March 29, 2008

Chronicle of a Devaluation Foretold

Quico says: So, as I mentioned, in the middle-class-to-escualidón circles I tend to frequent in Caracas, Cadivi has become a constant, ever-present worry, a universal obsession. Everyone you meet seems to be at some point along the process of getting Cadivi dollars, everyone you meet has a Cadivi story to tell.

Which, really, shouldn't surprise us. People get excited enough about a bargain when they’re shopping for clothes, or when they find an airline tickets at below-the-going-rate… but money? Money sold for less than it's worth?! That’s something else! The notion itself is counterintuitive, perilously close to the definition of "too good to be true".

But it is true. The Chávez government really is hawking dollar bills for 40 cents a pop. Can you really call it a surprise that a bit of a frenzy ensues?

And so Cadivi has become a conversation set piece, the petrostate's answer to the weather. Everybody has something to say about the weather, right?

In particular, the weirdly dysfunctional Cadivi website has become an object of collective obsession. The site - which you must use to file a currency application - works sporadically, erratically, shuts down completely for hours on end, and generally seems designed by an unreconstructed sadist.

How to beat it? Is it better to log on late or early? From a PC or a Mac? Firefox or Explorer? What, pray tell, is the secret!??

In fact, the secret isn’t hard to fathom. The government needs a rationing mechanism for dollars. Cadivi itself is supposed to be a formal rationing mechanism, but the demand for subsidized dollars is so overwhelming that a secondary, informal rationing mechanism has become a must. After all, if the state approved the $5,000 traveller's allowance people are technically "entitled to get" for the ten million Venezuelans who probably want it, the entirety of the nation's $50 billion in oil income would go up in smoke right there, before they've even paid for any imports.

The principle behind all this is pretty straightforward, though it systematically eludes the government's economic policy makers: When you price a good – any good – at below it’s market value, it’s going to run out.

If the going price for apples is $1 and you start selling apples for forty cents, you’re going to run out of apples. Why? Because people will soon realize that they can buy apples from you for forty cents and turn right around and resell them for a dollar, pocketing the difference. So you will run out. It's a mathematical certainty. How big an orchard you have or how loaded the trees look is neither here nor there.

For the exact same reason, if the going rate for a dollar bill is one dollar and you start selling dollar bills for forty cents, you’re going to run out. It's a certainty. That, in for-dummies form, is what Cadivimania comes down to.

Of course, people say, “well, with oil at $110 a barrel and $32 billion in reserves, what’s the problem?” But that’s just fundamentally flawed reasoning. No level of reserves, no level of income is "high enough” when you’re selling dollars off at less than half their value.

Problem is, the government can’t let dollars run out, or even appear to be running out. Again, for an economist, what comes next is simple: they either have to either raise the price of dollars (devaluation) or they’re going to have to ration them…whether it’s through a ration book, long lines outside banks, a dollar lotery, or Cadivi’s peculiar, 21st Century contribution to the fine art of rationing price controlled goods: the Kafka-inspired website.

The experience of using Cadivi’s website pretty much defies description. It appears purpose engineered to magnify your frustration. The system spends far more time down than up, and in the highly unusual case that you do manage to log on, will reject your application for the most inanely arcane reasons you can imagine. One night, I wasted three hours because Cadivi could not fathom that the name of my educational institute had a non-Alpha Numeric character in it (the humble dash.) And that after I had, miraculously, managed to log on to the system after "just" 45 minutes.

And so a generation of middle and upper class Venezuelans are spending the best days of their lives mindlessly hitting “refresh” on their browsers for hours and hours on end to try to get into Cadivi’s website. Social events get planned around Cadivi’s curious, día de parada style restrictions on when you can and can’t log on. (“Dinner Wednesday night…mmmm, well, that’s my Cadivi night… could we do it Thursday instead?”) Entire evenings are wasted. It’s futile. It’s maddening. It’s obsession forming.

This idiotically inefficient rationing mechanism has given rise to a bizarre twist on what was already a real anomaly. It was already weird that the revolutionary people’s socialist government was handing out wads and wads of free money to the (relatively) privileged through Cadivi, but thanks to the website, we class enemies are now taking that money with a sense of grievance!

“Pssshh! The nerve! Ransacking the national treasury should not be this aggravating!”

It’s easy to sneer but, if I’m going to be honest, I have to admit that more than once, during those long hours of hitting "refresh," that’s exactly how I felt.

Of course, this direct use of their website to get dollars is just the visible tip of the Cadivi iceberg…the much more relevant portion is below the surface, in the tens of billions of dollars worth of subsidized imports coming into the country now, making huge profits for importers, underselling local producers that can't compete with half-off dollars, wreaking havoc with the country’s industrial structure and subsidizing the lifestyles of, for the most part, the rankest of the rank oligarchs.

In the grand scheme of things, the rationing-via-404-error-screen thing is a relatively minor warning sign that Cadivi can’t keep up with the demand it has created for subsidized dollars. A more ominous sign is the long delays many importers are facing in getting their dollars. One prominent multinational that sells equipment to PDVSA is getting its dollars six months late; stories of three and four month delays are common.

In effect, Cadivi is taking forced-loan after forced-loan from importers, and speculation is rife about just how big the accumulated backlog of requests has gotten. Cadivi sources admit, off the record, a $12 billion backlog. The independent estimates I’ve heard range between $16 and $20. Which is pretty alarming, considering the operative reserves at the Central Bank (i.e. excluding the gold) amount to just $25 billion: pay off the backlog, and the grim reality of a highly precarious reserve situation would be plain for all to see.

“The reserves are a mirage,” is how one well connected friend put it, “if Cadivi isn’t executing its backlog it’s precisely to preserve the illusion.”

Where this is all headed is painfully obvious, and has been since the second the words “exchange controls” were first uttered: devaluation. Everybody knows this, and that knowledge fuels the antsy sense of urgency that hangs around East-side Cadivi-mania. And yet, for reasons that make exactly zero sense to me, the government keeps putting it off.

As one unconfirmed, unconfirmable, quite possibly false but nevertheless suggestive rumor would have it, the reason is simple. As the story goes, soon after taking on his post as Finance Minister, Rafael Isea sat down with President Chávez and showed him a carefully worked out power point presentation demonstrating beyond any reasonable doubt that devaluation was now inevitable and doing it sooner would be less traumatic than doing it later. Chávez, the rumor has it, listened carefully, thanked his minister warmly, and sentenced, “that’s all very good Isea, but you can just forget about it: No devaluation!”

Isea, shocked, tried to plead, “but, comandante…” only to get cut off “my decision is final.” End of conversation.

Such are the ways of policing making in the Chávez era.

And so, Isea is left to think up yet another new batch of tricks, accounting gimmicks, and ley-de-salvaguardia defying stunts to keep this whole Rube Goldberg Machine of a fiscal and monetary policy sputtering on for another few months. So far, they've tried:
  • Stretching out Cadivi’s payments over longer and longer periods of time, creating what amount to forced loans from importers to the state.
  • Setting up the website to accept just a handful of new requests a day, holding the line against even greater expansion of the backlog.
  • Getting PDVSA to demands payment for oil sooner, and to sell on future’s markets, literally selling oil before it’s pumped it out of the ground, to try to squeeze some extra cash out of the cash cow.
  • Issuing crazed amounts of “Notas Estructuradas” – dollar denominated domestic debt sold for bolivars - to try to relieve the pressure from the parallel market.
  • Holding up tens of thousands of new, imported cars up for weeks at a time in Puerto Cabello as Cadivi checks whether they meet new regulations.
And, no doubt, a thousand other gimmicks that you can bet are out there, but we're not hearing about. One could only wish the government would devote the kind of ingenuity it shows for concocting accounting smoke-screens to solving the country's actual problems.

None of these tricks really addresses the underlying non-viability of Misión Cadivi, none of them alters the ultimate inevitability of devaluation, but each of them puts off the day of reckoning for that little bit longer.

