for her life on campus. She claims the shooters began calling for her after the incident.
Prof. Toro says she and a colleague have been recieving death threats for days, and she linked these happenings to the decision by Venezuela's Supreme Tribunal to suspend student body elections at ULA, where chavismo was expected to lose.
If one is to believe Prof. Toro and University Pres. Rodríguez, these shootings are not random, isolated incidents. Something is brewing at ULA, something probably not unrelated to
Prof. Toro says she and a colleague have been recieving death threats for days, and she linked these happenings to the decision by Venezuela's Supreme Tribunal to suspend student body elections at ULA, where chavismo was expected to lose.
If one is to believe Prof. Toro and University Pres. Rodríguez, these shootings are not random, isolated incidents. Something is brewing at ULA, something probably not unrelated to
- chavismo constantly losing university elections;
- Pres. Chávez's announcement to eliminate nation-wide University standardized admittance tests;
- the surge in the amount of weapons on the street;
- the government's violation of university autonomy; and
- the impunity in our legal system.
The pretty-well-armed revolution
Katy says: This El Universal note sent shivers down my spine. While PSF chuggers comfortably spin about Venezuela from their First-World ivory towers or their VIO offices with a view of the Potomac, they should spare a thought for university students at one of Venezuela's oldest and most prestigious institutions trying to study while dodging bullets.
With FALs now in the hands of the civilian population, is this a preview of things to come?
"The President of the University of the Andes, Lester Rodríguez, reported that two of its students were wounded today in a gunfight. Nevertheless, he claimed that 'the situation at FACES College is under control ... there is a tense calm, of course, but the situation is under control.'
One of the wounded students was identified as Alfredo Contreras, who was taken to the Integral Medial Center of the Andes University after being hit by a bullet in the leg, presumably by another student who shot him with a 9 mm. weapon.
Several students were eyewitnesses to the incident and are currently giving their accounts at the Prosecutor's Office, the university's President said to Globovisión.Rodríguez said that he had spoken this afternoon with Lt. Cegarra, general secretary of the Mérida Governor's office, to schedule a meeting tomorrow with Gov. Florencio Porras, so they can work on a disarmament plan.
The university President stated that 'regrettably we have students bearing arms on campus. This situation is no longer sustainable, it is out of control, so it's not only infiltrated individuals anymore, now we also have students aremd with 9 mm. weapons inside the ULA.'
According to the president, there is little the university's authorities can do to control the access and the use of firearms on campus."
June 21, 2006
June 20, 2006
The Unforgettable Bash
This is my Tio Pepe's column in today's Universal.
The unforgettable bash
by José Toro Hardy
We Venezuelans are enjoying one of the greatest bashes of our history. Taking advantage of our swollen oil revenues, which are not the outcome of anyone's effort but rather of oil prices higher than we'd ever dreamed, we have gone on a collective consumption binge, forgetting that no society can survive if it doesn't produce.
Far from sowing the oil, as Arturo Uslar Pietri so often recommended, it seems like the governing leadership has coined a marvelous new formula to consume it directly, chugging it from the well. There's no longer any question of taking on great investments or winning markets. There's no need to worry about the feasibility of any project. Who cares? We have more money than we know what to do with.
The old sing-song about the need to be efficient and productive was just the babble of the old PDVSA, that discredited oil meritocracy that wanted to swindle Venezuelans into believing that the hydrocarbon industry is a knowledge-intensive business. None of that seems to make sense anymore. Now PDVSA belongs to everyone and therefore we all have the right to take a swing at that piñata. And not just all Venezuelans. All revolutionaries all around the world as well.
A magical new formula seems to have sprung from the government's labs. It allows us to turn oil into a sort of fascinating elixir that can be consumed directly, causing a feeling of collective happiness.
Nobody can doubt the efficiency of this new formula. Its results are out in the open. For instance, last year, thanks to the effects of this portentous beverage, Venezuela's GDP grew by 9.5%. And yet, that amazing result was achieved creating just 38,000 new jobs. So we have a mechanism that demonstrates the very high productivity of these new economic policies. I'm convinced that those who designed them should be awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics and honorary doctorates from all the best universities.
Chugging our petroleum straight out of the well, as though we're drinking milk from a cow's udder, has considerable advantages. For instance, so far this year, public spending has risen 67% from a year earlier, and in the first quarter imports totaled almost $6 billion. What more could we want?
The instant gratification our society gets is indubitable. For example, so far this year, retail sales have risen 29.8% and wholesaling has grown 51.8%. Other numbers ratify the virtues of the new model. Just in January 2006, car sales grew 112.7% compared to the same month the previous year. And that's nothing. Home appliance sales rose 136%, while textile, clothing, footwear and leather items grew 40.4%. Again, what more could we want?
Venezuelans are swimming in money. Liquidity in the hands of the public exceeds Bs.80 trillion . Who the hell cares that the Central Bank lost Bs.300 billion ($140 million) on the sale of domestic bonds aimed at mopping up excess liquidity to slow down inflation.
This society is finally shaking off all of the economists' pedantries. When it comes down to it, how does it affect us that the government grabbed over $10 billion out of the international reserves and transferred them to Fonden? In fact, to show that you can do that and much more, the government has decided to withdraw another billion dollars out of reserves to send them to a social fund. So what? Haven't the BCV directors told us that Central Banks don't go bankrupt?
The government's detractors insist on scaring us telling us that investment (public and private) is insufficient. Who cares about investing if we're all consuming like never before? Isn't the point of investing to obtain profits so you can consume more later? Well, we're already consuming more, without having to invest. Why worry?
It reminds me of an old story about a fisherman from Margarita:
"Why would I work more?" asks the fisherman.
"So you have money later on and you can retire and rest," said the gringo he was talking to.