And then, of course, there’s the political economy of all this lunacy. Because each of these gimmicks creates a new rent-seeking opportunity and spawns its own little ecosystem of parasitic intermediaries and financiers with more connections than scruples who long ago figured out how to monetize Chávez’s economic illiteracy. Each new patch stuck on the Cadivi money hole corrupts our society just that little bit more and helps transfer wealth from the socialist state to those who need it least, deepening the trends towards inequality the government daily swears to be combating.

And all for the sake of adding just a few weeks or months of life to a policy that isn’t even viable in the medium term, much less in the long term, and that will necessarily, self-evidently collapse…carrying with it a hugely destructive new wave of financial instability, corporate failures and heightened inflation that’s as sadly predictable today as it was in ahead of Viernes Negro in 1982, of the collapse of Recadi in 1989, of the Caldera controls in 1996 and of every other experience with the macroeconomics of populism Latin America has ever seen.

...just some thoughts to keep you entertained (and motivated) as you down another cup of coffee and keep hitting "refresh" on that %*#^)*^! Cadivi page.

March 27, 2008

No Hay Material

Quico says: Ask anyone at all and they'll tell you: hands down, the three most feared words in Venezuela’s bureaucratic vocabulary are "there's no material."

It's a kind of code phrase, meaning something like “no, seriously, there’s no use trying to bribe me: I genuinely can’t help you.” The cargo gods have not come through. For whatever reason, the tenuous link with the fairy country that manufactures the little physical booklets that, provided a photo and a battery of official stamps, become passports, has been severed.

For what reason? For how long?

These are questions no sane Venezuelan ever asks.

I ran into the dreaded phrase at El Llanito’s INTTT Inspectoría, Venezuela’s DMV, as I went to get my driver’s license renewed.

“No, mi amor, es que no hay material."

Oh shit. Well, “y ¿cómo hago?” I say in a gambit to see if there’s some back channel way to get that covetted bit of laminated plastic.

Amazingly, uncharacteristically, it works…for some baffling reason, she takes a shine to me and decides to confide.

“Mira,” she says, “word on the street is that they’ll have material tomorrow in Los Chaguaramos. Otherwise, you can try again here next week.”

I can’t believe my luck. I have a tip, an actual dato, straight from the functionariate’s mouth, good as gold.

“Muchas gracias, amiga,” I say and rush out smiling, actually happy, as though I haven't just wasted a trip that cost me an hour and a half in traffic.

The next day I go to the bank to pay my fee and then rush off to the Inspectoría in Los Chaguaramos, getting there at about 9:00 a.m.

Or, rather, I get to the metal fence setting off the Inspectoría from the sidewalk. A little hubbub of maybe 20 or 25 people are crowding in on the gate, as one single guy – a security guard – holds off the barbarian masses, trying to give out information one case at a time.

I kind of jostle my way up to the front and eventually get to ask him, “amigo, to renew my license?” as I show him my documents.

“Yeah, ok, we have 30 spots, and it’s first come first serve, so you better get in line right there.”

He points to a spot just outside the gate, on the sidewalk. I’m amazed, there’s just a handful of people in line there. “This is going to be a piece of cake,” I think to myself.

“Disculpe, is this the line for license renewals?” I ask the guys in line. They nod.

“And do you know what time they’ll let us in?”

“At 1:30,” one of them says.

“What?!”

“Yeah, 1:30…this is the line for the afternoon spots…the morning people already went in.”

Oh Christ.

“Ay coño,” I say, and add… “pero, sí hay material, ¿verdad?”

They all nod, a little too eagerly for my taste, as though they’re trying to convince themselves.

“That’s what they said…30 plásticos this afternoon.”

Bueno…nothing to be done. Just hunker down for four and a half hours on a sidewalk in Los Chaguaramos breathing exhaust fumes and passing the time who knows how.

Damn it, I should’ve had breakfast.

The vexation on my face must’ve been pretty clear, cuz one of the guys looks at me and says “c’mon, chamo, don’t make such a face: just think, this señor here’s been doing this for a whole week.”

I look at the round faced man just ahead of me in line.

“Really?”

He smiles, beatifically, obviously way past getting exasperated by this kind of thing anymore.

“You have no idea what they’ve put me through this week…” he pauses, thinking through the memories. “I spent all day queuing at El Llanito on Monday just to be told at the end that they’d run out of plásticos…on Tuesday they said they had no more material and didn’t know when any more would be coming in. Lost day. Wednesday a friend told me to head out to Los Teques and try there so I had to shell out for transport to get all the way out there, but it was a bust there as well. They told me to come here…and yesterday it was just like today, they said they had 30 plasticos, and I was number 23 in line, but right as I got up to the front, after 8, count them, eight hours standing here taking the sun like a rooftile, they said no, 'es que se acabó el material' and sent me home.”

He pauses, savoring the string of disasters.

“Bueno, the good thing is that at this point I’m immunized against frustration," he says, shrugging the whole thing off. "Today I came even earlier and now I’m fifth in line. If they turn me away again I’ll toss a Molotov cocktail in there.”

It’s the kind of story to put my own problems in perspective.

“Thing is, I’m a transportista, a bus driver," he continues, "so every day without a license is a day I can’t work, and a day I don't work is a day I don't bring home anything to my family."

A bit of a circle is forming around the guy’s story. Everybody's nodding. Pretty soon one of the other guys pipes in as well.

“That’s where I'm at too. The guy who owns the microbus I drive won’t let me go out without a license. The bribes we have to pay the cops if we get caught are so high they’d wipe out two weeks worth of work. But in the meantime…hell, you know how it is, we’re contractors, we don’t work we don’t earn.”

“¿Oh yeah?” one-week-running-after-a-license-man says, “¿what part of town do you cover?”

Pretty soon, it’s social hour at the license renewal line. Everybody knows we’re in for a long wait and conversation seems like as good a way to pass the time as any.

I find Venezuelans remarkably good humored in situations like this. I’m surrounded by people suffering real economic hardship because the damn government can’t get it together to source enough drivers’ license cards, but nobody really bitches. They crack jokes, trade stories, share anecdotes about being held up during work, and soon a pretty strong esprit de corps is arising in our group.

In my little sector of the line we have three bus drivers, a taxi driver, a guy who runs an ice delivery truck, a housewife who needs her license to drive her kids to school, and a guy doing a PhD in political science in Europe. It strikes me that standing in line waiting to be humiliated by the bureaucracy is one of the few spaces for genuine social equality in Venezuela. Right here, right now, there are no social distinctions: we really are all the same.

One thing is clear, though: nobody brings up politics. We’re strangers. More than likely some of us are chavistas and some are anti-. Bringing it up could only bust the vibe we’ve developed. It’s not a risk worth taking.

Just to keep things from getting too chaotic, somebody pulls out a pen and a note pad and starts making little numbered slips so we each know what our exact place in line is. The move makes the gate guard nervous. He comes over and warns us in no uncertain terms that the inspectoría will not recognize those numbers, that come 1:30 it’ll still be first come, first serve. His tone is that of a dad warning a 6 year old kid.

We grin and bear it: however squalid his little quota of power may be, right here, right now, he is the one guy we can’t afford to piss off. We reassure him we’re just doing it to keep track of who’s where among ourselves. But, actually, by this point, it’s kind of superfluous…we’ve spent 2 hours in this line already, talking, hanging out, and by now everybody knows who’s in what spot in line. The chances of someone cutting and getting away with it are nil.

Come to think of it, if the gate guard wasn't treating us like shit, would we be bonding the way we are? I kind of doubt it...when you get right down to it, the only thing bringing us together is the disdain of officialdom.

Still, we’re antsy…we kind of feel better with an actual number in hand, whether Power chooses to recognize it or now.

At about 11:30 I fall into a one-on-one conversation with Nelson, one of the bus drivers. After asking me a few questions about public transport in Holland (yes, a bus ride really does cost Bs.7,000 there, no, you don't get a Welcome Drink for that kind of money) he decides to confide.