"But that's what I'm doing now," replied the fisherman.
And where does all this leave us? Well, tomorrow will take care of itself. For now we're having a hell of a bash; it's an election year. Later on we'll have to pick up the broken glass.
Totalitarian Tendency Watch: Arepita de manteca...
...pa'mamá que da la...
A press release sent out by the Ministry of Information and Communications this week reaches an absurd new low in terms of politicizing the eminently apolitical. A note on the government's commitment to encourage breastfeeding carried the headline: "The First Act of Food Sovereignty."
Apparently, breastfeeding is only considered praiseworthy if it can somehow be turned into another lego-piece in the government's indoctrination strategy.
A press release sent out by the Ministry of Information and Communications this week reaches an absurd new low in terms of politicizing the eminently apolitical. A note on the government's commitment to encourage breastfeeding carried the headline: "The First Act of Food Sovereignty."
Apparently, breastfeeding is only considered praiseworthy if it can somehow be turned into another lego-piece in the government's indoctrination strategy.
June 16, 2006
ANTV and the Neutrality of Futbol
Long time readers know that I occassionally blow a gasket when lazy Opposition talking heads describe the government as "totalitarian." Following on Hannah Arendt's classic definition, I've argued that a Totalitarian government is one that seeks to control every aspect of social life - even the non-political aspects - whereas a mere dictatorship is happy just to control every aspect of political life. Chavez, for me, is an autocrat - not even a full on authoritarian yet - because it's controlling every aspect of the state that he has concentrated on.
For Arendt, the key to Totalitarianism is an irrational drive to control everything, even matters that are deeply apolitical. In a famous passage, she writes:
For Arendt, the key to Totalitarianism is an irrational drive to control everything, even matters that are deeply apolitical. In a famous passage, she writes:
"If totalitarianism takes its own claim seriously, it must finish once and for all with 'the neutrality of chess,' that is, with the autonomous existence of any activity whatsoever. From the point of view of totalitarian rulers, a society devoted to chess for the sake of chess is only in degree different and less dangerous than a class of farmers for the sake of farming.It always seemed to me like a crazy exaggeration to put Chavez in that league. But are there pressures in that direction? Well, read this Descifrado bit and you tell me:
Tha National Assembly's TV Channel, ANTV, shows World Cup highlights from Germany 2006 each night. But it's not a traditional highlight reel with goals and nice plays. The show has its ideological slant, and at this point it's just laughable. That's the revolution. For instance, last night dealing with Spain-Ukraine, the commentators explained that Ukraine was the victim of bad refereeing because it was a country that was part of the Soviet Union. The commentator recalled that in Soviet times, referees and FIFA had a conspiracy against Socialist Countries, which victimized the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc. The idea, he said, was that no socialist country should ever win the World Cup to cover up how great their sports were. The funny thing is that today in 2006, Ukraine is a democracy, but for these commentators it is still socialist and a victim of FIFA's imperial power.Sigh. This is so sad. Another shared social space where Venezuelans could come together irrespective of politics is extinguished. So much for the Neutrality of Futbol.
June 15, 2006
June 14, 2006
"We've shown that we're not authoritarian..."
...so, hell, we've practically earned the right to make some authoritarian moves...
(This Bloomberg piece no tiene pérdida, so I'll reproduce the whole thing:)
(This Bloomberg piece no tiene pérdida, so I'll reproduce the whole thing:)
June 14 (Bloomberg) -- Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez said he may shut down television stations for criticizing the government and broadcasting ``messages of hate.''
Chavez said the government has begun to review all television concessions, which expire in 2007. Chavez did not specify which stations may be shut down.
``We can't keep giving concessions to a group of people who use television stations against us,'' Chavez said in a televised speech in Caracas. ``Every day they broadcast messages of hate, of disrespect toward institutions, of doubt among us, rumors, psychological war to divide the nation.''
Chavez, 51, said some television stations helped plot a two-day coup he survived in 2002. The former army lieutenant colonel, who led a failed coup in 1992, is seeking a second six- year term in office in the December elections.
``They hide behind a supposed freedom of speech,'' said Chavez, who was wearing a green army uniform and red beret. ``I don't care what the oligarchs of the world say. We've shown that we aren't authoritarian or arbitrary.''
Chavez made his comments during a ceremony to receive the first 30,000 Russian Kalashnikov AK-103 rifles out of an eventual 100,000 Venezuela will buy this year.
Venezuela purchased the rifles to defend against a possible invasion by the U.S., Chavez said. The U.S. State Department has said the country has no plans to invade Venezuela.
Chavez also said today that Venezuela plans to buy Russian helicopters and build a factory to make rifles and bullets.
``We need a level of consciousness so we are willing to die for what we defend,'' Chavez said while holding one of the new rifles. ``Soldiers, this rifle is your new girlfriend. A real soldier loves his rifle.''
Hugo Chavez stroking his new girlfriend...
I am the fatherland
Katy says: These daily news summaries that I get can be eye-opening. Notice how different media outlets treat the same news item:
Globovisión: "Alan García se niega a disculparse ante Chávez"
(Alan García refuses to apologize to Chávez.)
El Universal: "Alan García descartó disculparse ante Chávez"
(Alan García rules out apologizing to Chávez)
Úlitmas Noticias: "Alan García no se disculpará con Chávez"
(Alan García will not apologize to Chávez.)
2001: "Alan García rechaza disculparse con Hugo Chávez"
(Alan García rejects apologizing to Hugo Chávez.)
State Television (VTV): "Alan García se negó a ofrecer disculpas a Venezuela"
(Alan García refused to apologize to Venezuela.)
Soon VTV will begin telling protesting chavistas to go and eat cake.