“Really I’m an accountant,” he tells me, “I got my degree from INCE, but you know how the vaina is, I couldn’t get a job so…now I drive a bus.”

I ask him about his work. He lives up in El Junquito and drives down into downtown Caracas a couple of times per morning. He tells me about the intricacies of timing his runs just right to maximize his take. Go too early and there aren’t any passengers. Go too late, and there’s too much traffic. You only make money when you’re loading passengers, and you can’t load passengers if you’re stuck in a traffic jam.

The best, he reckons, is to set off at about 5 a.m., that’s pretty much the sweet spot when good passenger numbers meet relatively unclogged streets. Then he gets back to El Junquito by about 6:30 and has a nice, leisurely breakfast just long enough to miss the student-heavy time slot; another variable in his little optimization problem.

“Students? Why do you go out of your way to avoid them? Are they really that rauckous?”

“Nah,” he says, “it’s the student ticket thing.”

He explains that they’re not allowed to charge students full fare. Technically, the government is supposed to make up the difference but, surprise surprise, refunds are invariably late.

“Right now, the delay in getting paid is about three months," he says, “and hell, I studied accounting, so I know exactly what that's called: a forced loan. Interest free, to boot.”

With inflation running as high as it is, the bolivars they get paid three months late can be worth a good 8% less than the bolivars they were originally forced to loan the government, he explains. It’s just not good business, driving during time slots when half your customers are going to be students, he explains. Not surprisingly, kids have a hell of a tough time finding a bus to get on to get to school in the morning...just one more downside to schooling, one more prod to drop out.

Just then, we see a military vehicle pull up to the Inspectoría gates. Three, four, five army guys in uniform make their way inside. The line goes from sociable to restless.

“¡Que arrechera, chamo!”
one of the guys says, “man that pisses me off! Each one of those guys going in is one less plástico for us.”

We’ve been standing out there for three and a half hours, now. It’s noon, it’s hot, some of us haven’t had breakfast. Nobody dares make too much of a fuss, though. Those guys are army, y’know.

Within five minutes, the gate guard comes out to announce that, mysteriously, there are now just 25 plásticos to hand out today. The back of the line (which, in effect, has just been told that no hay material) is more deflated than furious. They slink off, muttering cuss words but resigned to come again the next day.

It’s the DMV, after all: it’s not like you can go to the competition if they give you shitty service.

As 1:30 draws near, a palpable sense of expectation builds in the line. Soon, the carefully differentiated lines for license renewals, first-time licenses, and car registrations that had remained neatly separate all morning all clump together into a mass around the door.

The gate guard definitely can’t cope. Soon, he's pretty much forced to rely on the little scribbled numbers he’s already told us he wouldn’t accept. People shove and push and yell and you can’t really tell if people are cutting in line in front of you or if they’re just from one of the other lines that’ve gotten all mushed up into one big melée. The people from "my" line try to help each other out, as far as possible, but frankly that’s not very far. It’s pretty much chaos as the gate guard gets into a series of increasingly testy exchanges with the hordes clamoring to get inside.

“Lo que pasa,” he yells at us in exasperation, “is that you people aren’t properly organized! You need to get organized, otherwise look at the chaos we’re left with!”

In time, a Tránsito Terrestre official comes out to look over this mess. He sees the gate guard arguing with the users, shakes his head, and reprimands him, saying – loud enough for all of us to hear – “why do you waste your time talking to them? Don’t talk to them, man…no hables con ellos.”

In his own, haplessly testy way, the gate guard was treating us like human beings. Rookie mistake, obviously.

In the end, I manage to sneak in somehow and hand in my documents:
  • One cédula copy – check.
  • One bank payment slip – check.
  • One certificado médico – check.
  • One renewal form – check.
Now we wait inside the gate, finally sitting in proper chairs and under a bit of shade, it feels like relative luxury as we finish the conversations we’d started earlier. A half hour later, a Tránsito Terrestre official comes out and starts calling out names, handing out our 25 renewed licenses. I tremble in anticipation when he calls out Toro...

Then, just as suddenly as it had formed, our little community disappears.

As I stroke my still warm plastic, I can't help but muse on how thoroughly, gallopingly pointless the whole exercise is. Nothing I did, no part of the bureaucratic nightmare at all had even the slightest, most oblique bearing on my ability to drive a car. None whatsoever. There were no tests, practical or theoretical, no checks of accident records, no part of the procedure has anything to do with driving at all…and yet, if you want to drive a vehicle in Venezuela, you have to subject yourself to this baffling set of low level humiliations once every ten years, just because.

For me, normally stuck away in a Dutch provincial town, the whole thing was a bit of a curiosity, almost worth it just for the chance to talk at leisure with an accountant buseta driver. But for these other guys, the hours or days spent dealing with all this idiocy are days of real economic hardship, days of wages foregone for people living a hand-to-mouth existence.

Their good cheer baffled and charmed me, yes, but seemed to me also just a case of learned helplessness, of a deeply justified intuition that it’s just always been like this and it’s just never going to get better so what’s the point of getting upset?

As I left the Inspectoría with my plástico burning a hole in my pocket, I noticed a sign gracing the inside of the gate. In big, propagandistic blue letters it belted out,
“Now getting your license is easier!”
Heh. Quite.

March 26, 2008

Striking Oil in Terrazas del Avila

Quico says: My arrival in Caracas seems to have coincided with Milk’s. Everyone was real happy about that. It was all UHT, no fresh stuff, but I guess it’d been months since there’d been any kind of milk around so people weren't minded to be picky.

Personally, I don't really have much use for the stuff. I detest cereals, don't bake much, and I always have my coffee black. Still, particularly during those first few days, people were just so damn happy to have milk, I couldn’t help but feel it’d be rude to refuse it. “Would you like a café con leche?” they’d ask all proud like, with a big smile beaming from their faces, and I’d just nod meekly, unable to muster the courage to ask for the negrito I really wanted instead.

Actually, March was a fairly benign months in terms of shortages: toilet paper, sugar, beans, chicken, and beef were pretty easy to find. The biggest problem seemed to be with rice, but cooking oil and gas canisters (which, as I wrote, is a huge problem for people who can’t get them) were touch and go, and specific stores seemed to have specific shortages of oddball stuff, like paper napkins.

Even with the newly available staples, people were still antsy and minded to stock up while they could, so de facto rationing at the cash register remained quietly in force in many places.

Venezuelans being Venezuelans, all kinds of informal, back channel methods to beat the shortages now operate. When you find a scarce product, you’re fully expected to SMS your closest circle of friends and family about it. My sister, who hosted me, seemed to get at least two or three of these messages a day. “Toilet paper at Makro La Urbina”, or “rush for cooking oil at Cada La Florida,” they'd read.

With the supply situation a bit better, the messages during my trip weren’t so urgent but, she told me, a month back any “Milk” message would see her immediately drop whatever she was doing and rush to the place mentioned. "What can I say, Quico?" she'd shrug, "I have five children and a husband and all of them are hooked on Quick."

It was pretty clear that the milk shortage, in particular, had really messed with people's life.

One day during my trip she got a message, “corn oil at Exito Terrazas del Avila, 6 per person”…and we rushed out. While the cooking oil problem was not as dire as the rice drought, getting more than a bottle or two at a time had been hard for a while, and finding corn oil specifically, which Venezuelans typically prefer, had been really quite a challenge. For a long time, all you could find was weird stuff like peanut or soy oil or some gnarly tasting and alarmingly underlabeled stuff sold as "multipurpose vegetable oil."

So the prospect of six bottles of corn oil was still enticing enough to get her moving. We braved the traffic on the Cota Mil to get to the hypermarket out there and my sister went to work right away, making eyes at the guy behind the counter, blatantly flirting with him to see if he’d stretch the 6 per person rule.

“How many people are you?” He asked.

“Three,” she lied (it was just the two of us.)

“OK, so that's 18 bottles…” he says, but she's having none of it.

“¿Cómo?" she says, teasing him with a big smile, "You weren’t so good at math in school, were you? Three times six is 24, everybody knows that!”

He laughs and quietly lets her have the whole 24-bottle pack. It’s a big score. She’s thrilled. Very discretely, she slips him a Bs.5,000 bill. Everybody’s happy.

As we come out, she whips out her cell phone and starts banging away messages right away.

"Letting everyone know you struck oil, right?" I say, thinking I'm catching on. But she shakes her head.

"Nope, this message I'm sending out to my freebie network. Twelve of those 24 bottles I'm going to give out to them."

"Huh?" I couldn't believe it. "After all that, you're going to just give this stuff away?"

“It might seem crazy,” she says, “but I figured out a long time ago that the best insurance against running out of the basics is to just give stuff out. Whenever I get my hands on a hard-to-find item, my rule of thumb is to give half of it away. Of course, that means that whenever someone in my little network finds a hard-to-find item, they give me a freebie too. You know that rice we’ve been eating at home? I didn’t buy it: our neighbor Andrea just gave me three kilos cuz two months ago, when nobody could find toilet paper, I knocked on her door one day and gave her six rolls.”

She had her distribution list all worked out. Four bottles for her best friend, and then two-packs for four other lucky members of her little freebie network, each of them a tried-and-tested sourcer whom she knew she could count on, but only if they knew they could count on her.

And then it hit me. That sunuvabitch Chavez did it! We all made fun of him when he announced it, but now it’s happening! And not in some podunk nowhere town in Apure or something but right here in foufy East Side Caracas...she may not call it that, but what Ana is doing is trueque!

We never even noticed it creeping up on us, and now the Barter Economy is here!

March 22, 2008

Bring Back the Maisto Doctrine!

Quico says: So, wondering why posting’s been so light recently? Here’s the deal: I spent the last three weeks in Caracas. Elementary paranoia kept me from disclosing as much before coming back, but now that I am safely ensconced in a forgotten little bit of the Dutch countryside I will, of course, be posting at length about the trip.

Now, I’d love to tell you I went back to immerse myself in the politics of a renascent opposition, or the travails of my nearest barrio, or the wonders of our natural heritage. Alas, my motives weren’t so pure: basically, it was Misión Cadivi that brought me back. As a Europe-based Venezuelan student, I qualify for a
irresistible cupo of $1,800 each and every month, payable at a scrumptious, nibbliscious Bs.2,150/$.

Hell, I’m just a grad student: I’m in no position to pass up that much free cash.

Filthy lucre, yes, how very counterrevolutionary of me…or, is it?

On the one hand, I realize it’s a bit problematic to get on my high horse and denounce the systematic ransacking of the nation’s oil wealth as I sign on enthusiastically on the side of the ransacketeers.

On the other hand, what I’m doing is scrupulously (if counterintuitively) legal: I really am Venezuelan, really do study in Europe, and ultimately am just taking advantage of a policy that wouldn’t even exist if the revolution hadn’t put it there. As far as petro-state plunder goes, it doesn’t get much more zanahoria than my case: I’m not even scamming the system! Hell, it's almost unvenezuelan to do it this way...

Still, the irony is hard to get over: I, great escualido cyber-scourge of the revolution, just about doubled my income on the revoluion’s dime just by filing a few forms.

In Caracas, I found that I was far from alone. In the appallingly sifrino circles I tend to inhabit when I’m down there, Cadivi has become a kind of universal obsession: everybody I met had either just finished asking for their dollars, was fighting the Cadivi website for their cupo, had an aunt who’d just come back from Miami to cash out her’s, or some cognate of these stories.

At my sister’s house, where I was staying, even the maid was in the loop: the bureaucratic nightmare she was facing trying to send family remittances back to her folks in Colombia was easily the most hairraising of the bunch.

My second day in town (first day I was getting my cédula, so here's lookin' at ya, syd) I went down to my bank in Sabana Grande to explain my situation to them. I was told that, on top of my student cupo, I could qualify for a $5,000 traveller cupo as well.

To do so, I would need to take out one of their credit cards…for which processing times had risen to TWO MONTHS because, these days, everybody and his cousin's cat is desperately trying to get a credit card, precisely so they can get those 5,000 insanely subsidized dollars.

It’s a policy I found especially telling. To get the travellers’ cupo, you have to have a credit card, and to get a credit card you basically have to be middle class. My sister’s maid, as you can guess, can’t get one: she has neither a credit history nor a high enough salary for any sane bank to give her one. So, in practice, the revolutionary socialist state systematically discriminates against her (and everyone else who is poor) in one of the most expensive and systematic wealth ridistribution policies it runs.

This is no detail. Because, trust me, you’d have to add up a lot of misión scholarships to match the implicit subsidy in the 5,000 official-rate-dollars handout that only credit card-holders can even apply for.

It’s a realization that brought me back to a point Katy made a long time ago, but whose deeper truth only really sank in during my trip: if you revisit the Maisto Doctrine and judge chavismo by what it does rather than what it says, you have to conclude what we have in Venezuela is something like a right wing dictatorship.

All revolutionary/discursive paja aside, the government lets nothing stand in its way in its drive to redistribute oil income up the income scale. The mountains of bullshit that come out of Chávez mouth have tended to obscure this reality, yes, but have never altered it.

For those with the courage to revisit Maisto's supposedly (but only superficially) discredited theory, it’s really no surprise that the Central Bank finds income inequality is rising in Venezuela: the socialist revolutionary government’s two weightiest macroeconomic policies uniformly shift income up to the privileged.

A staggering seven percent of GDP is spent on a deliriously regressive gasoline subsidy, while untold billions of oil dollars are spent subsidizing the imported toys the rich amuse themselves with.

Needless to say, Maisto and his doctrine aren’t particularly fondly remembered in opposition circles these days. To my mind, though, the man was a visionary, a misunderstood genius. He was the first to intuit a truth that grows harder to ignore every day in Venezuela: that government discourse and government reality aren’t just “in tension” with one another, or “not always easy to reconcile” or even “sporadically contradictory", but rather run in completely opposite directions, and do so systematically, on the most salient policy fronts, and have done for a long time.

Seriously, take it from me: a Mantuano-descended reactionary and incorregible government critic just back from a Cadivi-funded junket that doubled his income.

March 20, 2008

The foreign correspondent's POV

Katy says: Posting will be light in the next few days. Quico is traveling and I'm full of work and family duties. But friend and all-too-infrequent poster Lucía sends us a link of yet another foreigner's impression of the full Venezuelan treatment.

The traffic, the wait in the hospital, the milk shortages, the panaderías, the lushness of the Ávila - it's all there in the diary of The Economist correspondent's life in our maddening capital city.

March 19, 2008

Chávez for Spaniards

Quico says: Julio Rivas Pita, the man-on-the-ground here for Spain's El Mundo, is running extracts from his upcoming book, Chávez para Españoles, in a new blog. His latest piece is on the backstory to the operation that got Raul Reyes. Worth a look...

March 18, 2008

English court OKs partial privatization of PDVSA

Quico says: So, it turns out English courts have no jurisdiction over the PDVSA/ExxonMobil pissing match. They've just lifted the preliminary asset freeze on PDVSA, handing chavismo a massive propaganda win and a chance to sell anything and everything PDVSA owns abroad. Effectively, it took an English judge to authorize the privatization of a big chunk of PDVSA.

My guess is that that's what we're about to see. Cuz, remember, the whole point of freezing PDVSA assets abroad was so that, in case the international arbitration case over the Faja contracts went ExxonMobil's way, they'd have some way to collect damages. Of course, that arbitration is ongoing at the International Chamber of Commerce in New York, but it isn't expected to reach a decision for another 3 years or more. Plenty of time for PDVSA to get rid of any asset Exxon might want to move on in case (hypothetically) they got awarded something at arbitration.

For now, the whole case looks like a big miscalculation on Exxon's part: its current status is no chivo, no mecate. And for a Venezuelan government finding it increasingly hard to meet its import bill, the chance to raise a few billion bucks by privatizing PDVSA's foreign holdings is excellent news.