Globovisión: "Alan García se niega a disculparse ante Chávez"
(Alan García refuses to apologize to Chávez.)
El Universal: "Alan García descartó disculparse ante Chávez"
(Alan García rules out apologizing to Chávez)
Úlitmas Noticias: "Alan García no se disculpará con Chávez"
(Alan García will not apologize to Chávez.)
2001: "Alan García rechaza disculparse con Hugo Chávez"
(Alan García rejects apologizing to Hugo Chávez.)
State Television (VTV): "Alan García se negó a ofrecer disculpas a Venezuela"
(Alan García refused to apologize to Venezuela.)
Soon VTV will begin telling protesting chavistas to go and eat cake.
Spain's turn...
Well, Daniel's favorites, France, embarrassed themselves yesterday. Today it's my favorite team's turn. Will Spain play a decent World Cup for once? Read all about it over at the World Cup blog...
June 12, 2006
...and after that he's off to Siam, Tanganyika, Prussia and Eastern Slavonia...
...on yesterday's Aló, delincuente, Chavez announced plans for his Axis of Evil World Tour '06, with the obligatory stops in Iran and Russia but also a highly unusual visit to North Korea and a courtesy call in a country he referred to as "North Vietnam." I kid you not...
June 11, 2006
Day 3: Holland v. Serbia & Montenegro - Montenegro
You've heard about the arroz-con-pollo-sin-pollo...today, we get to see a team that represents a country that no longer exists. Though the team qualified for the world cup as Serbia & Montenegro, the Montenegrins voted on a referendum to split the country in two last month - leaving us with Serbia-con-Montenegro-sin-Montenegro. I guess for the purposes of the World Cup, Montenegrin players will still play, but it's probably an unprecedented situation.
Won't matter much on the field - their two top players are both Serbs, both aging, both very good. Inter's Dejan Stankovic is a World Class central midfielder, and one of the most popular players in the Italian Serie A. Osasuna's Savo Milosevic (no relation) is a very talented goal scorer and could make problems for everyone. The rest of the team...well, don't know about them.
Holland shouldn't have a problem this afternoon. Robben and Van Nistelrooy are at the top of their game, Van Bronckhorst is still one of the best offense-minded defenders around, and Van der Sar is one of the greatest goalkeepers playing in Germany this year. Plus everyone says Van Basten has put an end to the prima-donnaish hissy-fits that have long hampered the Dutch national team. But then Sweden REALLY shouldn't have had a problem yesterday and bombed disastrously. So who can tell? Holland 1, Serbia 0.
Iran-Mexico and Angola-Portugal I neither know enough nor care enough to comment on...
Won't matter much on the field - their two top players are both Serbs, both aging, both very good. Inter's Dejan Stankovic is a World Class central midfielder, and one of the most popular players in the Italian Serie A. Osasuna's Savo Milosevic (no relation) is a very talented goal scorer and could make problems for everyone. The rest of the team...well, don't know about them.
Holland shouldn't have a problem this afternoon. Robben and Van Nistelrooy are at the top of their game, Van Bronckhorst is still one of the best offense-minded defenders around, and Van der Sar is one of the greatest goalkeepers playing in Germany this year. Plus everyone says Van Basten has put an end to the prima-donnaish hissy-fits that have long hampered the Dutch national team. But then Sweden REALLY shouldn't have had a problem yesterday and bombed disastrously. So who can tell? Holland 1, Serbia 0.
Iran-Mexico and Angola-Portugal I neither know enough nor care enough to comment on...
June 10, 2006
Where in the world is Luis Velasquez Alvaray?!
Well, LVA was a no-show at his National Assembly hearing. Guy was promptly, unanimously sacked and the rumor going around over at Noticiero Digital is that he skipped the country. His right-hand guy, Antonio Barazate - the same guy who tried to do an end-run around the Maduro faction by buttering up Chavez's mom - shot himself in Barinas when it became clear LVA was throwing in the towel. Barinas faction chieftain Pedro Carreño conspicuously also failed to show up at LVA's hearing, suggesting his clique is quickly reaching an Ameliachesque level of disfavor.
How to read this? Well, my conjecture is that this signals the ascendancy of the Maduro faction. It's just imaginable - though staggering in its implications - that the barely literate former rabble-rousing bus driver is really succeeding in establishing his people as the dominant force in the chavista faction wars. Which is good news for midgets near and far - and for their white-powder dealing higher-ups. It's interesting thinking through this development alongside Jack Sweeney's piece on the changes in the State Department staff dealing with Venezuela. Jack notes that more and more counter-narcotics types are getting assigned to Foggy Bottom's Venezuela desk. Put that in your pipe and smoke it.
How to read this? Well, my conjecture is that this signals the ascendancy of the Maduro faction. It's just imaginable - though staggering in its implications - that the barely literate former rabble-rousing bus driver is really succeeding in establishing his people as the dominant force in the chavista faction wars. Which is good news for midgets near and far - and for their white-powder dealing higher-ups. It's interesting thinking through this development alongside Jack Sweeney's piece on the changes in the State Department staff dealing with Venezuela. Jack notes that more and more counter-narcotics types are getting assigned to Foggy Bottom's Venezuela desk. Put that in your pipe and smoke it.
Day 2: England-Paraguay, Argentina-Ivory Coast
Three games today, including two good ones.
England-Paraguay: England is my pick to win the tournament, so I'm eager to see them playing a credible team right from the start. Paraguay has a history of advancing, but they'll have to get results against England and/or Sweden to get to the second round, which will be hard. England - and spare me the anglophobe comments - is flat out fantastic this year. Especially in mid-field - where futbol matches are won - the concentration of talent is frightening. Steven Gerard, Joe Cole, David Beckham and Frank Lampard are, all four of them, just show-stoppers. And their reputed striking difficulties are overblown - Owen is fit, and injured wunderkind Rooney's replacement Peter Crouch (all 6 feet and 7 inches of him - and as good with his feet as with his head) has been terrorizing defenses all year. (My pet theory is that Rooney will get fit by the second round and then have trouble earning a place back from Crouch.) I say England 2 - Paraguay 0.