Such a sale would add a few more months of viability to the macroeconomics of populism, and would put off the thoroughly inevitable adjustment that little bit longer...at the cost, bien sur, of decapitalizing the state that little bit more.

Calls for a bit of marginal analysis, this one: on the margin, what is the impact of one additional stripe on a tiger?

March 17, 2008

Hello, fat man!

Katy says: Every Monday I get in my inbox the abridged transcript from the previous day's political reality show, "Hello, Mr. President!" While I wouldn't be caught dead watching this show, I always make it a point to read the summary just to see what the Fat Man in the Palace emphasized and what his mood seems to be.

One thing seems clear after yesterday's show: Chávez was not in a good mood.

First off, he kept talking about health policy, no doubt worried about the jump in health care as one of the population's top concerns, according to Alfredo Keller. He went on and on about how they needed to integrate new clinics to the current Misiones, no doubt realizing that the Misiones are slowly collapsing.

The other big topic of the day was communication policy. The President is still reeling from the fact that the death of Raúl Reyes put a hamper on the liberation of six of the FARC's hostages. He also scolded the Education Minister (his older brother) for not reacting to recent news reports that said that the rate of student enrollment has fallen dramatically in recent years, according to the Education Ministry's own statistics.

The Minister, who was immortalized thanks to this hilarious YouTube video, replied that these were all lies of the opposition, that this was all a conspiracy and that they were "manipulating the numbers to confuse the population." He said they would hold a press conference on Tuesday to explain what is going on. He also put out a press release that is full of lies and confusing statistics that do not address the crux of the issue raised by the news reports.

The President scoffed, saying it was silly to hold a press conference on Holy Tuesday and that, if this is false, the Ministry should have come out and said so immediately after the item was published. Chávez also stated that the problem is that the Annual Reports from the ministries are weak and are not "well-grounded" from a mathematical point of view, whatever that means. At one point he seemed so pissed, he said that all PSUV meetings had to be approved by him.

All of the government's media was focused yesterday on the President and his pet topics. Yet this little event went unmentioned in all of them. For chavista news outlets, it never happened.

March 15, 2008

The French Dieterich

Quico says: I'm starting to think of Bernard Henri-Lévy as the French Heinz Dieterich: a writer who combines deep insights with flashes of baffling idiocy in seemingly random proportions. His latest piece, on the death of Iván Ríos, (whom Henri-Lévy actually interviewed a few years back) has lots of the former and not that much of the latter.

March 14, 2008

Keller says

Quico says: Keller's first quarter poll slides are making the rounds, and I took the liberty of translating the most interesting one below. (Click to enlarge:)


In other results, Keller finds that scarcity has jumped up into the top four problems cited by poll respondents: 13% now say it's their biggest problem, compared to just 6% in the last quarter of '07.

Scarcity is now mentioned by one percent more people than "unemployment" which has traditionally slugged it out with "crime" for the top spot in Venezuelans' worry list, but is now down to fourth. These days, Crime is clearly top dog with 34% of first mentions, double the 16% who cited the "cost of living" - which is poll-code for inflation.

Finally, Keller now classes 37% of respondents as broadly chavista, 41% as broadly opposition minded, and the remaining 22% as "neutrals": though, of course, those numbers are highly sensitive to polling methodology and your definition of where exactly the line between "neutrals" and partisans lie.

Dato mata paja

Quico says: So, Minister Rodríguez Chacín, care to guess which is the only large economy in the region that has deepened its dependence on the US market since 1998?

March 13, 2008

Dear Enemy, here's your $80 million...lets do this again tomorrow.

Quico says: More and more, I think the defining trait of chavismo is its penchant for deforming language; the capacity of words to transmit meanings that correspond to anything at all in the real world.

Almost any look at the day's newspapers or any ten minutes watching VTV brings heaps and mounds of examples, but today Interior Minister Ramón Rodríguez Chacín brings us a particularly delirious case: his contention that Venezuela's #1 trade partner, a country that sends down $80+ million to the Revolutionary Government each and every day in return for oil (and is therefore, in effect, its main financier) has a de facto "blockade" against the revolution as part of some "declared war."

Crazy overstatement is, of course, no longer news when it comes out of chavista mouths. But what strikes me is that more and more official announcements aren't "in tension with" the truth, or "not fully reconcilable with" the record, but in fact diametrically opposed to it.

Day is night. Black is white. Oceania has always been at war with East Asia.

Orwell called it doublethink, but what's fascinating is that, in chavismo, doublethink takes place on the level of discourse only. For Orwell, and for observers of totalitarianism in general, doublethink had definite implications in terms of state violence, of repression, of the willingness of the powerful to impose their version of reality on society by force.

In chavismo, the visible gap between official discursive reality and "real reality" is allowed to endure, allowed to be made plain, instead of being systematically closed down through violence, like in any totalitarianism that respects itself.

It's as though discourse and reality operate on parallel plains: never really permeating one another, in a state of ongoing estrangement that's increasingly accepted as "normal."

It's not normal. It's far, far from normal.

I say six

Katy says: The Catholic Church has announced a list of seven "social" sins, to add to its list of seven Cardinal sins. They are:

1. ``Bioethical' violations such as birth control

2. ``Morally dubious'' experiments such as stem cell research

3. Drug abuse

4. Polluting the environment

5. Contributing to widening divide between rich and poor

6. Excessive wealth

7. Creating poverty

Since I am busy with work I pose a question: how many of these do you think Hugo Chávez has committed? Discuss.

PS.- On a slightly more serious note, Misión Cadivi, Chavez's flagship social program for the wealthy, has made it to the New York Times. This article is not to be missed. Check out the last paragraph in the article, it sums up the scam that is Cadivi pretty neatly.

March 11, 2008

The SSOT scenario

Katy says: Last week's bizarre diplomatic/military crisis left many uncovered manholes. One of the biggest comes from the information supposedly contained in Raul Reyes' computer, showing the deep links - political, military and financial - between the Chávez government and Colombia's FARC.

Not surprisingly, the U.S. State Department is looking into the possibility of including Venezuela in its list of State sponsors of terrorism, a list that is currently composed of international pariahs Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. Venezuela is currently the only country listed as "not fully cooperating" in the fight against terrorism that is not in that list.

I think Venezuela's inclusion in the SSOT list is still a longshot, and the "announcement" of the "possibility" of "looking into" its inclusion sounds more like a threat than a decision that has been made. Still, the possibility exists, and we should start working through what the consequences would be.

There is no recipe for the type of sanctions placed on SSOTs, as they vary from country to country. However, the State department webpage says sanctions typically include:

1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales.

2. Controls over exports of dual-use items.

3. Prohibitions on economic assistance.

4. Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including opposition to loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions; lifting diplomatic immunity to allow families of terrorist victims to file civil lawsuits in U.S. courts; denying tax credits for income earned in terrorist-listed countries; denial of duty-free treatment of goods exported to the United States; authority to prohibit U.S. citizens from engaging in financial transaction with a terrorist-list government; and prohibition of Defense Department contracts with companies controlled by terrorist-list states.

The likely effects of Venezuela's inclusion are the following:

1. Our oil would be cheaper in the U.S. and harder to sell. Undoubtedly, one of the main effects of this move would be that Venezuelan oil would be more difficult to sell in the U.S. The price of our oil would suffer, since U.S. companies would have to incorporate both the extra cost of doing business with PDVSA and the risk of being sanctioned by the government. A likely tax on Venezuelan oil would be that much easier, since our oil would lose its duty-free status. The amount of oil we sell to the U.S. would also suffer because companies would undoubtedly substitute away from PDVSA. This would mean having to place our oil in markets that are further away, increasing our transport costs and hurting our bottom line. Finally, U.S. companies would be less inclined to engage in joint ventures in the Venezuelan oil, gas or mining sectors, paving the way for oil companies from France, Russia, Brazil and other countries.