Argentina-Ivory Coast: Play starts in the "group of death" tonight with Argentina taking on the best of the first-time participants. The BBC had an excellent report on World Cup fever in the war-torn Ivory Coast (click here and slide to 33:16) and, frankly, it's hard not to root for them. The Ivorians have at least three top-level players - Chelsea's intimidating striker Didier Drogba and Arsenal's on-form defensive duplet Eboué-Touré - whereas Argentina is still relying on Riquelme after all these years, and on the over-hyped teenager Messi. I say Argentina 1 - Ivory Coast 1. (Still, with Holland and Serbia-Montenegro - a talented team without a country - also in the group, the fight to qualify will be a cuchillo.)
There's also Sweden-Trinidad & Tobago, but that one's barely worth watching. The Trinidadians - who are only in the world cup cuz they're in the absurdly over-represented Concacaf qualifying group - will be aiming merely to prevent humiliation. I say they'll fail, and call it Sweden 3 - T&T 0.) Sweden, incidentally, could get pretty far in this tournament with a little luck. They have two of my favorite players (Lundberg and Zlatan - the class!) and Larsson to boot. It'll be important for them to try to actually win Group B (which also has England and Paraguay) because the second-place team in the group looks sure to end up playing Germany in the second round: not a pretty prospect.
England-Paraguay: England is my pick to win the tournament, so I'm eager to see them playing a credible team right from the start. Paraguay has a history of advancing, but they'll have to get results against England and/or Sweden to get to the second round, which will be hard. England - and spare me the anglophobe comments - is flat out fantastic this year. Especially in mid-field - where futbol matches are won - the concentration of talent is frightening. Steven Gerard, Joe Cole, David Beckham and Frank Lampard are, all four of them, just show-stoppers. And their reputed striking difficulties are overblown - Owen is fit, and injured wunderkind Rooney's replacement Peter Crouch (all 6 feet and 7 inches of him - and as good with his feet as with his head) has been terrorizing defenses all year. (My pet theory is that Rooney will get fit by the second round and then have trouble earning a place back from Crouch.) I say England 2 - Paraguay 0.
Argentina-Ivory Coast: Play starts in the "group of death" tonight with Argentina taking on the best of the first-time participants. The BBC had an excellent report on World Cup fever in the war-torn Ivory Coast (click here and slide to 33:16) and, frankly, it's hard not to root for them. The Ivorians have at least three top-level players - Chelsea's intimidating striker Didier Drogba and Arsenal's on-form defensive duplet Eboué-Touré - whereas Argentina is still relying on Riquelme after all these years, and on the over-hyped teenager Messi. I say Argentina 1 - Ivory Coast 1. (Still, with Holland and Serbia-Montenegro - a talented team without a country - also in the group, the fight to qualify will be a cuchillo.)
There's also Sweden-Trinidad & Tobago, but that one's barely worth watching. The Trinidadians - who are only in the world cup cuz they're in the absurdly over-represented Concacaf qualifying group - will be aiming merely to prevent humiliation. I say they'll fail, and call it Sweden 3 - T&T 0.) Sweden, incidentally, could get pretty far in this tournament with a little luck. They have two of my favorite players (Lundberg and Zlatan - the class!) and Larsson to boot. It'll be important for them to try to actually win Group B (which also has England and Paraguay) because the second-place team in the group looks sure to end up playing Germany in the second round: not a pretty prospect.
June 9, 2006
Gangland stuff
Thinking about the way Venezuela is perceived abroad, perhaps what's hardest to convey is the way gangland tactics have colonized the regime. Europeans, used to thinking about politics as a struggle for control over the institutions that make and apply laws, can't begin to fathom the extent of their collapse in Venezuela. Their understanding of "politics" has no room for the aggressive pursuit of state loot we're seeing. And I'm not talking about mere corruption here. Because the opposition keeps framing the issue in corruption terms, but the word badly mischaracterizes the problem - if it was just corruption, it wouldn't be so bad.
It isn't, though: it's out and out gangsterism.
Corruption, in itself, need not be a social disaster. Italy, Greece, Brazil and even South Korea show that it's possible for an economy to grow consistently over decades, creating a massive middle class, even with a lot of corruption in the system. Once institutionalized in a stable way, corruption can be made compatible with long term growth and social development.
In Italy, the Christian Democrats institutionalized an elaborate system for distributing corruption rents between insiders - longstanding officials in key posts within the party acted as gate-keepers to the loot, harmonizing the interests of the various party factions and bringing a measure of order and predictability to the looting. Mexico's PRI institutionalized a system of 6-year "turns" for various factions to get their hands on the goodies, with the understanding that each new government would cover up for the last. Both systems lasted for decades, and both were compatible with growing incomes and rising living standards.
Every corrupt regime that stands the test of time realizes sooner or later that no amount of money is enough to satisfy every player's craving for state rents if everyone's scrambling for the loot at the same time, because it's never in a parasite's interest to kill the host organism. To make the system work, to make the system last, you need some informal institutionalization. You have to establish a stable set of unwritten "rules of the road" for corrupt officials and wannabes to bring a measure of predictability and stability to their actions. You need some widely-shared understandings of the Dos and Don'ts - if the standard kickback is going to be 10% of the contract's value, you need to apply that consistently, both to give the payers a measure of predictability and, more importantly, to make sure that no faction in the regime feels like it's getting a worse deal than any other.