2. Families of terror victims could sue in the U.S., potentially hurting our assets there. Think of the following scenario: American or Colombian-American relatives of people killed or kidnapped by the FARC sue the Venezuelan government for damages in U.S. courts. The courts decide in favor of the relatives, and they award the families billions of dollars. Citgo and other assets the Venezuelan government holds in the U.S. (including bank accounts of people linked to the government) are seized to pay for damages. Right now this is not possible, but our inclusion in the SSOT list makes it entirely plausible and, in my view, highly likely.

3. Deepening military links to Russia and China. Venezuela's defense policy has traditionally been supported by U.S. technology. The Chávez government has been shifting away from U.S. technology, preferring Spanish, Brazilian, Russian and Chinese military weaponry instead. If SSOT sanctions were to be put in place, this trend would accelerate.

4. Increased visa restrictions for everyone. A lot of people think that our inclusion would mean shutting down the U.S. Embassy in Caracas. This is not necessarily the case since the U.S. has, for example, an embassy in Syria. However, visa restrictions would increase and it would be much tougher to get a visa to fly or go live in the U.S. The increased restrictions vary from country to country, but the visa page on the website of the U.S. Embassy in Damascus gives you a taste.

That rubber stamp at the head of this post will be showing up more and more on Venezuelans' visa applications. Venezuelans will have to forego some of their trips to Disney World and try more exotic locales like Havanna, Damascus, Teheran or Khartoum. Pyongyang, for instance, is lovely this time of the year.

5. No loans from the World Bank or the IMF. Right now, as Venezuela is awash in petro-dollars, so this seems like a harmless sanction. Venezuela does not really have any IMF loans, and I believe its World Bank loans portfolio is very limited. However, if oil prices were to fall, Venezuela would be hurt by these sanctions. Not only would it wipe out the possibility of getting loans from these institutions, it would make it much more expensive to get financing from private international financial institutions.

When Pres. Chávez announced Venezuela's decision to withdraw from the IMF and the World Bank, he immediately backtracked and the move never materialized. Venezuela's presence in these institutions provides some guarantees that help maintain a minimum flow of foreign direct investment. Financial sanctions would decidedly hurt our chances of receiving FDI. I guess the Banco del Sur would not seem like such a crazy idea at that point.

Finally, I don't believe the sanctions would include freezing of assets held by Venezuelan citizens in the U.S. Most of the wealth of Venezuela's wealthier citizens - estimates I have seen range from $50 billion to $100 billion - is in the U.S., so a move like this would be dramatic to say the least.

A lot of people think that these sanctions would mean the freeze of bank accounts and the impediment to sell or buy property or stock in the U.S., but I think that's unlikely. I believe the U.S. understands that its government is one thing and its citizens are another.

All in all, not a pretty picture, but it may be coming. Are we ready?

March 10, 2008

Things that make you go plop

Quico says: From the Wall Street Journal's perdida-less exposé on Franklin Duran, of Venoco and Maletazo fame:
Mr. [Guido] Antonini even drove a Porsche Boxster with a bumper sticker that extolled Mr. Chávez's socialist revolution. "Venezuela is now for everyone," it said.

March 7, 2008

Caption Competition, Rio Group Style

Quico says: Is it just me, or did that meeting today make no sense at all? After a half-day summit where they called one another everything from green-belly on up, this! I thought I was hallucinating!


It's made to order for a Caption Competition, this one...

March 6, 2008

La Vanguardia deconstructs Chávez's Mechanized Reality Show

Quico says: Have you noticed yet? I love good journalism. There isn't much that gives me a bigger thrill than finding a perfectly crafted bit of reporting. Like, for instance, this piece by La Vanguardia's Joaquím Ibarz deconstructing the Venezuelan military im-mobilization in La Guajira. Gorgeous. For the record, I've never met the guy, but wish I had.

(Por ahora, it's available in Spanish only.)

Gay marriage in Venezuela

Katy says: In a little noted decision, the Supreme Tribunal of Venezuela recently rejected the possibility of legalizing gay marriage in Venezuela. The majority opinion by Justice Pedro Rondón Haaz was hardly surprising: Article 77 of the Constitution explicitly says that marriage is between a man and a woman, and that it is to be protected under the law. The dissenting minority, however, seemed befuddled by the court's restraint, highlighting a court culture where any and every issue is seen as fair game for judicial action.

The case arose because, though the constitution's article 77 is pretty clear, it exists alongside Article 21, which bans discrimination based on sexual orientation. However, the court ruled that Article 77 excludes gay people's inability to get married from the list of factors that amount to illegal discrimination.

Of course, gay marriage is a famously emotive and divisive issue. Whether you're for it or against it, you can't help but notice that in the societies where it has become politicized, the debate has always come at the tail end of a long process of social and political change, shifting attitudes, and growing tolerance for gays and lesbians in the public sphere. Venezuela is very far from such a point.

A move like legalizing gay marriage should be the result of a serious, open democratic debate, where society comes to an agreement with itself about the best course moving forward. That's the province of politics, not court rooms, so any such reform needs to be taken through either Executive or Legislative action.

Supreme Tribunal justices are not held accountable to society: Mayors, Governors, Presidents and Congressmen are... por ahora. Sensitive topics such as this one should ideally be brought forward by accountable members of the State, so that its pros and cons are weighed, society can have an informed debate, and attitudes have the chance to change organically. Democracy assures that those processes can take place: when those who want change realize they have to answer to the voters, they will realize that for change to stick, the people have to be convinced.

These are not arguments our very red Supreme Tribunal is much aware of. The one dissenting opinion, by Justice Carmen Zuleta de Merchán, highlights a judicial culture where judges think they can do it all, as though they could change not just the law, but also the most intimate feelings and prejudices of the people through a court order.

Justice Zuleta regrets that the majority opinion,
"...decided not to solve legislative black holes, such as matters related to what happens when a gay union is dissolved by separation or death, the legal obligation to mutually help each other, guardianship by a permanent companion, the right to constitute a home, the issue of social security benefits for same-sex couples, the right to protection from saying anything against a permanent companion, the constitutional clause that prohibits friends or relatives from occupying similar posts, the possibility of a permanent companion to acquire citizenship, the right to adopt and protection against intra-family violence."
Clearly debatable topics, and important ones at that. In fact, they are so important, it makes them hardly suitable for a simple judgement on something the Constitution is very clear about.

Justice Zuleta seems to be advocating for judges who are not only activists, but who legislate from the bench on sensitive topics and related issues. What she envisions is not a ruling on whether the Constitution allows for same-sex marriage or not, but basically a ruling that reads like an entire section of the Civil Code. That is a strange position to have in today's Venezuela.

Chavistas have complete control of the National Assembly. The President has an Enabling Law that allows him to dictate whatever law he pleases by simple decree. Chavistas appoint all of the country's judges at whim. And yet chavista judges lament that they don't have enough power, that they don't go far enough.

In a country such as the U.S., with its layers upon layers of checks and balances, it is understandable for some to want to see a role for judges wishing to shape legislation. Legislative work is made slow by the many parties involved, the numerous interest groups and the incredible differences between, say, local, regional and federal legislative bodies, and between the two equally powerful groups that share power in each of those instances.

This is not Venezuela's case. All the power in the country - judicial, economic, executive and legislative - is concentrated in one man. Zuleta's plea for judges to do more does not mesh with the fact that the group in power is the same group that appointed her and, basically, writes her paycheck. This is a group that does not believe in consensus and does not believe in finding common ground with the other side because there is no other side. It's a group that believes reality changes automatically when laws change, that society will do what it's told because it is told to do so.

Chavez's Venezuela is a country where the laws are changed at a whim. Don't like the Constitution? Call an Assembly and change it. Don't like a law? Pass one in thirty days. Thirty days is not enough? Ask for an Enabling Law and write it yourself. The dizzying rate at which new legislation and regulations are passed in Venezuela makes it hard for the ordinary citizen, businessman or judge to keep up.

And yet some people think this is not enough. Perhaps Justice Zuleta can ask at the next PSUV meeting why chavistas haven't simply steam-rolled this law through the Assembly, or why Chávez hasn't decreed gay marriage to be legal on Aló, presidente.