Much of it is about regulating relations between top-level crooks and the class of aspiring bandits a step down from them on the organizational ladder. A stable corrupt system has to have a way to reassure second-tier thieves that, if they go along and get along, if they follow the implicit rules without raising a fuss or trying to jump the queue, they will, in time, get their shot at being first-tier pillos with access to the really big bucks. Without an implicit, stable seniority system, there's no way to control the competition for spoils between factions.
Even chickens understand that they need a pecking order.
What's new and scary about kleptobolivarianism is that there seems to be no stable pecking order, no institutionalized system for regulating and stabilizing the looting. Without it, the scramble for loot all too easily succumbs to gangland logic.
The Luis Velasquez Alvaray scandal provides a startling glimpse of chavismo's serious difficulties in institutionalizing corruption. Even in the upper echelons of the kleptocracy, you can never feel quite safe in your position. At any time, some other faction could make a play for your faction's racket. You may be getting obscenely rich, but you have to sleep with one eye open.
In such circumstances, your only insurance is to be more aggressive than the other guy. To steal more, faster in order to secure your position before you find yourself in trouble. To stash away enough compromising material on the other guy to make sure you can blackmail him in case he decides to go after you - (hell, LVA said explicitly that that was his game!) And, increasingly, to be willing to turn to violence if that's the only way your short-term interests can be secured.
Only problem is that if every faction starts following this logic at the same time, the result is pretty much anarchy. We end up with what we're seeing more and more: gangland stuff.
In this sense, the Danilo Anderson murder really was a watershed moment in Venezuela's recent history - an event whose full impact we are only now starting to appreciate. More and more, I think that the laughably amateurish cover-up was not merely a matter of incompetence. That somebody high up wanted to send a message - you can and will be killed if you cross me - and could only send it effectively if everyone in the country could SEE that the murder had been covered up. There's just no other explanation I can fathom for the opera buffa starring Giovanny Vasquez de Armas.
Because we can sit here and argue for months. But the reality is that the top, say, 3,000 people in the regime, they know. They know exactly who killed Danilo Anderson, and they more or less know why. They got the message. They understand that in the absence of any stable mechanism to institutionalize the looting, disputes will end up getting settled at the point of a gun. Just ask Luisa Coronel, Francisco Ameliach's assistant.
So this is what it's come to. The opposition keeps talking about corruption, but the reality is that corruption, in the old sense, is something for Venezuela to aspire to these days. It sounds morbid, but a system for looting state resources in an orderly fashion would be far preferable to what we're getting now.
It isn't, though: it's out and out gangsterism.
Corruption, in itself, need not be a social disaster. Italy, Greece, Brazil and even South Korea show that it's possible for an economy to grow consistently over decades, creating a massive middle class, even with a lot of corruption in the system. Once institutionalized in a stable way, corruption can be made compatible with long term growth and social development.
In Italy, the Christian Democrats institutionalized an elaborate system for distributing corruption rents between insiders - longstanding officials in key posts within the party acted as gate-keepers to the loot, harmonizing the interests of the various party factions and bringing a measure of order and predictability to the looting. Mexico's PRI institutionalized a system of 6-year "turns" for various factions to get their hands on the goodies, with the understanding that each new government would cover up for the last. Both systems lasted for decades, and both were compatible with growing incomes and rising living standards.
Every corrupt regime that stands the test of time realizes sooner or later that no amount of money is enough to satisfy every player's craving for state rents if everyone's scrambling for the loot at the same time, because it's never in a parasite's interest to kill the host organism. To make the system work, to make the system last, you need some informal institutionalization. You have to establish a stable set of unwritten "rules of the road" for corrupt officials and wannabes to bring a measure of predictability and stability to their actions. You need some widely-shared understandings of the Dos and Don'ts - if the standard kickback is going to be 10% of the contract's value, you need to apply that consistently, both to give the payers a measure of predictability and, more importantly, to make sure that no faction in the regime feels like it's getting a worse deal than any other.
Much of it is about regulating relations between top-level crooks and the class of aspiring bandits a step down from them on the organizational ladder. A stable corrupt system has to have a way to reassure second-tier thieves that, if they go along and get along, if they follow the implicit rules without raising a fuss or trying to jump the queue, they will, in time, get their shot at being first-tier pillos with access to the really big bucks. Without an implicit, stable seniority system, there's no way to control the competition for spoils between factions.
Even chickens understand that they need a pecking order.
What's new and scary about kleptobolivarianism is that there seems to be no stable pecking order, no institutionalized system for regulating and stabilizing the looting. Without it, the scramble for loot all too easily succumbs to gangland logic.
The Luis Velasquez Alvaray scandal provides a startling glimpse of chavismo's serious difficulties in institutionalizing corruption. Even in the upper echelons of the kleptocracy, you can never feel quite safe in your position. At any time, some other faction could make a play for your faction's racket. You may be getting obscenely rich, but you have to sleep with one eye open.
In such circumstances, your only insurance is to be more aggressive than the other guy. To steal more, faster in order to secure your position before you find yourself in trouble. To stash away enough compromising material on the other guy to make sure you can blackmail him in case he decides to go after you - (hell, LVA said explicitly that that was his game!) And, increasingly, to be willing to turn to violence if that's the only way your short-term interests can be secured.
Only problem is that if every faction starts following this logic at the same time, the result is pretty much anarchy. We end up with what we're seeing more and more: gangland stuff.
In this sense, the Danilo Anderson murder really was a watershed moment in Venezuela's recent history - an event whose full impact we are only now starting to appreciate. More and more, I think that the laughably amateurish cover-up was not merely a matter of incompetence. That somebody high up wanted to send a message - you can and will be killed if you cross me - and could only send it effectively if everyone in the country could SEE that the murder had been covered up. There's just no other explanation I can fathom for the opera buffa starring Giovanny Vasquez de Armas.