Her beef should not be with her fellow justices nor with the conservatism of society. Her beef should be with the guy on top.

March 5, 2008

Movimiento 1,373

Quico says: Colombia has taken a justified pounding over the way it flouted International Law in attacking Raul Reyes's Ecuadorean jungle hideout. The states brandishing the sanctity of International Law in that case, however, appear far less inclined to cite UN Security Council Resolution 1,373 - through which the security council:
1. Decides that all States shall:

(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;

(b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;

(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts ...

...

2. Decides also that all States shall:
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;

(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information;

(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens;

(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens;

...

(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings;

(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents...
Resolution 1,373 was approved under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, and is therefore legally binding for all UN member states, much like the principle of territorial integrity.

Of course, chavismo argues the resolution is irrelevant, because planting bombs, kidnapping people, using indiscriminate weapons such as landmines, etc. do not constitute "terrorist acts." Trouble is, a later UN Security Council resolution (1,566) defined terrorism as:
...criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
(In one of these weird twists of international law, turns out this definition is not binding on the international community...but still...)

The Eudomarian Republic of Venezuela


"Como vaya viniendo, vamos viendo..."
Eudomar Santos, character in the legendary 1990s soap opera Por Estas Calles
Katy says: Venezuelan President Chávez recently announced that he was deploying thousands of soldiers to the border after Colombia bombed a FARC base in Ecuadorian territory. His government also announced the land border would be closed to all traffic, and expelled all Colombian Embassy officials while it announced it was bringing home all personnel from the Venezuelan Embassy in Colombia.

It remains to be seen whether all these announcements are part of an actual policy and consistent with some established policy goal. It's not clear what objectives Venezuela is pursuing with this unilateral action, or how long all this is going to last. The reason given so far, "to ward off a possible Colombian attack," has little to do with what has actually transpired, which differs from what has been announced.

Take the military mobilizations. Reports abound in Caracas that this is all a bluff. General Baduel said yesterday that it was all part of a "reality show" and a "media event." Stories from Caracas and the Pentagon hint that troop movement has been minimal, and that the little there is was put on just for show since, the story goes, the Venezuelan army does not have the plan, the logistics nor the operational capacity to mobilize thousands of soldiers to its border in three days.

In the meantime, Interior Minister Rodríguez Chacín blasts local media for reporting the troop movements, threatening to charge them with treason. Apparently the Minister thinks that the media should shut up about the movement of tanks in heavily populated areas during broad daylight.

Perhaps the Minister should ask himself why Chávez announced the troop mobilizations on national TV if they were, in fact, supposed to be secret. Perhaps they should have declared some sort of media blackout to prevent this sort of thing from getting out. Perhaps they should ask themselves if it's reasonable to allege the Colombian army, an institution with the technology to identify guerrilla camps inside Ecuador and pinpoint an attack, an institution aided by the technology of the US government, is relying on Globovisión to know where Venezuelan troops are headed.

But it's all just a show.

There is an undeniable whiff of improvisation in everything the government is doing. The Foreign Ministry, for example, is acting like a teenage child, making up responses on the hoof to the Colombian government's serious allegations like, well, like a country that doesn't need diplomacy and brains because it has oil.

One of MinPop Maduro's most embarassing responses was his claim that $300 million was simply too much money, suggesting it would take four rooms the size of the National Assembly to store that amount of cash. Maduro thinks this shows that the Colombian allegation of Chávez's financing of the FARC was a lie. Apparently the Minister thinks the whole world operates in cash.

Sounds like the kind of reasoning you overhear on a bus. "En la parada por favor!"

The Agriculture Minister announces the borders have shut down, which is akin to the Environment Minister announcing troop deployments (come to think of it, we may live to see the day). Meanwhile, people in the border say that, while traffic has slowed, it has not closed completely. Today, Chavez's burly Defense Minister said that he has received no orders to close the border.

No policy details are offered, no clear goals are set out, no end date is provided, no two spokespeople can agree. It's all dependent on Chávez's next whim. It's all improvised, it's all a show, unless... well, unless things change.

Como vaya viniendo, vamos viendo.

PS.- The legendary Zapata hits a homerun with his latest cartoon. Thanks to loyal reader Juantxon for pointing it out to us.

March 4, 2008

The kind of war we're going to have...

Quico says: As we all take to hyperventilating about the looming war with Colombia, it's worth pausing to ponder the kind of war footing the country is really on.

Two days ago, President Chávez ordered 10 mechanized batallions to the border in preparation for who-knows-what...but the mobilizations from Caracas ended up getting delayed yesterday because taxi drivers in La Victoria blocked the strategically critical Central Regional Highway for seven hours as they protested the crime wave that grips their town.

March 3, 2008

Now we're cooking without gas

Quico says: One thing I always struggle to convey is the nearly complete divorce between revolutionary discourse and practice, the yawning, widening gap not just between what is said and what is done, but also, more and more, between the staples of the chavista discursive diet and the kinds of issues that actually concern normal people in their day-to-day lives here.

Long the province of the hysterized opposition media, this divorce between media-reality and real-reality has become pervasive in the official media, to the point where serious social problems are basically blacked out (and I use that term advisedly) by a state media focused like a laser-beam on Chávez's highly abstract and mystifying ideological agenda.

A shocking case in point is the deepening supply crisis surrounding cooking gas canisters. Now, unless you live in a third world shantytown, you probably associate portable gas canisters with camping. Not so for the Venezuelan poor. While legally constructed housing gets its cooking gas delivered through a pipe, just like households in rich countries, Venezuelans who live in self-made housing have to buy their cooking gas in heavy metal canisters that they have to wheel into shanties.

Except, due to price controls, they can't. There's a serious cooking gas canister shortage. Reports from some barrios all around Caracas say cooking gas trucks haven't been up there in weeks. The government has pledged to set up Canister filling stations in downtown Caracas, but that's no solution: you're not allowed to take bombonas onto public transport (for obvious safety reasons) and for people living high up on hillside barrios, lugging a heavy canister up the cerro to their houses is never easy and sometimes not really possible. (Think of the elderly.)

Without trucks, there's no gas, and without gas, you can't cook: that's pretty much the situation thousands upon thousands of poor households face today in the Western Hemisphere's premiere energy exporter.

When you think about it, this is really a disaster for poor people: if rice is in short supply, you can always switch to pasta or cornflour, if milk is in short supply you can more or less do without, but if you can't get gas, you can't cook anything. People are having to resort to fire-wood, which they have no safe way of burning and no easy way of obtaining. This is a major problem for people already living in precarious circumstances, the kind of thing that can turn your life pretty much upside down...and, guess what? You won't hear anything about it on state TV beyond generic assurances that don't pan out and never get followed up.

It's not hard to understand why...if VTV, or Vive, or ANTV, TVeS or any of the growing constellation of chavista mouthpieces on the tube were to touch the subject, the people involved would find themselves out of a job pretty fast. The shortage brings up too many questions: not the least of which is why this is happening just after PDVSA spent $125 million to take over Vengas and Tropigas, the leading private sector gas canister distribution companies, precisely to "forestall speculation and hoarding" of gas canisters. (The respective purges apparently have not paid off.)

This morning, thousands of poor urban families in Venezuela woke up to mull the irony: now that, finally, the government has managed to get some staples back on store shelves, they can't cook them. Having milk, which has reappeared on the market, is nice and all. But the iconic "café con leche" you can forget about: there's no way to make coffee without cooking fuel.

But what, I imagine, will piss them off the most is that when they turn on their TV channels, the ones their taxes pay for, the ones that bill themselves constantly as belonging to all Venezuelans, they'll hear obsessive, wall-to-wall coverage of a shootout in some jungle hideout a thousand miles away that bears no relation whatsoever with their ability to fry an empanada.

Quiarrechera, mi hermano.