Because we can sit here and argue for months. But the reality is that the top, say, 3,000 people in the regime, they know. They know exactly who killed Danilo Anderson, and they more or less know why. They got the message. They understand that in the absence of any stable mechanism to institutionalize the looting, disputes will end up getting settled at the point of a gun. Just ask Luisa Coronel, Francisco Ameliach's assistant.
So this is what it's come to. The opposition keeps talking about corruption, but the reality is that corruption, in the old sense, is something for Venezuela to aspire to these days. It sounds morbid, but a system for looting state resources in an orderly fashion would be far preferable to what we're getting now.
June 8, 2006
The consumption boom and how he told it...
It's a challenge that every reporter assigned to cover the economy has to face: how to write about an irreducibly complex topic without either dumbing the story down or sending the reader into a boredom-induced catatonic comma. Jens Gould demonstrates how it can be done well in this piece in yesterday's New York Times:
It's worth reading the whole thing. The only thing I would've done differently is that I would've leaned on the we've-been-here-before-angle more - cuz the current boomlet is such a 1975 redux it makes you weep. On the other hand, I my reporting probably wouldn't have been as good...
With oil revenue flowing into its coffers, the government is spending like never before on social development programs that free up cash for the poor by providing free education and health care and cheap food. Wage increases and infrastructure projects also fill the economy with money that filters down to Venezuelans' pockets. As a result, consumers are buying more each year, helping Venezuela post growth that exceeded 9 percent last year and in the first quarter of 2006.
But economists here and abroad say that such rosy indicators are part of an artificial economic boom that could later hurt the country; the spending spree, they say, is masking the fundamental limitations of an economy propped up by spending, but failing to generate enough new private investment to sustain longer-term growth and job creation.
It's worth reading the whole thing. The only thing I would've done differently is that I would've leaned on the we've-been-here-before-angle more - cuz the current boomlet is such a 1975 redux it makes you weep. On the other hand, I my reporting probably wouldn't have been as good...
Teodoro Petkoff still hasn't understood what draws the poor to Chavez
Picking up where I left off yesterday, I wanted to comment on this bit from Teodoro's interview in El Mundo on Tuesday:
Teodoro has been playing on variations of this riff for some time: Chavez's one merit is that he put poverty at the center of the national debate. I think that's wrong, in a subtle but deep way.
For as long as I can remember, the "social question" has been at the center of Venezuela's national debate. It's not like Luis Herrera beat Piñerúa in the 1978 election because Piñerúa didn't talk about poverty. It's not as if Lusinchi campaigned on a platform of abolishing inherittance taxes. No! Every government in the democratic era has come to power with a discourse about poverty. There's nothing innovative about that...
Chavez's discoursive innovation was something quite different: Chavez talked to the poor, not about them. While the old elite talked about the poor, using technocratic language that made sense within elite conceptual categories, Chavez talked to the poor in their language, using their conceptual categories, and saying things that made sense to them.
This, I think, it's the crux of his considerable success in engendering fierce loyalty among his poor supporters. Chavez's discourse treats them as subjects, not as the objects of the debate. Though I'm convinced this is a purely rhetorical ploy, the emotional impact of the strategy has been startling, and continues to be effective. Poor people feel included by Chavez's discourse - and, politically, that feeling is worth a thousand realities.
Teodoro doesn't seem to quite grasp the distinction. In his little riff, he always credits Chavez for having launched a debate about poverty. In his 30-second talking-head spots, he seems to think he's matching him. But he isn't - because he's subtly but badly misunderstood the nature of Chavez's discoursive innovation. Teodoro is trying to counter a guy who talks from the gut and to the poor with a discourse from the head about the poor. It won't work.
Q: At first, president Chavez also campaigned on the importance of work with dignity. Thousands of people ran to Miraflores to look for jobs. And what happened?
A: It's true. He took power with that goal in mind. He announced that his great enterprise would be to attack poverty. And I have to recognize that he succeeded in making the social question the great topic of national debate. Today, no one doubts that that's the issue...
Teodoro has been playing on variations of this riff for some time: Chavez's one merit is that he put poverty at the center of the national debate. I think that's wrong, in a subtle but deep way.
For as long as I can remember, the "social question" has been at the center of Venezuela's national debate. It's not like Luis Herrera beat Piñerúa in the 1978 election because Piñerúa didn't talk about poverty. It's not as if Lusinchi campaigned on a platform of abolishing inherittance taxes. No! Every government in the democratic era has come to power with a discourse about poverty. There's nothing innovative about that...
Chavez's discoursive innovation was something quite different: Chavez talked to the poor, not about them. While the old elite talked about the poor, using technocratic language that made sense within elite conceptual categories, Chavez talked to the poor in their language, using their conceptual categories, and saying things that made sense to them.
This, I think, it's the crux of his considerable success in engendering fierce loyalty among his poor supporters. Chavez's discourse treats them as subjects, not as the objects of the debate. Though I'm convinced this is a purely rhetorical ploy, the emotional impact of the strategy has been startling, and continues to be effective. Poor people feel included by Chavez's discourse - and, politically, that feeling is worth a thousand realities.
Teodoro doesn't seem to quite grasp the distinction. In his little riff, he always credits Chavez for having launched a debate about poverty. In his 30-second talking-head spots, he seems to think he's matching him. But he isn't - because he's subtly but badly misunderstood the nature of Chavez's discoursive innovation. Teodoro is trying to counter a guy who talks from the gut and to the poor with a discourse from the head about the poor. It won't work.
June 7, 2006
Like an over-caffeinated grandpa reading a bedtime story...
My unbridled enthusiasm for Teodoro Petkoff's politics is matched only by my dismay at the guy's abysmal electioneering skills. A little bird put this campaign ad and this other one in my inbox. It's stunning - after all these years, the guy still manages to come off as both condescending and over-intellectual when he panders. I can't exactly put my finger on why I think these ads are so terrible. It's not the message; though it could be better phrased, it's what we've come to expect from him. Partly, it's that - bizarrely - he's dressed like a mortician.
Mostly, tough, it's the impression you're left with after watching them, the taste they leave in your mouth. There's something about his intonation that makes him sound like an over-caffeinated grandpa reading a bedtime story. It's terrible. You don't feel like you're watching a leader in waiting, you feel like you're watching a pundit, a fantastically entertaining insider maybe...but not a leader.
One thing actively horrified me: he uses that ghastly formulation - "los más pobres" - to refer to the poor, and so unwittingly ends up talking about them, rather than to them - a estas alturas del partido! Teodoro, pana, you're not at the Ateneo: you can't talk to people whose votes you desperately need as though they're not in the room!
My source isn't sure if these ads are already running on Venezuelan TV, or if they're just screen-tests. Note to Teodoro's people: Teo is a disaster reading into a camera. You'd do much better going for more produced, voice-overed ads like this one.
Want s'more free advice? Get it through your heads: you can't beat Chavez with brilliant analysis. You can sell a lot of newspapers that way, yes, but it won't win you an election. Teo needs to use his ads to establish an emotional connection with the audience - because elections are won in the gut, not the head. That's true not just in Venezuela, that's true everywhere.
So show the guy walking through the Sur del Lago town where he grew up, show him emoting as he sees the conditions there, show him talking to poor folks, not about them. That might get you somewhere. But these ads - especially the first two - are seriously off on the wrong track.
June 6, 2006
Makarem's Recadi Past
Delicious tidbit on North American Opinion Research Big Cheese Julio Makarem: according to the Diccionario de la Corrupción en Venezuela, Volume III, Makarem was indicted way back in 1989 for his role in a complicated scam to bilk millions of subsidized dollars out of Recadi.
(Recadi being the 1980s corruption sink-hole in charge of administering rationed, subsidized dollars under the Lusinchi-era Currency Controls.)
Makarem fled the country to avoid trial.
(Recadi being the 1980s corruption sink-hole in charge of administering rationed, subsidized dollars under the Lusinchi-era Currency Controls.)
Makarem fled the country to avoid trial.
June 5, 2006
Garcia wins Peru by 10 points - NAOR poll off by 28
Heh...sorry, couldn't help the headline. Not a week ago, chavista briefcase-pollster North American Opinion Research was saying Humala would win in Perú by 18 points. In Lima, NAOR's "tracking poll" through May 31st had Ollanta beating Alan by ten points, but official results show Alan beat Ollanta by 62% to 38% in the capital.
But on more subtantive grounds: God it was great to see Chavez's unhinged meddling in Peru backfire spectacularly. A couple of weeks ago, I talked about the internationalization of hemispheric politics in Latin America. Yesterday, for the first time possibly ever, a newly elected South American leader chose to portray his own election as a direct rebuff of another South American leader. Alan García is defining his presidency via its antichavismo, from the start.
Interesting stuff. I have this sense that, in 20 years, we could look back on the summer of 2006 as the time when the wheels fell off of Chavez's hemispheric project. But it's early days still...all eyes now have to go on the big prize: México.
But on more subtantive grounds: God it was great to see Chavez's unhinged meddling in Peru backfire spectacularly. A couple of weeks ago, I talked about the internationalization of hemispheric politics in Latin America. Yesterday, for the first time possibly ever, a newly elected South American leader chose to portray his own election as a direct rebuff of another South American leader. Alan García is defining his presidency via its antichavismo, from the start.
LIMA, Peru, June 4 (Reuters) - Ex-President Alan Garcia, who leads Peru's runoff election, said on Sunday he had defeated plans by anti-U.S. Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez to increase his influence in Latin America.
"Today, Peru has sent a message of national sovereignty and has defeated efforts by Hugo Chavez to incorporate us in the expansion strategy of his military and backward-looking model, which he's tried to implant in Latin America," Garcia told supporters after exit polls showed him winning the election.
Interesting stuff. I have this sense that, in 20 years, we could look back on the summer of 2006 as the time when the wheels fell off of Chavez's hemispheric project. But it's early days still...all eyes now have to go on the big prize: México.
June 4, 2006
Anatomy of a Scoundrel...
The more folks look into it, the longer Julio Makarem's "rabo'e'paja" looks. You know who I'm talking about...Mr. Makarem, chairman of that most respectable polling firm North American Opinion Research, he of the Humala-will-beat-Alan-Garcia-by-18-points poll, the very same two-bit would-be intimidator of Venezuela's English-language blogosphere, our ever-popular alleged Belkys Cedeño gopher and shady Petrotulsa/Vatramafia influence-peddler extraordinaire...well, according to the Diccionario de la Corrupción en Venezuela, Volume III, the guy was indicted way back in 1989 for his role in a complicated scam to bilk millions of subsidized dollars out of Recadi. He fled the country to avoid trial.
Una joyita, el tipo.
Una joyita, el tipo.
Light Summer Reading
A couple of months ago, Harvard's Center for International Development hosted the second conference on Venezuelan Economic Growth 1970-2005. I'm really sorry I didn't get to attend, but I've been reading the conference papers (all linked to from the conference web page) and many of them are really fascinating.