March 2, 2008

Chavez raises the stakes

Katy says: Hugo Chávez is playing a dangerous game with Colombia, and indirectly, with the US. Today he announced that he was shutting down Venezuela's Embassy in Bogotá, unilaterally plunging diplomatic relations to its worst level since the Gran Colombia split in 1830. He also announced a large buildup of troops alongside the border, and insulted Pres. Uribe for the n-th time, calling him a "criminal" and the head of a "narco-government."

The only reason for this is the murder of the FARC's No. 2, Raúl Reyes in what is apparently Ecuadorean territory. Not even Ecuador has reacted this way.

This is serious stuff. Neither Venezuela nor her interests have been attacked, and they are not at risk of being attacked, and yet the President is acting as if they were. No Venezuelan in their right mind should support this unjustified unilateral rush to war.

Let's hope cool heads prevail and that the Colombian government continues to ignore Chávez. If there is a war, the losers will be the Venezuelan people, specially those who live close to the border, whose day-to-day problems once again take the backseat to Chávez's obsession to see the FARC triumph in Colombia.

February 29, 2008

The opposition's identity problem

Katy says: New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd is not my favorite. Still, I make it a point to read her since a lot of people do. Sometimes, when she's good, she taps into what many people are thinking but haven't really said before.

This week Dowd picked on one of the reasons why Hillary Clinton's campaign seems to be floundering. She claims that Clinton seems desperate to reinvent herself all the time, conveying to the voters in the process that either they don't know her that well or, worse, that she doesn't know who she is or who she wants to be.

For example, she says,

"The fact that Obama is exceptionally easy in his skin has made Hillary almost jump out of hers. She can’t turn on her own charm and wit because she can’t get beyond what she sees as the deep injustice of Obama not waiting his turn. Her sunshine-colored jackets on the trail hardly disguise the fact that she’s pea-green with envy.

After saying she found her “voice” in New Hampshire, she has turned into Sybil. We’ve had Experienced Hillary, Soft Hillary, Hard Hillary, Misty Hillary, Sarcastic Hillary, Joined-at-the-Hip-to-Bill Hillary, Her-Own-Person-Who-Just-Happens-to-Be-Married-to- a-Former-President Hillary, It’s-My-Turn Hillary, Cuddly Hillary, Let’s-Get-Down-in-the-Dirt-and-Fight-Like-Dogs Hillary.

Just as in the White House, when her cascading images and hairstyles became dizzying and unsettling, suggesting that the first lady woke up every day struggling to create a persona, now she seems to think there is a political solution to her problem. If she can only change this or that about her persona, or tear down this or that about Obama’s. But the whirlwind of changes and charges gets wearing."
Time and again, our own opposition politicians judge themselves against the bar of Hugo Chávez. If they are not as charismatic as Chávez, they think that is a problem. If they are not as populist as Chávez, they think that is a problem. If they are not as vulgar as Chávez, they try and make up for it. It's as if they have internalized that Chávez changed the political landscape only in terms of what kind of wrapping makes a candidate electable. They've forgotten how important it is to just be who you are, with no apologies.

Take Manuel Rosales, for example. I think one of the key mistakes that Rosales made (and continues to make) is that he wants to copy some of the things Chávez does in ways that appear non-sincere.

One day he is signing the Carmona decree, the next day he is launching Mi Negra. One day he is denoncing populism, the next day he is handing out bags of food. And while we can quibble about the theoretical pros and cons of a scheme like Mi Negra, two things are clear:
a) it was a half-baked idea; and
b) the voters didn't buy it at all.

It was perceived as an insincere pledge, like Rosales was pandering.

The issue of the use of public funds for personal promotion is a good example of how opposition politicians confuse the voters. This has long been a pet-peeve of mine, and it should be yours as well. It is an egregious show of corruption, one that says "look what I can get away with, in your face!"

Chávez and his minions have long used this tool. But the reason it doesn't backfire on them is that they are completely unapologetic about it.

When Rafael Ramírez, the PDVSA President, was caught in a clandestine video telling state workers that they all had to vote for the President, Chávez didn't apologize. He basically said "that is who I am, deal with it." Attempts to turn this episode against him backfired. In hindsight, this bold-faced strategy was brilliant.

Maracaibo is one of the places where these low-level political tactics are mostly used. Street signs are enormous and they all have some political figure's face painted on them. As you drive through the city, brightly colored red buses pass you by, painted with the faces of the mayor and the President lest you forget who you need to thank at the ballot box for that comfortable ride to work.

I was writing a post in my head railing against this when I realized I couldn't, in all honesty, blast Chávez for this particular offense without bringing to task Manuel Rosales for doing the same thing. True, Rosales' ads are not as pervasive, and his picture is not used as much as his name. Yet that may be more a reflection of the State government's budget constraints than his philosophical respect for institutions.

This is illegal, wasteful, counterproductive and devoid of content. After all, what does "the true strength of the people" actually mean? That Rosales is a strong leader? That he is backed by the people? That bus makes me want to vote less for Rosales, not more.

What this reflects is an identity problem. If Rosales believes that this is an acceptable way of doing politics, then he is not as different from Chávez as he claims to be. If he doesn't believe in it but thinks he has to do it because Chávez does it, then he doesn't really know who he is. Either way, it conveys weakness and insecurity, two traits you don't want in a leader.

Think about that the next time you fly out of Maracaibo. Think about why it is that right there, in the stub for the airport tax you just paid, there is a message from Manuel Rosales wishing you a merry journey.

Think about how long it's been since we had a national politician in the opposition who was truly comfortable in his or her own skin.

February 28, 2008

Leashing the unhinged can be hard work

Katy says: Yesterday, celebrity terrorist and chavista fanatic Lina Ron forced her way into the offices of the Archbishop of Caracas.

There, she demanded that the government cease harrassing chavista subversive groups in the "23 de Enero" projects. She also announced that Globovisión was "a target of the Revolution" - in case you didn't know - and promtply declared that the late Héctor Serrano, a government spy who blew himself up last Sunday as he was innocently setting up a bomb outside the main building of business umbrella-group Fedecámaras, was "a martyr of the Revolution."

I was not surprised by Ms. Ron's latest travails into the public arena. The grande-dame of chavista nomenklatur is so unbalanced, I would have to see her applying for US citizenship or auditioning for Venezuelan Extreme Makeover to be surprised.

The crazyness ensued when Chávez himself phoned his pet TV show "La Hojilla" and promptly denounced Ms. Ron for displaying "revolutionary indiscipline," as if "indiscipline" was a noun in need of a revolutionary adjective. (If all revolutionary things are good, shouldn't "revolutionary indiscipline" be a good thing?)

Chávez also scolded former PSUV congressman Luis Tascón, of Tascón List fame, for denouncing corruption schemes without any evidence of malfeasance. And to top it all off, he publicly berated Bolivarian Circles camped outside opposition TV station Globovisión as being "anarchic" groups that do not respond to anyone, leaving out the fact that he created them in the first place.

Ms. Ron, Mr. Tascón and the Bolivarian Circles are all part of Chávez's inner circle. They have, until now, enjoyed the trust of the President and, more importantly, served as his first line of attack in harrassing everyone from the church to political parties to students. His attempts to put distance himself from them are laughable, and Chávez knows it.

We are used to Chavez's Orwellian-talk being directed at our side, the opposition. But now, in an interesting twist, Chávez appears to be directing the crazy at some of his most loyal followers. He seems to be trying to convince the public that he is reining in his loonies. If only they would obey.

This is a dangerous game, one the public is not going to buy easily. The rift between the moderates (led by Miranda Governor Diosdado Cabello) and the extremists (Ron, Tascón and the Bolivarian circles) in the government seems severe and its consequences unpredictable. Insulting the ladies of Altamira may get you some pots banged in Eastern Caracas, but insulting the Tupamaros or the Franken-bride of the Revolution may well get you shot. This is not the position you want your party to be in when the election you have once again labelled as "crucial" is only a few months away.

But then again, it's all possible in Chávez's Venezuela. The President lamely trying to play the wolf in sheep's clothing is not new, but his belief that it's going to work this time is simply nuts.