Everybody who is anybody in the inbred little world of Venezuelan political economy research seems to have presented. We're talking Ricardo Hausmann, Francisco Rodríguez, Osmel Manzano, Dan Levy, Roberto Rigobón, Jonathan DiJohn, Javier Corrales, Michael Penfold, Francisco Monaldi and a number of others who are maybe not so well known, but are doing really high level work on why the Venezuelan economy tanked from 1977 onward.
Many different points of view were put forward (it was the labor laws! no, it was the clientelism! actually, the crappy financial system! no, the oil policy!) and your head more or less spins after reading a few of the papers. I would really love to interview some of the authors for the podcast...actually, thinking about taking that on as a summer project.
Have a look!
Everybody who is anybody in the inbred little world of Venezuelan political economy research seems to have presented. We're talking Ricardo Hausmann, Francisco Rodríguez, Osmel Manzano, Dan Levy, Roberto Rigobón, Jonathan DiJohn, Javier Corrales, Michael Penfold, Francisco Monaldi and a number of others who are maybe not so well known, but are doing really high level work on why the Venezuelan economy tanked from 1977 onward.
Many different points of view were put forward (it was the labor laws! no, it was the clientelism! actually, the crappy financial system! no, the oil policy!) and your head more or less spins after reading a few of the papers. I would really love to interview some of the authors for the podcast...actually, thinking about taking that on as a summer project.
Have a look!
Quotable Vegas
Thanks to Katy, I got my hands on a copy of Falke, Federico Vegas's remarkable novel about the ill-fated "invasion" of Venezuela by anti-Gomez exiles in 1929. I'm just starting it, but the book is so quotable you can hardly help yourself. I can't imagine Vegas is, erm, unaware of the contemporary overtones when he writes passages like:
No hay quien se salve del gomecismo...unos están a favor y otros en contra mientras nuestro verbo gira desde hace demasiado tiempo alrededor del mismo sátrapa. Es un caso de vampirismo. ¡Nos ha chupado hasta los sesos!...La palabra "Gomez" anula esos inesperados vericuetos que le permiten vagar a una imaginación libre, y por lo tanto, su persistente efecto acaba tarde o temprano con las buenas conversaciones.
Nobody's safe from gomecismo...some are in favor and others against while our words have been centered for too long around the same old fox. It's a case of vampirism...he has sucked us down to our brains!... The word "Gomez" annuls those unexpected byways that allow a free imagination to wander, and so its persistent effect puts an end, sooner or later, to good conversations.
June 1, 2006
The plant that ate the lake
Katy says: Once again, the rain season is upon us, and lemna has returned in full force to Lake Maracaibo. A year after an environmental disaster caused, in part, by the government's complete disregard for environmental conditions in South America's largest lake, the plant has made an encore appearance. Neighbors are already complaining about the disease and the smell.
If anyone can tell me what the government has been doing this past year to prevent another serious outbreak of the stuff, I sure would like to hear it.
May 29, 2006
Are you in Brighton? Know anyone in Brighton?
Come to watch this roundtable on Wednesday (day after tomorrow) at 4:00 pm:
Latin America in the Spotlight & 40th Anniversary of IDS
Roundtable
Politics in Latin America: deconstructing the meanings of the Left and the implications for the region’s development
Much has been said about the turn to the left in Latin America as a response to the unsatisfactory socio-economic situation that lasts for more than two decades. The neoliberal approach failed to revert the situation and a shift to the left was a hope for many countries. Left-wing elected leaders in Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela appear to enforce the impression that a homogenous Left block is being constituted in the region.
Nevertheless, the political projects of these countries are very diverse and constructed as a response to particular social, economical and political contexts. This roundtable aims to deconstruct this so called turn to the Left by debating:
Date: May 31st 2006, 4pm
Venue: Lecture Theatre at the Brighton and Sussex Medical School, University of Sussex
*** Joe Foweraker
Director of the Centre for Mexican Studies, University of Essex
*** Laurence Whitehead
Senior Fellow of Nuffield College, University of Oxford
*** Francisco Toro
Former, journalist specialised in Venezuela. Publishes articles at The New York Times, The Economist, The Finantial Times, The Washington Post and several Venezuelan media
*** Sue Branford
Latin American Bureau, author and journalist of BBC, the Financial Times and Red Pepper among others
*** Mick Moore (Mediator) - Research Felow, Institute of Development Studies, Director of the Centre for the Future State
Latin America in the Spotlight & 40th Anniversary of IDS
Roundtable
Politics in Latin America: deconstructing the meanings of the Left and the implications for the region’s development
Much has been said about the turn to the left in Latin America as a response to the unsatisfactory socio-economic situation that lasts for more than two decades. The neoliberal approach failed to revert the situation and a shift to the left was a hope for many countries. Left-wing elected leaders in Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela appear to enforce the impression that a homogenous Left block is being constituted in the region.
Nevertheless, the political projects of these countries are very diverse and constructed as a response to particular social, economical and political contexts. This roundtable aims to deconstruct this so called turn to the Left by debating:
- What does this Left in Latin America really mean?
- Is the turn to the Left in many Latin American countries a consolidation of democracy or a challenge to the current political system?
- Does the Left represent a real alternative to the demands of the societies for region’s development?
Date: May 31st 2006, 4pm
Venue: Lecture Theatre at the Brighton and Sussex Medical School, University of Sussex
*** Joe Foweraker
Director of the Centre for Mexican Studies, University of Essex
*** Laurence Whitehead
Senior Fellow of Nuffield College, University of Oxford
*** Francisco Toro
Former, journalist specialised in Venezuela. Publishes articles at The New York Times, The Economist, The Finantial Times, The Washington Post and several Venezuelan media
*** Sue Branford
Latin American Bureau, author and journalist of BBC, the Financial Times and Red Pepper among others
*** Mick Moore (Mediator) - Research Felow, Institute of Development Studies, Director of the Centre for the Future State
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